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New England Puritanism, as a derivative of Calvin­
ism, was not by nature optimistic, but pessimistic. The 
promises of Christianity belonged only to the elect, or 
to a small portion of mankind, chosen by God prior to.the 
creation of the world. Puritans viewed life on earth as 
merely a trial, after which those worthy ones would enter 
into the Kingdom of God. The majority of mankind, however, 
corrupted by original sin and outside God's benefices, 
were damned to eternal perdition. God predetermined elec­
tion and damnation absolutely, without regard to man's 
earthly activity, as the guilt of original sin tainted the 
elect and the damned equally. This pessimistic theological 
view developed within the scholastic conception of man and 
the universe. God, the absolute sovereign, actively par­
ticipated in the daily workings of the universe} He con­
trolled and moved the heavens, and ordered all events upon 
the earth. Man's trial was only one part of this divine 
plan, not for the glorification of man, but of God. This 
view clouded man and nature in the same pessimistic morass.
1
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By 1760, changes within the New England Puritan 
order created a new role for man in God's scheme, and 
posited a more optimistic religion. Signlficantly, man 
no longer viewed himself only as a passive agent; he now 
accepted an active role in the determination of his future 
state, and was unwilling to leave that decision totally in 
the hands of God, Optimistic Puritanism, like traditional 
Puritanism, rejected man's free will, hut instead modified 
God's control over man. The demands that God judge man 
reasonably tempered the absolute sovereignty of God and 
increased man's own function. Other fundamental Puritan 
tenets required similar re-interpretation for this changed 
attitude to occur. Joseph Bellamy, as well as other New 
Divinity leaders^-, described the presence of sin in the 
world as a blessing, or a benefit, creating greater good 
for man, and not merely his damnation. In this interpre­
tation, the nature of sin had not changed, it was still as 
hateful to God; however, through sin, God displayed His 
divine purposes in the best possible means and elevated 
the general level of holiness and happiness in the world. 
Further, election, released from dependence upon predesti-
•̂The New Divinity clergymen consisted of students 
and followers of Jonathan Edwards. JThese enli/ghtened di­
vines were to dominate New England^'the c/logy in the last 
half of the eighteenth century. They occupied the majority 
of the Puritan pulpits, and in 1795 assumed leadership over 
Yale College. Infra. p. 175.
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nation, became less restrictive, encompassing "all men" 
through a general redemptive call. Taken together, these 
changes within the doctrines of the sovereignty of God, 
original sin, and the redemption of Christ moderated the 
negative nature of Puritanism without severing connection 
with the Calvinist tradition.
These changes in New England theology were not uni­
que , but were part of a general response to the influences 
of the Enlightenment. Primarily a secular movement invol­
ving a revolution in science and psychology, the prevalent 
attitude of the eighteenth century emphasized man’s reason 
and confidence in his ability to comprehend the workings 
of nature. In response to this new intellectual mood, 
Puritanism underwent profound redefinition in order to 
become compatible with the age. New England Puritanism, 
more conservative than other Puritan religious bodies, re­
sisted this redefinition, but following the Great Awaken­
ing duplicated those changes that had occurred in England 
and in other Calvinist countries. Optimism, as a pervading 
religious attitude, developed from this redefinition of 
Puritan principles upon a firm reasonable basis.
In 1689, John Locke wrote An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, describing a reasonable theory of the nature 
of knowledge, that, like Newtonian physics, was based upon 
inductive or empirical proof.2 Post-Reformation scholas­
ticism taught that man’s knowledge expanded by deductive, 
or syllogistic reasoning, which demanded that man held 
universal statements innately. Locke denied that man 
could have innate knowledge, because in the process of 
-learning, one did not discover that which he already 
knew. Man derived all knowledge through observation and 
experience.^ As innate knowledge was not possible, there 
could be no innate laws or universal statements, imprinted 
upon man's original nature. Locke stated that these laws 
were natural, merely hidden from man's understanding be­
cause of his original ignorance.^ Even the idea of God, 
the most natural discovery that man made, was not an in­
nate idea, but one uncovered by human reason.
We have an intuitive knowledge of our exis­
tence and a demonstrative knowledge of God; 
of the existence of anything else, we have 
no other but a sensative knowledge, which 
extends not beyond our senses.5
Thus, Locke described a unity in man's acquisition of know­
ledge that rejected the scholastic separation of modes and
faculties. Reason, imagination, will, and emotion were
\
^John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understand­
ing (New York; E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1961), in two 
volumes. Lockjp wrote the )Essay in 1689# but all copies of 
the first edition were datfed 1690.
3ibid.. I, p. 77. 4Ibld.. I, p. 35.
5lbid.. II, pp. 157-158.
not separate processes of the mind, but conformed to the 
same process of inductive reasoning. With all knowledge 
accessible through sensation, Locke removed the mysteries 
that had surrounded man's comprehension of nature and ac­
cented the role of human experience and the dignity of the 
mind and senses.
In 1695» John Locke directly attacked the tradition 
ov the English Church in The Reasonableness of Christian­
ity, utilizing this change in epistemology. Locke pleaded 
for toleration for the dissenters, or Non-Conformists, that 
the Act of Uniformity in 1662 had denied them.^ He searched 
the scriptures and found that Christ had reduced the com­
mandments of the church to but one article of faith. He 
commanded men only to believe in Him as the Messiah.
This was all the doctrine they /the scrip­
tures/ proposed to be believed? for what 
they taught, as well as our Savior contained 
a great deal more? but that concerned prac­
tice and not belief.7
^The Act of Uniformity revised the English Book of 
Common Prayer, required episcopal ordination (excluded Puri­
tan "presbyterian" ordination) and reserved the celebration 
and administration of the Lord's Supper only to those so 
ordained. The Act, a reaction to Cromwell's Puritan rule 
of England, was a part of the restoration of the Stuart 
monarchy. The clergy were forced to subscribe explicitly 
to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England? those 
who refused were "dissenters" or "Non-Conformists." Norman 
Sykes, From Sheldon to Seeker, Aspects of English Church 
History(Cambridge, England? At the University Press. 1959), 
pp. 5 , and p. 69.
7john Locke, The Works of John Locke, vol. VII1 The
6
Locke argued that men had exceeded the biblical demands by- 
restricting church membership, and hence entrance into the 
Kingdom of God. The Bible required simply belief in Jesus 
Christ as the Son of God.
Following the Newtonian revolution in science, men 
began to argue the merits of natural religion over reve­
lation, or whether man can best understand God through His 
worksj i. e., the universe and natural law, or through His 
word in the scriptures. In scholasticism, no disparity 
existed, but with the new science verifying a mechanistic 
cosmos, some theologians favored proofs demonstrable by 
natural law and reason rather than biblical ones. Locke 
rejected any difference between natural and revealed reli­
gion, as both were reasonable and could not conflict. In 
a like manner, he argued that the doctrinal differences be­
tween Conformists and Non-Conformists were traditional, 
rather than' fundamental. He denied that tradition could 
establish any essential doctrine of the church. ’’Nobody 
can.add to these fundamental articles of faith; nor make 
any other necessary, but what God Himself hath made, and 
declared to be so."8 Locke urged the elimination of all
Reasonableness of Christianity (Aachen, Germany, Scientia 
Verlag, 1963), p. 51.
8Ibid., p. 115.
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church dogma that was not strictly scriptural; -the real­
ization of this simple faith, he felt, would end all doc­
trinal controversy and intolerance. Man's senses could 
judge the fundamental nature of these articles of faith in 
the same manner that his senses revealed natural law.
Locke's writings lent support to a loosely organ­
ized group of divines within the Church of England, known 
as Latitudinarians. Both Locke and these "liberal” theo­
logians opposed enthusiasm and blind traditionalism, and 
sought, by eliminating doctrinal questions, "to preserve 
Christianity while adjusting it to the rational /reasonable/, 
scientific temper."9
The firstfruit of Locke for most people was 
not the scepticism latent in his eplstemology;
It was his own faith in a rational /reasonable/7 
religion, his commonsense revolt against the 
'mysteries' accompanied, however, by his belief 
that Christianity could be both simple andclear.10
Latltudinarian liberalism appeared in England as early as 
1650, influenced by the Dutch Remonstrants ( A r m i n l a n s ,
^Roland N. Stromberg, Religious Liberalism in Eigh­
teenth Century England (London, England; Oxford University 
Press, 1954), p. 20,
10Ibld.. p. 18.
HArminians followed the teachings of Jacobus Armin- 
ius who was condemned at the Synod of Dort in 1618. They 
contradicted traditional Calvinist positions by denying pre­
destination and by teaching free will acting in concert with 
free grace.
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but at the end. of the century, one feature seemed to dom­
inate their demandsj a plea for toleration for the dis­
senters, or broad based membership of the church. The 
opposition to such a move by the Puritan element of the 
church was a matter of course. Any move to broaden church 
membership led to further corruption of the Visible Church, 
through the influx of the baser, more impure elements of 
society. Toleration was antithetical to Puritan principles, 
as the Visible Church must approximate the Invisible 
Church (the elect Kingdom of God) as closely as possible.
The Puritans who came to America in the l620's and l630's 
left England because they abhorred toleration. They sought 
to establish the perfect Christian community, the community
of the elect, and through this experience, purify the 
1 Pchurch. &
Latitudlnarians made no such restrictions regarding 
church membership? they considered all who confessed adher­
ence to the Apostle's Creed as full members.*3 Their pre­
ference for the Apostle's Creed indicated a desire to ac­
commodate both Puritans and liberals within the framework
l^Perry Miller, Errand into the W1lderness (New 
Yorki Harper Torchbooks, 195&). PP. ^-5.
^Norman Sykes, Church and State in England in the 
XVIII Century (Hamden, Connecticut« Archon Books, 1^62 )", 
p. 22, and p. 257.
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of the English Church. The Act of Uniformity, in the Se­
cond Prayer Book, had replaced the Apostle's Creed with 
the Athanasian one.l^ These men of Latitude favored the 
former primarily because it offered a much simpler state­
ment of doctrine than did the one incorrectly attributed 
to St. Athanasius. In their attempts to make theology 
reasonable, they generally followed Locke by reducing 
church doctrine to essentials, in order to minimize' con­
flicts which tended toward heresy.
Their attempt to simplify the foundation of the 
church and .thereby to give it a broader base and greater 
unity had the opposite effect. The Athanasian Creed pos­
tulated a triune God with no part superior, while the 
Apostle's Creed indicated that Christ's position in the 
trinity was subservient to that of the Father. Instead of 
drawing dissenting factions back within the Church of Eng­
land, the emphasis upon the Apostle's Creed rekindled the 
Arian heresy that the Council of Constantinople had set­
tled in 381. Instead of quieting doctrinal questions, the
l^James Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and 
Ethics (New York* Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), vol. 4, 
p. 242, The Athanasian Creed, falsely attributed to St. 
Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria (c. 375)» was formulated 
in the fourth century to oppose the Arian heresy that had 
originated in the Eastern Church. The other Christian creeds 
are the Nicene and the Apostle's? the Roman Catholic adhered 
to the former and Protestant Churches generally adhered to 
the latter, because of its simple doctrine and connection 
with the early church.
10
Latitudinarlans opened further conflicts, and threw English 
theology into turmoil throughout the first half of the 
eighteenth century.
Latltudinarianism did not move into heretical posi­
tions unknowingly. John Tillotson, Edward Stillingfleet, 
and Simon Patrick— typical leaders of these Latitudinarlans 
in the eighteenth century— corresponded with the Dutch 
Remonstrant, Philip van Limborch, ̂--5 Ralph Cudworth, a 
Cambridge Platonist, wrote Limborch in 1674- that the English 
Church,
just as in Noah's ark were all sorts of ani­
mals, are all kinds of Protestantsi Calvin­
ists, Remonstrants, and.I believe even Socin- 
ians, all dwelling here, united with no appar­
ent discord in one and the same communion.1°
The dissenting Arian movement grew out of this seventeenth
century diversity, but was more directly a result of the
Latitudinarlan preference for the Apostle's creed. The
1^Philip van Limborch, a leading Arminian theologian, 
held a professorship at the Remonstrant college at Amsterdam 
from 1668 until his death in 1712, His most important works 
included A Compleat System or Body of Divinity (1686) and 
A History of the Inquisition (1692). Samuel Macauley Jack­
son, editor, The Schraff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious 
Knowledge (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1959)*
vol. 6 , p. 490. Norman Sykes states that the Dutch Armin- 
ians and the Cambridge Platonists shared similar aims and 
a vigorous correspondence from 1667 to 1687. Sykes, From 
Sheldon to Seeker, pp. 142-143.
l^Sykes, From Sheldon to Seeker, p. 146. Sykes 
states that "the line dividing the Cambridge Platonists and 
their Latitudinarlan successors is devious and difficult 
to draw. Their relationship indeed was one of filiation."
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actual heresy originated with Dr. Samuel Clarke's Scrlpture- 
Doctrlne of the Trinity, published in 1712. Clarke, obvi­
ously Influenced by John Locke, demonstrated the necessity 
of Christian principles conforming with reason.^-? Clarke 
did not deny the divinity of Christ, but felt that both 
the scriptures and common sense taught that the Son was 
subordinate to the Father. He demonstrated the contrariety 
of the trinity expressed in the Athanasian Creed to that 
in the Bible. Clarke's chief opponent, Daniel Waterland, 
defended the orthodox position on the trinity. Their con­
troversy climaxed in 1719» at the Salter's Hall Synod, 
with the split between Presbyterians and Independents over 
the trinity. Of the English dissenters, the Presbyterians, 
who followed Dr. Clarke, became identified with liberty of 
opinion and laxity of church doctrine.^-®
By mid-century, the division within the English 
Church was greater than at the Revolutionary Settlement of 
1689. Between 1?30 and 1750, all the major doctrines of 
the Christian Church came under scrutiny, resulting in the 
realization that all of them were not purely scriptural.^ 
The Arlan controversy in England during the eighteenth
Hay Colllgan, The Arlan Movement In England 




century differed substantially from that of the fourth 
century. The promoters of Arianism intended to liberate 
theology from predestination and election by reasonably 
interpreting the scriptures and extending the Protestant 
principle of private judgment.2® Latitudinarianism had 
challenged traditional Puritanism, and found the latter 
wanting in the eighteenth century.
These changes that took place in science, psychol­
ogy, and religion did effect New England theology, although 
Puritanism there exhibited greater solidarity than in Eng­
land. For over a century, reliance upon the covenant or 
federal theory of theology dominated New England Puritan­
ism. The covenant was the basis both of church polity and 
of social theory; God covenanted individually with the re­
generate person (the covenant of grace) and with the soci­
etal group as a whole. According to Perry Miller, "God 
settles the social terms with a band of men, which there­
upon becomes committed, as a political entity, to a specif­
ically enunciated political program,"2 -̂ Rigid Calvinism 
had demanded absolute and predetermined election, but the 
Puritan covenant system tempered this rigidity through this
2QIbld.. p. 146.
^Perry Miller, The New England Mind; From Colony 
to Province (Boston* Beacon PressT•1953)t p. 21.
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societal or national covenant, Man's preparation for sal­
vation, or endeavoring to perfect external behavior, could 
not gain his personal salvation, but did fulfill the na­
tional terms of the covenant. Because even the elect had 
no definite assurance of their future state, this inter-, 
pretation gave a unity of purpose to society and impeded 
the splintering into separate groups and competing inter­
ests, "All men could be called upon to prepare themselves, 
and so to exert themselves toward exactly that obedience 
required by the nation's covenant,"22 Preparation, oper­
ating without the experience of saving grace, resulted from 
human volition; man turned towards God and through this vol­
untary act, obtained an awareness of his helpless and hope­
less condition,23
Roland Stromberg, in discussing the widespread ac­
ceptance and approval of Newtonian science stated;
By 1721 Cotton Mather of Massachusetts had 
accepted the new science as Christianity's 
handmaiden on behalf of what was surely the 
Western world's most conservative religious 
body.24
Stromberg correctly assessed the conservativism of New Eng-
22Ibld.. p, 56.
23Edmund S. Morgan, Visible Saints; The History of 
a Puritan Idea (New York; New York University Press, 1963), 
pp. 68-69.
2^Stromberg, Religious Liberalism, p, 22.
14- .
land theology, but underestimated the extent that theo­
logians there had adopted Lockean and Newtonian thought. 
Perry Miller noted that in 1700 Cotton Mather published 
Reasonable Religion, and followed with tracts entitled 
Reason Satisfied and Faith Established and A Man of Rea­
son; Experience Mayhew in 1720 wrote A Discourse Shewing 
that God Dealeth with Men as Reasonable Creatures; and 
Benjamin Coleman announced as well that God Deals with us 
as Reasonable Creatures in 1723. Further, the sermons of 
Joseph Sewall, Thomas Prince, and Thomas Foxcroft "bur­
geoned with similar tributes to the charm of reason."25 
These principle Boston clerics had sought to incorporate 
the Lockean and Newtonian emphasis upon reason within the 
spirit of the church.
New England divines, while conceiving the world 
order in Aristotelian terms, never completely made their 
theology dependent upon scholastic science. For the most 
part, the shift to Newtonian physics created no great 
change in their formal system of ideas.2^ They merely 
adopted the Newtonian world order, and utilized it in ex­
actly the same manner to confirm their theological proposi­
tions, and to defend the New England covenant system.
^^Miller, The New England Mind, p. 4-17. 
26Ibid. . p. 4-39.
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Miller stated that these so-called Matherian conservatives
had learned to accept, "willingly or unwillingly, an array
of ideas simply incompatible with their federalism."2?
For at least a quarter century, New England Puritans made
no attempt to reconcile the tension between the new science
and the rigidity of covenant theology. New England Puritan
ism had not experienced any major conflict like the Puritan
Revolution in England. As a consequence, rigid doctrinal
groupings had not developed,.so that the Latitudinarlan
controversy had made much less of an impact. Not until the
Great Awakening, from 1739 to 17^5. did the church undergo
widespread schism, and allow Latitudinarlan principles to '
disrupt the New England system.
Jonathan Edwards, in the following excerpt from a
sermon that he delivered in 17^1 at New Haven, described
the spirit of the Great Awakening that had just swept
through New England.
The Spirit that is at work, takes off person's 
minds from the vanities of the world, and en­
gages them in a deep concern about eternal hap­
piness...It awakens men's consciences, and makes 
them sensible of the dreadfulness of God's anger, 
and causes in them a great desire and earnest 
care and endeavor to obtain his f a v o r . 28
27lbld., p, 460.
n O Jonathan Edwards, "The Distinguishing Marks of a 
Work of the Spirit of God," The Works of President Edwards. 
Sereno Dwight, editor (New York! Leavitt & Alien, 1854), 
p. 5^6.
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This spirit of experiential religion emphasized, renewal, 
or the regeneration of the purity of the Apostolic Church. 
This spirit awakened within the sinner both the under­
standing of the depth and enormity of his sin, and the 
emotional beauty of God and His divine plan. The revival 
uncovered man's depravity, rather than optimistic promises 
of universal salvation; yet, as Edwards noted, the spirit 
of renewal awakened a general concern for salvation above 
concerns of this world. This reformation emphasized piety 
and the personal relationship of man to God through the 
conversion experience. The Great Awakening signalled the 
end of a long process of depersonalization of religion that 
had accelerated in the early part of the eighteenth century, 
and had removed the vital spirit from Christianity.^9
The reform of the Great Awakening, like all reli­
gious reformations, was no simple process. Man cannot 
easily turn to a different spirit or ideal, when he is tied 
to a particular institutional framework. And the Puritan
^Edwin Gaustad, The Great Awakening in New England 
(New York: Harpers & Brothers, 1957) i P. 13. Gaustad
cites the Saybrook Platform of 1707/8, as the beginnings 
of the movement away from pietism towards rigidity and for­
malism. C. C. Goen, Revivalism and Separatism in New Eng­
land (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 3» des-
cribes similar declension in New England Puritanism with 
the beginnings of separation between Massachusetts and Con­
necticut churches dating from the Saybrook Platform.
17
Church, as a social association had to operate institution­
ally. Reform can seek the simple spirituality of early 
Christianity, as the New England Puritans did during the 
Great Awakening, but expressing that spirituality within 
an institutional framework frustrates that simple ideal.
The reformation of the Great Awakening, then, consisted of 
two separate, but not necessarily antagonistic, processes. 
The first related directly to the spirit of renewal, or 
the individual "reform" of Christianity. This process,.as 
in the case of millenial reform, looks to an ideal spiritu­
ality in the future, rather than in the past.30 The spirit 
of renewal, with its emphasis upon personal piety and moral 
purity, was institutionally careless, and in truth could 
not be completely institutionalized. Renewal led to the 
second phase of reform, or to "re-form" the institution of 
the Church to incorporate the spirit of renewal or the in­
dividualized reform. Institutionalized reform was more 
traditional, and as a consequence, thwarted the full impact 
of renewal.
30por discussion of the Puritan historical view, 
see Wiliam C. Eamon, "Kingdom and Church in New England, 
Puritan Eschatology from John Cotton to Jonathan Edwards," 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Montana, 1970), pp. 
4-7, and passim.
31For further discussion of "reform ideas" see Ger­
hard Ladner, The Idea of Reform? Its Impact on Christian 
Thought and Action"in the Age of the Fathers (Cambridge! 
Harvard University Press, 1959)'» "JeffreyBurton Russell,
18.
New England Puritanism, through the Great Awaken­
ing, had experienced the first phase of reform prior to 
17^5* The reform after 17̂ +5 was institutional, concerned 
less with revival, than with incorporating that spiritual 
reform within a doctrinal framework. The revivalists, es­
pecially the enthusiastic lay preachers during the Awak­
ening, had attacked the unconverted clergy and created di­
vision within the church structure over questions of enthu­
siasm and itineracy. Exacerbation of these conflicts led 
to schism, or separation within the Puritan Church by 17^2, 
and led ultimately to the development of three doctrinal 
groupings.32 This schism was the result of the attempt 
to recapture or renew the spontaniety of pietism, or reli­
gion of the heart33. the doctrinal separations that followed 
were the workings of the institutionalization of that piety. 
In the context of this second phase of reformation, Puritan-
A History of Medieval Christianity, Prophecy and Order (New 
York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968 ) , and Samuel H.
Miller and G. Enerst Wright, editors, Ecumenical Dialogue 
at Harvard (Cambridgei Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 
330-3^3. Each of these authors dealt with the tension in 
Christianity that causes a' continual process of reformation, 
either of the individual or of the institution. Each em­
ployed different terminology to describe this tension:
Ladner contrasted "renewal and reform," The Ecumenical Dia­
logue , "reform and re-form" and Russell, the antagonistic 
processes of "prophecy and order."
32xnfrat p. 32,
33Gaustad, The Great Awakening in New England, p. 16.
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ism fully severed its reliance upon scholastic rationalism 
in favor of the reasonable epistemology of the eighteenth 
century. The repudiation of scholasticism, along with this 
reform of order, changed the relationship between God and 
man, and created a new Puritanism, iiarkedly different from 
that held before the Great Awakening.
CHAPTER II
THE DOCTRINES, OF GLORIOUS GRACE. UNFOLDED. DEFENDED.
AND PRACTICALLY IMPROVEDt THE ARMINIAN 
‘ CHALLENGE TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD
Optimistic Puritanism, a phenomena of the 1760's, 
came not as a denial of Puritan principles, but was the 
natural outgrowth of a reasonable religion, immersed in 
eighteenth century natural law and order. Traditionally, 
Puritanism, a pessimistic creed, exhibited optimism, or 
the promise of a better world, only for those whom God 
had predestined to salvation, and only in life after 
death. The majority of mankind, depraved and corrupted 
by original sin, deserved and received eternal damna­
tion. Essential to this pessimistic scheme was the fed­
eral or covenant theology, which established a parallel 
between sin's entrance into the world and man's deliver­
ance from that sin. God covenanted twice with mankind's 
federal heads: first with Adam in the covenant of works,
and second with His son Jesus Christ in the covenant of 
grace. Sin entered the world by one man, Adam, just as 
salvation entered by the adherence of one man to the 
moral law, Christ, or the second Adam.
20
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As Adam was the root of sin, death, and 
condemnation to all his natural seed, so 
Christ is the root of holiness, righteous­
ness, and life to his spiritual seed.l
Traditional Puritanism depended upon the doc­
trine of original sin, or the belief that all mankind 
shared the sin of Adam through imputation, which made 
man naturally corrupt and sinful, incapable of perform­
ing good works. Correlated to the doctrine of original 
sin were the doctrines of predestination and redemption 
by free grace. Predestination required God's perfect 
foreknowledge of Adam's fall prior to creation. Conse­
quently, God, through His absolute grace, chose some men 
to salvation, and damned the majority of mankind, al­
though the same pollution of sin tinged the elect as it 
did the damned. In this conception of God the sovereign, 
the absolute ruler, no other power in the world'limited 
His judgment or will.
Doctrinally, this view had changed very little 
since the early seventeenth century; however, conditions 
by the mid-eighteenth century had changed drastically.
In America, the clerical leadership had avoided fundamen­
tal doctrinal changes to a greater degree than in any 
other Calvinist country. New England orthodoxy institu-
^■Isacc Chandler, The Doctrines of Glorious Grace, 
Unfolded, Defended, and Practically Improved (Boston; S"? 
Kneeland and T. Green, 17^4), P. 9*
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2ted. changes, like the Half-Way Covenant and Stoddardism , 
to preserve and maintain their social control, and to in­
crease membership, but these were institutional or cere­
monial changes. Voluntarism^ increased man's volition 
in preparation for salvation, but retained covenant theo­
logy and the sovereignty of God. Thus New England Puri­
tanism, without incorporating any vital doctrinal changes, 
occupied a unique and unstable position in the eighteenth 
century. New England theologians had not harmonized cov­
enant theology and the new science,* they avoided conflict 
between the scholastic theological system and Lockean and 
Newtonian thought because of the clerical solidarity in 
New England, No major challenge to this unity had occur­
red prior to the Great Awakening in the 17^0's. When 
that disruption did occur, the English heretical ideas 
infected New England and the attack upon Puritan ortho­
doxy there began.
The schism in American Puritanism created by the 
Great Awakening was not initially a doctrinal split, for
^The Half-Way Covenant allowed baptism for chil­
dren whose parents had received baptism, but had not ex­
perienced conversion. The Synod of 1662 in Massachusetts 
extended the criteria of the external covenant so that the 
third generation Puritans were not excluded from the Church. 
Stoddardism, begun in the Connecticut Valley by Solomon 




in the revival, churches separated over the spirit of re­
newal and fear of an unconverted ministry, and not over 
theological positions. As early as 17^2, the midpoint in 
the revival, the Boston clergy had divided into pro­
revival new lights and anti-revival old lights over whether 
or not the revival was the "work of God.’,ij/ Charles Chauncy, 
one of the first of the Boston clerics to oppose the re­
vival, did so over questions of itineracy and ehthusiasm, 
and not theology.? In 17^2-17^3* Chauncy in Seasonable 
Thoughts on the State of Religion and Jonathan Edwards in 
Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival in New Eng­
land clashed over the nature of the revival and of true 
religion. Chauncy claimed that an enlightened mind, and 
not affections (emotions) judged truth through "reason­
able solicitude," not "censoriousness, separations, itin-
£erants, and frenzies."0 The revival, according to Chauncy, 
was not the work of God, but in fact, the work of the
% .  C. Goen, Revivalism and Separatism, pp. 31- 
33, and 36-39. Goen states that the concern of the clergy 
over the evangelical issues exceeded that of doctrinal 
differences at the onset of separation. Immediately after 
17^3 » separatist protest concentrated on the standard of 
church membership.
^Clifford K. Shipton, Sibley*s Harvard Graduatest 
Biographical Sketches of those who Attended Harvard College 
(Bostonj Massachusetts Historical Society, 1958)* vol. 6 ,
p . .
^Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards (New Yorki William 
Sloane Associates, 19%), p. 176.
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Devil. This debate exacerbated the differences between 
pro-revival and anti-revival clergymen and led to a 
wider schism. The spirit of renewal and questions re­
garding the "works of God" created the first significant 
chink in New England theological solidarity. The min­
istry no longer presented a united front against doc­
trinal errors? now they would have to come to grips with 
religious changes that had occurred throughout the Pro­
testant world..
In the period after 17^5* three doctrinal groups 
emerged from the revival experience and became clearly 
discernible* radical new lights who tended towards Anti- 
nomlanism, liberal old lights who tended towards Arminian- 
ism, and a middle group of pro-revivalists who avoided 
either heresy and sought to re-intrepret Calvinism and 
make it compatible with the new age.? The history of New
?Goen, Revivalism and Separatism, p. 3kn. Alan 
Heimert, Religion and the American Mind (Cambridge* Har­
vard University Press, 196$), states "there were in sub­
stance only two parties on the American religious scene 
in the period after the Great Awakening. Generally speak­
ing one consisted of the opponents of the revival, and 
the other of its advocates...." (p. 3.) Further, he 
states that these groups represented either "reason." Or 
"piety." While it is true that there could be no middle 
ground over the revival experience, one either supported 
or opposed it, the moderate leaders themselves felt their 
median position. Jonathan Edwards in Religious Affections 
and Joseph Bellamy in True Religion Delineated saw the 
religious reformation endangered by the activities of the 
radical new lights as well as the opposition from the lib-
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England Puritanism from 17^5 to 1763t unveiled a reforma­
tion of order, and institutional "re-forming” of the Puri­
tan Church to incorporate the spirit of renewal. Such a 
reformation dealt with those questions that had been un­
important or ignored during the revival, and led ulti­
mately to a redefined Puritanism. This second phase of 
the reformation had two major goalsi to incorporate re­
newal into the institutional structure of the church, and 
to re-establish New England theological solidarity. As 
a consequence, clergymen turned their attention to those 
questions, raised by the Enlightenment, of human liberty 
and natural law, and to the English heresies. The con­
flicts that developed led to a new theology, doctrinally 
tied to the earlier New England Puritanism, yet conformed 
to the changing American experience at the end of the 
colonial period.
Immediately following the Awakening, the differ­
entiation of these groupings began. The first to fall 
out was, quite naturally, the old light liberals who 
tended toward Arminianlsm, These were primarily anti- 
revivalists who opposed experiential religion, and after
eral old lights. Thus, from the standpoint of the contin­
uing reformation after 17^5 , three clearly discernible 
doctrinal groups developed. Two of these groups supported 
the revival, and the moderate group represented a balance 
between "piety" and "reason," denigrating neither.
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the schism, adopted the Latitudinarian attitudes that in­
vaded New England, Essentially, the problem after 17^5 
was the same that had confronted the revivalists, as well 
as those during the sixteenth century Reformationi "What 
must I do to be saved?" However, Newtonian science and 
Lockean epistemology created a new framework for its ans­
wer; the elevation of human reason caused man in the 
eighteenth century to doubt that the answer rested in the 
sovereignty of God completely. English Latitudinarians 
had stimulated similar disturbances in the half-century 
prior to the Awakening and had laid the foundation for 
this attack upon Puritan orthodoxy.
In America, Arminianism had already infected the 
clergy of the Church of England, especially the mission­
ary wing of the church, the Society for the Propagation 
of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG). The Church of Eng­
land, at the time of the English Reformation, had only 
nominally accepted the doctrines of Calvinism, and in the 
eighteenth century, many in the church recanted these te­
nets. Anglican Arminianism taught universal salvation, 
free will acting in harmony with free grace, and had
Qdenied absolute predestination and original sin. This
®Sir Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought . 
in the Eighteenth Century (New Yorki Harcourt, Brace, 
and World7 inc., 1962), a reprint of the 1876 edition in
27
blatant denial of Puritan dogma indicated the denigra­
tion of the workings of God and the elevation of man's 
own part in the affair of salvation. The emphasis upon 
human reason and free will negated the very basis for ex­
periential religion which demanded man's passivity in the 
actual process of salvation? man prepared himself to re­
ceive the workings of God, but this preparation did not 
insure that he would be saved. Thus, the doctrine pro­
posed by these Anglicans offered a greater challenge than 
the elevation of works over grace. The emphasis of "rea­
son" over "piety" challenged the whole process of revival 
and religion of the heart. Puritan resistance in the 
period after the Great Awakening became more vital than 
in the period preceeding it, because of the schism. In 
this second phase of the reform the Puritan clergy dis­
covered that a retreat to the traditional interpretations 
of the Bible was no longer an adequate response to doc­
trinal attacks.
The conflict between Anglican and Puritan clergy­
men predated the Awakening by at least two decades, in­
tensifying after the revolt to Anglicanism by Samuel 
Johnson, Timothy Cutler, and several of their Yale col-
two volumes. Stephen provides a good survey of the Lati- 
tudinarian influences upon the Church of England. For a 
more recent monograph, see Norman Sykes, From Sheldon to 
Seeker.
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leagues in the 1720's.9 The opposition that followed the
Yale apostasy centered on church form and practice, rather
than upon doctrine. In the specific debate between John
Beach and Jonathan Dickinson that began in the 1730's,
one can discern two separate phases. Only in the second
phase that followed the Great Awakening and matched the
reform of order, did Beach and Dickinson include doctrl-
10nal questions in their debate. John Beach opened this 
phase in 17^5 with a sermon entitled Eternal Life is 
God's Free Gift. This sermon embodied the heretical writ­
ings of Daniel Whitby and Thomas Chubb, two prominent 
English Latitudinarians, and threatened the workings of 
the revival.
^Samuel Johnson, Samuel Johnson, President of 
Kings Collegei His Career and Writings, vol. li Auto­
biography and Letters, edited by Herbert and Carol 
Schneider (New Yorki 1929)» p. 13.
Jonathan Dickinson, The Vanities of Human In­
stitutions in the Worship of God (New Yorkt John Peter 
Zenger, 173^). and John Beach, A Vindication of the Wor­
ship of God, According to the Church of England from the 
Aspersions Cast upon it (New Yorki William Bradford,
1 7 3 6 " ) The Presbyterian, Jonathan Dickinson, accused the 
Anglican Church of denying the Reformation and turning to 
Romish practices, specifically with its liturgy which de­
monstrated man's vanity in worship, (p. 8 .) The Anglican, 
John Beach, responded that they placed no "religion” in 
institutional ceremonies such as the liturgy, but were 
merely means of placing "order” in worship, (p. 13.) The 
fear of the Puritans, as expressed by Dickinson, resulted 
from the apparent rejection of the sixteenth century Re­
formation by the Anglicans? this natural antagonism ex­
isted throughout the Colonial period.
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John Beach had. not defected from orthodoxy with 
the initial group in 1722, but belonged to the second 
wave of Anglican converts. As an undergraduate at Yale 
College, he came under the influence of Samuel Johnson, 
his tutor, but upon graduation in the year of the apos­
tasy, he remained within the Puritan fold. Beach stayed 
in close association with Johnson for nearly a decade be­
fore he actually converted. He entered the ministry at 
the Congregational Church in Stratford, Connecticut, 
where Johnson served as an Anglican missionary. In 1724, 
Beach moved to Newton, Connecticut, as minister of the 
Congregational Church there. His close friendship with 
Johnson eventually led to conflict between Beach and his 
congregation. In 1732, convinced that he had strayed, 
Beach's congregation voted his removal because of his 
"defection to e p i s c o p a c y . F o l l o w i n g  his dismissal, 
he Journeyed to England and received Anglican ordination 
and commission as a SPG missionary. In September of that 
same year, Beach returned to Newton and established an
Anglican Church there, and later another one in Redding,
; 1 ?Connecticut.
1^Franklin B. Dexter, Biographical Sketches of 
the Graduates of Yale with Annals of the College History 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, lHbjjj, p. 24-0.
11Ibld., p. 240.
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In 17*1-5, before the congregation in Newton, Beach
preached Eternal Life is God's Free Gift, using as his
text Romans 6i23#^ He asserted the concert of free will
and free grace, a position that Puritanism traditionally
denied._ Beach argued that in fact there was no contra-
dictiom man's salvation "began, continued, and ended
1 Llby the infinite mercy and free grace of God."A There­
fore, without grace, man could not effect his own salva­
tion through good works, and the action of his will.
Beach merely expanded God's free grace, so that it was 
not confined to an elect number of saints, but "compre­
hends the race of Adam. "̂ -5 The crux of this scheme of 
salvation hinged upon conditional grace and not absolute 
grace. Damnation occurred not from a lack of grace, but 
the failure of man to improve the grace that God gave, 
"...everyone of us Christians belong to the election of 
God's free grace? yet notwithstanding, we shall perish, 
if we don’t walk worthy of God's electing’ love."1^ Also,
13"For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of
God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord."
l^John Beach, A Sermon Shewing that Eternal Life
is God's Free Gift. Bestowed upon Men according to their 
Moral Behavior and that Free Grace and Free Will Concur
in the Affair of Man's Salvation (Newport; Printed by the 
Widow Franklin, 17^5)» P. 5*
15lbld.. p. 6 . l6Ibld.. pp. 13-1*K
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man’s conversion "is of grace; and if we remain wicked, 
it is because we abuse grace, when we could do otherwise. 
In advocating the doctrine of conditional election, Beach 
denied Puritan irresistible grace and predestination. 
Puritans stipulated that grace was irresistible, or that 
God's elect could not refuse His saving grace. Beach 
countered that if grace were irresistible, then man could 
not avoid salvation, whereas free grace allowed a choice. 
Man could work with God and gain salvation, or he could 
turn and work against God's plan and receive damnation. 
Free will placed the responsibility for salvation or dam­
nation upon the individual; irresistible grace placed the 
responsibility upon God.^9 if man did not have free will, 
then the blame for sin reflected back to God, fori
if we did sin by necessity, our consciences 
would never reproach us for any wickedness; 
nor could we be justly punished, by God or 
man for crimes that we could not a v o i d . 20
Beach's synthesis of free will and free grace, if
l?Ibld., p. 20. l8Ibld.. p. 24.
■^Arminians, following the example of Daniel Whit­
by, argued that the Puritan scheme of redemption and ori­
ginal sin placed the blame for sin upon God and not man.
They reasoned that if man were not a moral agent, and some
other power determined their actions, then they acted nec­
essarily and without free choice. The blame for sin, then, 
belonged to the cause, or author of sin, and not to the 
bound agent.
^°Beach, Eternal Life is God's Free Gift, pp. 22-23.
32
allowed, would disrupt the entire Puritan scheme, speci­
fically the covenant or federal relationship of Adam and 
Christ. Universal redemption and universal free grace, 
as proposed by Beach, limited God's sovereignty. If the 
Puritans conceded either doctrine, then man's will and 
not God’s sovereignty determined election. Thus, in this 
scheme of salvation, the Arminians viewed God's authority 
as subservient to man's will and human liberty. Beach 
argued that man must have grace, and that grace preceded 
any workings of man's will, but man's will made the final 
determination whether the individual received salvation 
or damnation.
Soon after Beach wrote this pamphlet, Samuel 
Johnson joined in the attack upon Puritan orthodoxy. Now 
the two "ablest defenders of the Church /Anglican/ in the 
colonies combined against the Calvinist view of redemp­
tion."21 Johnson was one of the oldest and most promin­
ent dissenters in Americaj when he published his Letter 
From Arlstocles to Authades. he had actively opposed 
Puritanism for nearly three decades.22 Johnson had re-
21Dexter, Biographical Sketches, p. 240.
22The same year as Johnson's graduation from Yale 
College, 171^, the college library received the Dummer 
Collection which included books by John Locke, Isaac New­
ton, Daniel Whitby, Isaac Barrow, and John Tillotson, "how­
ever, few had any curiosity to consult these fine writers
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mained after his graduation at Yale as a tutor from l?l6 
to 1719i the same years that the English heretical ideas 
infected his doctrinal view. After journeying to England 
in 1722, and receiving ordination as a SPG missionary, he 
returned to Connecticut as minister of the Anglican 
Church at Stratford in 1723.2^ Johnson remained at Strat' 
ford until April 15, 1754» when he became the first pres­
ident of Kings College (now Columbia University)
Johnson anonymously entered the debate in 1745 
with A Letter From Aristocles to Authades. Concerning the 
Sovereignty and Promises of God. Johnson's presence 
greatly Improved the position of Beach, and gave the 
Anglicans greater persuasiveness. His careful reasoning 
complemented the hot tempered rhetoric of B e a c h . Sam­
except Messrs.. Cutler, Eliot, Hart, Whittelsey, Wethmore, 
Browne, and he /Johnson/. Johnson, Autobiography and 
Letters, p. 7. Most of the individuals Johnson listed 
journeyed to England in 1722, and received Anglican ordin­
ation. The English clerics warmly received the defectors, 
and included with ordination an honorary D.D. for Rector 
Timothy Cutler, and a M.A. for Johnson. Later, in 1743. 
Oxford University honored Johnson with a D.D.
2^Ibid., p. 13. The situation at Stratford was 
unique, as approximately thirty families, recently arrived 
from England, petitioned the SPG for a minister. This pro­
cedure lacked precedence in Connecticut, and released John­
son from proselytization in establishing a congregation.
2^William B. Sprague, Annals of the ‘American Pul­
pit, vol. 4 1 Episcopalians (New York; Arno Press and the 
New York Times, 1969), p. 55,
^Throughout the controversy Beach resorted to vin-
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uel Johnson claimed that the doctrine of absolute sov­
ereignty contradicted the attributes and nature of God as 
the moral governor of the world, and established God as 
a judge, and not as an absolute sovereign. He argued 
that the Puritan doctrine placed God's creatures under a 
"necessity of being good or bad, and leaves no room for 
either virtue or vice, praise or blame, reward or punish­
m e n t " ^  He felt, therefore, that theologians must distin­
guish between God the benefactor, the bestower of talents 
and favors upon man, and God the judge, the arbiter of 
man's use of those talents and favors.
Johnson granted that God exercised His decrees 
absolutely and personally, but man's life was only tem­
porary and probationary. Therefore, he contended, an ab­
solute disposition previously made, or predestination, 
could not decide the condition of men, but rather God de­
cided according to the improvement and use that the in-
dictlve attacks upon the Puritan clergy} e.g., "Thus by 
your stupid interpretation of Holy Scripture...you have 
presented /our blessed savior7 as being of the same mal­
icious spirit and temper with infernal spirits, who re­
joice in man's wickedness and damnation." John Beach, 
God's Sovereignty and His Universal Love to the Souls of 
Men Reconciled (Bostoni Rogers and Fowle, 1747), p. 12.
2^Samuel Johnson, A Letter From Arlstooles to Au- 
thades, Concerning the Sovereignty and Promises of God 
(Boston* T. Fleet, 1745), pp. 1-2,
2?Ibld., p. 6 .
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dividual made of the talents that God freely gave. John­
son pleaded for a reasonable God, one who sat in judgment 
of men as moral agents, rather than a sovereign, whose
divine decrees conformed to no logical or consistent plan.
Johnson arrived at this view by surveying the ef­
fects of God's absolute sovereignty on those who received 
damnation without their activity as moral agents. He ar­
gued that man's will could work in harmony with God's, 
but only if both complied with the laws of reason? God 
could not be arbitrary and despotic in determining sal­
vation. If man acted by necessity, however, and his ac­
tions did not determine his eternal condition, then man 
lacked responsibility for his actions and could not sin.
If we suppose our actions immediately de­
pendent on the will of God, we must sup­
pose them necessary as to u s , and conse­
quently that we are not to blame for them, 
being not properly moral agents, but acted 
and necessitated in what we do? which is 
absurd as it makes God the author of oursins.28
These arguments against Puritan principles origi­
nated in England with Thomas Chubb, Daniel Whitby, and 
Samuel Clarke. Beach and Johnson served only as agents, 
bringing the beginnings of the Enlightened spirit in theo­
logy in America. The Anglican Arminian position centered
28ibid.. p. 12.
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upon man's free will, or moral agency. To deny free will 
placed the onus of sin upon God, and therefore was blasphe­
mous and degrading. The doctrine of free will contradic­
ted the doctrines of original sin and predestination, so 
that the latter had to be tempered or removed from the 
Christian redemptive scheme. This demand by the Arminians 
undercut God's sovereignty and challenged Puritan federal 
theology. God’s will and man's will worked in harmony, 
with the individual Christian's eternal state determined 
by man’s activity alone. The Arminians denied emotional 
religion and the work of God upon man's heart and there­
fore, dismissed the spirit of renewal that had just swept 
through New England.
Jonathan Dickinson took up the Arminian challenge. 
Before the Great Awakening, he had denounced, as danger­
ous, the practices of the Church of England, and saw the 
threat now posed to Puritanism as similar. Dickinson's 
opposition to Anglican Church practices stemmed from 
their denial of the sixteenth century Reformation and 
obvious popery. In 17^5 they endangered the reform ex­
perience that continued after the revival? the elevation 
of reason at the expense of piety created a sterile, un­
emotional religion. Dickinson began this extended contro­
versy with Anglican clergymen at the time of the Yale 
Apostasy? his first defense of Presbyterian ordination
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came in 1723.^ Until his death in 17^7» he remained the 
constant opponent of those who denied religion of the 
heart, and a proponent of the Protestant Beformation and 
revivalism. Thomas Foxcroft, delivering his funeral ora­
tion, declared*
It may be doubted whether, with the single 
exception of the elder Edwards, Calvinism 
has ever found an abler or more efficient 
defender in this country than JonathanDickinson.30
Jonathan Dickinson's Vindication of God's Sover­
eign Free Grace (1746) confronted the Arminian arguments 
of John Beach, Samuel Johnson, and Henry Caner. 33- He 
launched a direct attack upon their logic, but relied most 
heavily upon scripture and tradition to refute the Armin­
ian principles. His defense embodied the traditional 
Puritan arguments defending the sovereignty of God and
2^xn 1723 Dickinson answered John Checkley's A Mod­
est Proof of the Order and Government Settled by Christ, in 
the Church with A Defense of Presbyterian Ordination. Leo­
nard J. Trinterud, The Forming of an American Tradition 
(Philadelphia1 The Westminister Press, 1949), p. 230.
3°Dexter, Biographical Sketches, p. 49.
33-Henry Caner's tract did not conform to the type 
of approach revealed in those by Beach and Johnson, but 
centered over a specious argument whether Christ directed 
the Sermon on the Mount to the multitude or to His disci­
ples. Caner favored the latter, which he said taught the 
elevation of works over grace. Henry Caner, The True Na- 
ure and Method of Christian Preaching, Examined and Stated 
In a Discourse (Newport» Printed by the Widow Franklin, 
17^-5)» P. 8 # and pp. 10-11.
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appeared more a part of the seventeenth century than the 
eighteenth. This did not mean that Dickinson had ignored 
Locke and Newton, but indicated the rapid change that 
was occurring within New England theology after the Awak­
ening. Dickinson's major concern was to retain covenant 
theology, which had grown out of scholastic thought and 
not the new science. Thus, his defense comprised scrip­
tural and traditional arguments, and failed to answer 
definitively the questions posed in this reasonable age.
Beach had denied predestination, taught univer­
sal redemption by Christ, free will cooperating with free 
grace, and the possibility of the regenerate falling from 
g r a c e . T h e s e  statements conflicted directly with the 
orthodox view represented by the declarations of the 
Synod of Dort. This Synod, composed of representatives 
of all the reformed churches, convened in November, 1618, 
at Dort, Netherlands, to adjudicate between the doctrines 
of Jacobus Arminius and Calvinism, The representatives 
affirmed Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion 
and the doctrines of original sin, predestination, and 
justification by grace alone. The Church of England con­
firmed these declarations and denied adherence to the now 
heretical doctrines of Arminius. Dickinson argued that
32Beach, God's Sovereignty, pp. 17-21.
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Beach was maintaining a position counter to Protestant­
ism in general, and specifically contradicted the Arti­
cles of the Church of England, the institution that he 
claimed adherence to,33 Article X denied expressly that 
man had free will after the fall.3^ Dickinson pointed 
out Beach's position refuted not only the fundamentals 
of Puritanism, but the entire Protestant Reformation.
This he felt would be the result of overbalancing reli­
gion based upon reason, rather than upon the heart.
Dickinson's primary concern dwelt with the Armin- 
ian conception of grace. Beach and Johnson declared that 
salvation came by way of grace, a universal grace that 
contradicted any notions of grace held by Puritan theolo­
gians. The latter separated common and saving grace by 
kind or species as well as degree. In other words, com­
mon grace was not just a lesser form of saving grace, but 
a distinct type of grace that allowed man only to live a 
holy and Christian life. Universal grace, as described 
by these Arminians, was to Dickinson no different than 
common grace, also granted universally, but with no pro-
33 Jonathan Dickinson, A Vindication of God's Sov­




mise of salvation.35 Man could improve upon common grace, 
but by that improvement, one could not earn saving grace. 
Puritans separated two kinds of grace in order to allow 
the individual to prepare himself for the workings of 
God. Man turned towards God and lived a Christian life, 
but by so turning did not receive salvation. Justifi­
cation by grace alone meant that the work of election was 
by God alone, without man's activity.
Dickinson also attacked Beach's concert of free 
will and free grace, and uncovered some basic contradic­
tions. First, Beach stated that man cannot "oblige God 
to thank or reward us," as God freely gave grace, which 
denied any obligation. Yet, when our obedience complied 
with the conditions of the moral law, "veracity and jus­
tice obliges Him to make the promise good; and when he 
performs it, it is a reward of bounty."36 Beach contra­
dicted himself in declaring that our obedience cannot 
oblige God to reward us; however, our obedience in fact 
does oblige God to reward us,37 Secondly, Dickinson
35johnson argued universal salvation from Matthew 
20j16— "Many are called, but few are chosen." Dickinson 
answered that only common grace was promised, and that 
election to saving grace was predetermined, and outside 
of man's will. Ibid.. p. 69.
3^lbld., p. 19, quotes Beach, Eternal Life, p, 5» 
and p. 32.
37Ibid.. p. 19.
stated that Beach declared that "no man can come to 
Christ til he be drawn of the Father," or until God de­
termined man towards good and holy acts. Again this was 
a contradiction, as the notion of determination refuted 
the notion of free acts by the individual, or freedom of 
the will.38 Dickinson demonstrated that Beach placed 
free will and free grace in opposition, as the Puritans 
had, yet claimed that they acted in harmony.
Dr. Johnson's charge that the Puritan belief in 
God’s sovereignty made good and evil necessary posed a 
greater problem for Dickinson. He denied that Puritans 
had ever held a compulsive necessity for holiness or wick­
edness, but that mankind remained in a state of perfect 
freedom, so that until election they acted by their own 
voluntary inclinations.3^ He did deny though, that this • 
"perfect freedom" of action had any effect upon man's sal­
vation. Dickinson circumvented the major argument of the 
Arminians, ignoring the ticklish conflict of human liberty 
and predestination.
In the Second Vindication, published after his 
death by his brother Moses, he again approached the issue 
of the authorship of sin. Dickinson stated that God re­
tained determining power over man's wills, but this did
38Ibld., p. 20. 39ibld.. p. 68.
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not make Him the author of sin, hut rather of holiness 
and g r a c e . T h e  Arminians had confused tiie issue by de­
manding that man have free will to committ sin and frus­
trate God's plan, rather than turning to God and true 
holiness. Further, God did not determine the sin, in­
stead He determined the event and permitted the sin to 
occur. God became the permitter of evil, but not the nec­
essitating cause or author of sin. God's decree to per­
mit sin left the sinner with as much "liberty in all his 
actions, as if there had been no decree at all, and there­
fore, cannot be the author of sin which is freely and 
voluntarily committed."^
Dickinson's logic, demonstrated in these two tracts, 
was pejorative. Freedom of the will could not improve 
God’s purposes, but only man's, so that he placed less 
value on unassisted human liberty, than the bondage of 
man's will to God's divine plan. The liberty that he al­
lowed man was not human liberty in the eighteenth century 
sense. At his death in 1747, Dickinson had not halted 
nor impeded the Arminian attack, nor had he met them on
^Jonathan Dickinson, A Second Vindication of God's 
Sovereign Free Grace (Boston* Rogers and Fowle,1748), p.
19.
^ Ibid., p. 67, The permission of sin was the 
basis for the reasonable, optimistic Puritanism that Jona­
than Edwards began and Joseph Bellamy perfected. Supra, pp.
3̂
their terms, God's sovereignty was as absolute with Dick­
inson as it was with Calvin. He had attempted to preserve 
the theological solidarity that had existed before the 
revival, and to do so, retreated to the authority of tra­
ditional biblical interpretation. The failure of Dickin­
son to refute the Arminlans was not personal, but that of 
traditional Puritanism. The intellectual climate had
shifted, so that men judged truth by reason, rather than
Zi.2venerated tradition.
Dickinson tried to preserve the spirit of the re­
newal in terms of the revival itself. His answers were 
not essentially part of the reformation of order that 
followed renewal. He, like othe Puritans before the re­
vival, endeavored to retain the traditional New England 
system, the spirit of renewal, and the new science, which 
led to an untenable position. In his unfinished work, 
the Second Vindication, he hinted at a reasonable defense 
of God's sovereignty through the idea of the permission
^Others as well entered into the controversy, yet 
Dickinson was the staunchest defender of Puritanism imme­
diately afther the Great Awakening. See also Jedediah 
Mills, A Vindication of Gospel-Truth and Refutation of 
Some Dangerous Errors (Boston» Rogers and Fowle, 17^7).
For the Puritan defense of justification by faith alone, 
see Richard Elvins, True Justifying Faith Producing Evan­
gelical Obedience (Bostoni S. Kneeland and T. Green, 1747) 
and Israel Loring, Justification not by Works, but by 
Faith in Jesus Christ (Bos ton» S'. Knee land and T. Green,
m 9 ) .
of sin, but had not re-interpreted Puritan principles, 
so that they conformed to the demands of the eighteenth 
century.
The recognition of the Puritan failure to retain 
theological unity came in 17^7. with the first Arminian 
pamphlet written by a Puritan and not an Anglican. The 
old light Puritans who had opposed the Awakening had not 
entered into the controversy between the moderate Puritans 
and the Anglicans. That the first response from the lib­
eral clergy favored the Anglican position in the contro­
versy was extremely significant. The Anglican pamphle­
teers had successfully penetrated Puritan doctrinal unity, 
and initiated a fundamental schism, beyond revivalism.
. The Puritan response to this split became more important 
than the controversy between Puritans and Anglicans.
Experience Mayhew, father of the more famous lib­
eral leader Jonathan Mayhew, wrote Whether Saving Grace 
be Different in Species from Common Grace, or in Degree 
Only, and changed the complexion of the controversy. The 
elder Mayhew argued that the process of regeneration must 
restore man's free will, so that former sinners could 
turn to God and lead a holy life,^ MayheW's pamphlet
By no means did the Anglican attack end in 17^7» 
but that controversy became only tangential to the disrup­
tion within the Puritan orthodoxy, the concern of this 
paper.
^5
espoused an extremely mild Arminianism. He did not teach 
a universal redemption promise, and retained the tradi­
tional Puritan view that common grace and saving grace 
differed in kind as well as degree. However, he believed 
that men could receive salvation through the improvement 
of common grace, a position counter to traditional Puri­
tanism,
The mild Arminian view presented in Experience 
Mayhew's pamphlet typified the non-Anglican or liberal 
Puritan position in the 1750's and l?60's. The writings 
of Clarke, Whitby, Chubb, and other English Latitudinar- 
ians did not affect the principles of these divines to 
the extent that they did the Anglicans. Charles Chauncy 
and Jonathan Mayhew accommodated both the attitudes of 
the Latitudinarians and the Puritan tradition in a scheme 
that confused both reason and the s c r i p t u r e s T h e y  did
Experience Mayhew, A Letter to a Gentleman on 
the Question. Whether Saving Grace be Different in Species 
from Common Grace, or In Degree Only (Bostom S. Kneeland 
and T. Green, 17^7), p. 6.
^Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 176, In the 
debate between Chauncy and Edwards during the Awakening, 
Miller cites the former defending his position in the lan­
guage of the outmoded science, while the defender of Cal­
vinism used modern, dynamic, analytic psychology. This 
contradiction resulted from Chauncy's retention of schol­
astic psychology, with reason, Imagination, will, and emo­
tion as separate "faculties.” He had not incorporated 
Lockean mixed modes, ideas, and sensations into his theo­
logical view as Edwards had.
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not redefine Puritanism to fit the mood of the age, nor 
did they sever their connection with Puritan orthodoxy. 
Instead, they retained the best of both schemes; when 
reason and scriptures conflicted, they accepted the rea­
sonable proof. Jonathan Mayhew displayed the inherent 
contradiction in determining doctrine in this manner. He 
insisted that man must strive for salvation, but made no 
provision in his doctrine for man's free will. He accep­
ted the loss of free will with Adam's fall, as well as
46the doctrine of predestination. His position was more 
a modification or extention of the concept of voluntar­
ism, than an attack upon orthodox Puritanism. Mayhew and 
other liberal Puritan leaders, by ignoring free will as 
the underlying principle of their doctinral view,, contra­
dicted the English Arminians and their American disciples, 
Beach and Johnson. The liberal Puritans argued moral vir­
tue and not free will; they disregarded whether man acted 
freely, maintaining only that his actions were righteous.
Opposition to the revival and experiential reli­
gion centered around Harvard College in the 1740's. George
46Jonathan Mayhew, Striving to Enter in at the 
Strait Gate (Boston* R. Draper, 1761), pp.41 -42. See 
also Conrad Wright, The Beginnings of Unltarianlsm in 
in America (Boston* Starr King Press, 1955)* P. 60, and 
p. 9^. and Charles W. Akers, Called Unto Liberty (Cam­
bridge* Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 124-125.
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Whitefield's famous claim that Harvard taught dangerous 
doctrines inspired by the liberal Archbishop John Tillot- 
son and Samuel Clarke was refuted in 1740, but probably 
would have stood in 17^5*^ Whitefield's challenge sti­
mulated interest in these works; during the Awakening, 
Jonathan Mayhew, and undoubtedly others as well, read 
these works and incorporated Latitudinarian principles 
into their theology. Harvard College became for America 
during the Awakening, what the liberal academies at Whit- 
haven and Finden were for the English dissenters in the 
1720's and 1730's, both politically and religiously 
Surely the rights of man and Lockean epistemology entered 
Harvard theology as they did political theory.
The liberal influence of Harvard College became 
apparent when Lemuel Briant challenged Puritan orthodoxy ' 
with the sermon, The Absurdity and Blasphemy of Depreca-
^Edward Wigglesworth, president of Harvard Col­
lege, answered Whitefield that no undergraduate had bor­
rowed Tillotson's works from the college library for nine 
years, and Clarke's for over two, Akers, Called Unto Lib­
erty. p. 28.
k o See J. Hay Colligan, Eighteenth Century NonCon- 
formlty (Londoni Longsmans, Green and Co., Ind., 1915)> 
pp. 72-73» for the importance of dissenting academies in 
the growth of English heterodoxy. For a similar assess­
ment of Harvard, see Wright, Beginnings of Unitarianism. 
p. 36. Mayhew's fellow students included the Revolution­
ary leaders James Otis, Jr., Samuel Cooper, James Bowdoin, 
James Warren, and Thomas Cushing, as well as future reli­
gious liberals. Akers, Called Unto Liberty, p. 23.
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tins Moral Virtue. Before Its publication in 1749, Briant 
had preached this sermon several times; from his own pul­
pit at the North Church in Braintree, and also from the 
pulpits of Nathaniel Eells and Jonathan Mayhew. ^  Un­
doubtedly, this repetition served more to stimulate con­
troversy, than the doctrine it contained. As it was,
Briant received scant notice from the major orthodox cler­
ics. Nathaniel Eells exclaimed after Briant first preached 
the sermon, "AlasI sir, you have undone today all that I 
have been doing for forty years. Eells, to repair the 
damage, preached a series of sermons with doctrine closely 
resembling that in The Absurdity and Blasphemy. Briant 
presented a doctrinal view quite common in New England at 
the end of the 1740's, but gained notoriety primarily 
because of his avowed Arminianism.
The heretical sermon had as its text, Isaiah 64i4, 
"All our righteousnesses are as filthy rags." Puritans 
traditionally interpreted this text as a demonstration of 
man's inability to perform good works. Briant argued that 
this interpretation belied the context of the Book of 
Isaiah. The prophet referred to the wicked character of




the Jews, who "made religion a cloak for their immoral­
ities," considered themselves righteous and God's chosen 
people, yet lived an unholy life.^ By re-interpreting 
this text, Briant claimed that the salvation scheme re­
quired, man's personal righteousness, and that God did not 
do everything. Briant; like Beach had earlier, stated 
that man's salvation "by grace" did not exclude all moral 
agency, and that man's Christian duties, or works, at 
least aided in salvation. Puritans, Briant claimed, by 
not studying the scriptures in context, took Christian 
morality, which considered man as a moral agent, and 
"turned /It/ into idle speculation instead of a doctrine 
of sobriety, righteousness, and piety."52 Deprecating 
moral virtue, as the Puritans had done by denying man's 
righteousness, led men into utter contempt for those 
things that they should value most.
Ostensibly, Briant argued the importance of man's 
personal righteousness, but underlying these arguments 
were the questions of justification by grace and by works, 
the imputation of original sin, and the validity of pre­
destination. Puritans traditionally had argued that
^Lemuel Briant, The Absurdity and Blasphemy of 




Christ was the source of all human righteousness, and that 
man had no personal righteousness because of Adam's fall. 
Throughout the ensuing controversy, Briant insisted that 
, the only disparity between his position and that of tra­
ditional Puritanism was the single line of text from 
Isaiah, and refused to argue the specific implications of 
. his sermon. He did not broach free will, original sin, 
or predestination, but argued only moral virtue. Still 
his insistence upon man's personal righteousness was a 
denial of God's absolute sovereignty and predestination, 
and negated man's passivity.
Briant's sermon attracted little attention from 
prominent Puritans; only John Porter, the country pastor 
at the First Congregational Church at Brockton, felt 
moved to answer him. Porter, an unlikely defender of or­
thodoxy, had previously ventured into controversy only by 
, defending George Whitefield from charges of enthusiasm in 
17^5. Porter delivered his Justification by the Personal 
Righteousness of Men is Absurd and Blasphemous from the 
new light pulpit in Braintree on Christmas Day, 17^9. 
Afterwards, Briant charged that Porter had invaded Brain­
tree in an attempt to have him unseated.53 jn the debate, 
both disputants were intemperate, lapsing into personal
53shipton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates, vol. 10,
p. 3^.
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charges rather than doctrinal criticism. Porter accused 
Briant of immaturity and "heathenish morality," and in 
turn was accused of forgetting his Latin, misunderstanding 
Calvin, and having stolen two of his sermons from Arch­
bishop Ti H o t  son.-5̂  Each was reluctant to argue the 
specific implications of moral virtue, and demonstrated 
their failure to root their arguments in the reasonable 
thought of the Enlightenment. Briant's attack indicated 
only a superficial reliance upon any Latitudinarian prin­
ciples, and Porter's answer was traditional.
Porter correctly stated the traditional Puritan 
view of personal righteousness and the text from Isaiah.
He claimed that Briant had first fixed upon the principle 
of man's moral virtue, and then investigated the scrip­
tures for support of this preconceived notion. Through 
this type of proof, he argued, "Arlans, Socinians, Arm- 
inians, Antinomians, and even Quakers have endeavored to 
support and maintain their destructive tenets."5-5 Clearly, 
the reference in Isaiah referred only to the righteous­
ness of the best men, as the scriptures never used the 
word "righteousness" to describe the hypocritical perfor-
5^ibid.. p. 70, and p. 3^.
55John Porter, Justification by the Personal Righ­
teousness of Men is Absurd and Blasphemous (Boston» S, 
Kneeland, 1750)» P* 3#
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mances of wicked men as Briant had suggested.56 Further, 
the reference to righteousness as "filthy rags" indicated 
that man’s acts were imperfect and not suited "to cover 
their moral nakedness and render them agreeable to the 
King of Glory."57 Porter understood the full implication 
of Briant's sermon? personal righteousness voided the 
Puritan conception of salvation by grace alone, and in­
cluded works in the scheme of Justification.
Whoever is establishing a scheme /thatJ  sub­
stitutes the personal righteousness of men, 
in the room of the surety righteousness of 
Christ, in the affair of Justification and 
salvation, runs counter to the gospel, and 
will assuredly find themselves falling infin­
itely short of the favor and Kingdom of God.5°
Briant, throughout the controversy, emphasized 
that the only dispute between Porter and himself was the 
interpretation of Isaiah. Porter answered that in fact, 
there was a general controversy between them over the na­
ture of. Justification. Briant had exploded the notion of 
imputed righteousness from Christ in Justification, and 
maintained that moral virtue made man righteous before 
God, and that foregiveness of sin depended upon the per­
sonal righteousness of man.59 Porter recognized the im-
5^ibid. . pp. 5-6, -^Ibld., p. 8.
58ibld.. p. 21.
59john Porter, Vindication of a Sermon (Bostoni
S. Kneeland, 1751)* p. 10.
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plication of these arguments, and exploited their inten­
tion, presumably, to force Briant to admit adherence to 
the papist doctrine5 of merit, or that man's works merited 
salvation. Such an admission would have demonstrated the 
full implication of Arminian doctrine— the denial of the 
whole reformation experience.
John Cotton, minister of the rural church at 
Halifax, Massachusetts, joined Porter in an appendix to 
the Vindication explaining the agreement of Briant's doc­
trine to the traditional Arminian heresy. Briant had ex­
plicitly denied free justification by the imputed righ­
teousness of Christ, and by this denial, opposed personal 
election, or predestination, and the doctrine of original 
sin.60
The most important outcome of the controversy 
existed outside the pamphlet warfare, in the reaction of 
Briant's congregation to his apostasy into the errors of 
Arminianism. They called a council to judge his hereti­
cal views. On April 14, 1753* the council, headed by 
John Quincy, announced that they found no error in doctri­
nal questions; they differed personally with his doctrine, 
but upheld his "undoubted right to judge for himself.
6oIbld., p. 24.
6lShlpton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates, p. 3^7.
5^
This judgment established a precedent that allowed devi­
ation from orthodoxy without censure, and emphasized 
human liberty arid the right of personal Judgment in reli­
gious matters. The council affirmed the attitudes of 
Latitudinarianism, that reason judged religious truths, 
and not traditon. This judgment also endangered the 
workings of the Awakening and renewal of-the heart, by 
emphasizing religion of the mind. Briant's congregation, 
in establishing this precedent, admitted that any hope 
for doctrinal solidarity in New England was now at an end.
Lemuel Briant, striken with illness before the 
council met, died later that year, vindicated. John Porter 
remained active in his pulpit at Brockton until his death 
in 1802, but never again became involved in controversy.
In his later years, he gradually moved to an increasingly 
conservative religious position.
Briant's views concerning man's moral virtue did 
not deviate greatly from those taught by most Puritan 
divines in New England after the Great Awakening. Con­
sequently, they ignored what he said, but they could not 
ignore what he implied. He avowed Arminianism, and taught 
works and grace together as necessary for salvation.
Like most liberal clergymen, he emphasized the importance
62Ibid.. p. 72.
55
of man'a active participation in salvation, rather than 
passive acceptance of God's decisions. These Arminians 
required God to act reasonably, and to perform as God 
the judge rather than God the sovereign. Their position 
differed substantially, however, from that of the Angli­
can Arminians. They exhibited reluctance either to op­
pose the Puritan redemptive scheme completely, or to 
fully accept that of the Latitudinarians.
Lemuel Briant's more famous liberal associate, 
Jonathan Mayhew, revealed the same accommodation of both 
schemes, and reluctance to attack the position of Puri­
tan orthodoxy on justification. Mayhew had developed 
his Arminianism prior to his ordination in 174-8, which 
led to difficulty when that ceremony took place. The 
opposition came not from the parishioners of the West 
Church in Boston, a rather homogeneous group of merchants 
and the newly wealthy, but from the established clergy 
at the other Boston c h u r c h e s . ^3 The clergymen boycotted 
the ordination ceremony scheduled for May 20, which de­
layed that ceremony nearly two months, until July 17, 174-8, 
In order to insure the presence of enough ministers the
^Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 113. Miller dis­
cusses the economic and social order within the West Church 
that allowed Mayhew to break away from a purely orthodox 
position. He preached a theology compatible with reason­
able and commercial Boston.
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second time, the West Church ignored the Boston clerics 
and invited divines from country parishes.^
Even with these problems in ordination and his 
position outside of orthodoxy, Mayhew did not attack the 
principle Puritan tenets. In the latter half of the 
1750's, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
attempted to establish an American bishopric, and Mayhew's 
stormy protest led to his acceptance by the Boston brtho- 
doxy.^ Still, with the clerical opposition lessened, 
Mayhew did not publish Striving to Enter in at the Strait 
Gate until 1761, declaring the importance of works in the 
scheme of salvation, Mayhew, like other liberal divines, 
dared not exert those ideas too strongly which would 
split them from the Puritan fold. They strove to remain 
within orthodoxy, and to avoid being declared heretical.
Mayhew's Seven Sermons, published in 17A9 , de-
^Akers, Called Unto Liberty, p. 51* Akers de~ 
scribes the boycott not as a religious one, but a protest 
against the West Church's invitation of only the Brattle 
Street and the First Churches, while Ignoring the other 
seven Boston churches. The ordination ceremony carried 
great significance as a social and religious event in the 
eighteenth century. The boycotting of Mayhew's ordination 
resulted in deep resentment and antagonism between Mayhew 
and Boston's established clergy,
65lbld.. p. 91.
&^Jonathan Mayhew, Seven Sermons on the Following 
Subjects (Boston 1 Bogers and Fowle, 17^-9), demonstrates 
his nascent Unitarianism that developed soon after ordi-
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monstrated the liberal reliance upon reason, and the ac­
commodation of English Latitudinarianism and traditional 
Puritanism. Passages of these sermons indicated Mayhew's 
acceptance of Lockean thought; Mayhew's style, like that 
of most liberal divines in America, was simplistic and 
highly reminiscent of Archbishop Tillotson's.^7 in the 
first sermon concerning right and wrong, Mayhew declared 
that there was a natural difference between truth and 
falsehood; truth was determinant in itself and existed 
independent of man's notions concerning it.
No man's opinions are either right or 
wrong— that however contrary the senti­
ments of different men are to one another, 
both are equally conformable to the na­
ture and reality of the thing that they 
Judge.68
Mayhew believed that there existed an absolute nature of 
truth and moral rectitude, which did not depend upon the 
opinions of men, and especially upon the number of men
nation. For Mayhew’s christology, see Wright, Beginnings 
of Unltarlanlsm, or Akers, Called Unto Liberty.
67Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 27 and p. 48, com­
pares the pulpit styles of liberal divines and the pro­
revivalists. The former, lacking the histronics of the 
revivalists, were dry and reasonable to the extreme.
See also Louis G. Locke, Tillotson, A Study in Seventeenth 
Century Literature (Copenhagen; Hosenkilde and Bagger, 
1954), pp. 114-116, and passim. Locke discusses Tillot­
son’ s stylistic innovation, that of a plain and simple 
style.
^®Mayhew, Seven Sermons, p. 7.
with such an opinion. "They /absolute truths7 will not 
change their nature out of compliance to the most numer­
ous and powerful body of men in the world,"^9 He joined 
this idea of truth and falsehood to ideas of man's per­
formance of righteous acts, or man’s need to imitate the 
moral excellence of God and, thus, approach the design 
of the Creator.7° Lemuel Briant had presented a much 
more heterodox view of man's moral virtue than Mayhew 
had, as the latter placed no value upon works themselves, 
but called instead, for freedom of interpretation of the 
scheme of God.
He expanded this theme further in the remaining 
sermons, specifically with man's ability to recognize 
the difference between truth and error. Men had this 
ability, but the ability varied in individual men.?1 
This variation revealed a natural limitation upon human 
reason that accounted for man's instruction through divine 
revelation, Mayhew distinguished in the manner of the 
Latitudinarians between natural and revealed religion, 
with revelation compensating for man's limited under­
standing. But even though man's understanding was lim­
ited, reason exhalted him from the beasts in the field
69lbld.. pp. 17-18. 7°Ibld.. p. 12.
?1Ibld.. p. 29.
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and allied him to God and the angels.
Yea by this we resemble God himself. So 
that how weak so ever our intellectual 
faculties are, yet to speak reproachfully 
of reason, in general, is nothing less 
than blasphemy against God.72
Man's reason sufficed for him to judge moral and reli­
gious truths, or those man received through divine reve­
lation. This contradicted the Puritan notion of total 
Ignorance that resulted from Adam's fall and hid the work­
ings of God from man, Mayhew argued, in a manner contra­
dictory to traditional Puritanism, that through reason and 
revelation, man could understand the divine s c h e m e .73 
In further application of these ideas, Mayhew 
stated that man had the duty to assert private judgment, 
with freedom of thought and inquiry in religious matters. 
Christ forbade man to submit implicitly to the dictates 
of any other man, or for Christians to usurp or assume 
authority over their brethren. Man inhibited judgment 
and assumed authority in the formation of creeds, or "set­
ting up human tests of orthodoxy instead of the infallible 
word of God."7^ Mayhew directed this argument against the 
high Anglicans and Roman Catholics who based truth on the 
authority of tradition and not upon reasonable interpreta-
72 i b i d . . p, 39. 73 i b i d . . p. 38.
7^ i b l d . . p. 5 9 .
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tlon of the word of God. He realized, but did not empha­
size, the relevance of making the same attack against 
Puritan orthodoxy.
Mayhew's Seven Sermons expressed a conservative 
religious view and pled for freedom of inquiry and an end 
to Judging truth by tradition rather than common sense.
His demands were significant in increasing man's role in 
God's plan, but fell short of Briant's moral virtue. In 
1753 when the council at Braintree adjudged Briant's apos­
tasy, Mayhew's insistence upon private Judgment received 
open approval. Even with this victory, Mayhew never 
launched a full attack upon the Puritan redemptive scheme, 
but attempted only to accommodate his views alongside 
traditional church dogma.
Twelve years after the publication of the Seven 
Sermons, Mayhew sought to clarify his position on Justifi­
cation In Striving to Enter in at the Strait Gate, and 
stressed the importance of man's working for salvation.
He used for his text, Luke 13«1^» "Strive to enter in at 
the strait gate: for many, I say unto you, will seek to
enter in, and shall not be able," To Mayhew, striving 
referred to man's earnest endeavors, or working for sal­
vation. This striving came after the spirit of God af­
fected the heart of the sinner, and awakened an under­
standing of his sinful nature.75 The failure of the major­
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ity who "seek to enter in" was not due to election of only 
a few, but that of those who heeded the call, few strove 
to obtain the goal.78 Mayhew contended that the gospel 
offered a general salvation to all men, and God would not 
make the offer without providing the means. "For if God 
hath no pleasure in their death, but the contraryj and if 
they themselves desire life, and endeavor to obtain it, 
what should hinder their salvation?"77
Mayhew pointed' out that striving did not relate 
to the regenerate, "or those already born of God, or such 
as are true believers and real Christians," but wholly 
to the workings of the unregenerate.78 Mayhew, then, re­
tained the concept of predestination and election. God 
chose a few elect prior to the creation of the world, the 
regenerate. For these elect, works, or man's personal 
righteousness had no influence, yet in the salvation of 
the unregenerate, once the spirit of God had infected 
their souls, works and virtue made them worthy of salva­
tion. Mayhew emphasized that works always followed grace, 
and could not exist independent of grace. By this argu-
7%ayhew, Striving to Enter, pp. 11-12.
78Ibld., p. 35. Mayhew did not deny election, 
but argued only that election was not the sole means for 
obtaining salvation.
77Ibld. , p. ^9. 78Ibid., p.
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ment, he shunned the threat of heresy for teaching the 
popish doctrine of merit.
Mayhew had avoided any declaration regarding the 
salvation of all men, and did not stress works and grace 
in conjunction until the l?60's. The actions of Mayhew, 
Briant, and other liberal Puritans demonstrated a fear 
of heterodoxy that forced them into only a mild Armlnian- 
lsm. They argued moral virtue and righteousness rather 
than justification by works, and freedom of Inquiry rather 
than freedom of the will. For these Arminians, works did 
not differ in definition from the Puritan "fruits of 
faith" which followed grace. Although these liberals 
espoused only a mild Arminlanism, they aroused enormous 
fear, that if left unchecked, the heresy would soon ex­
ceed the bounds of the liberal divines and destroy the 
work of renewal and the Puritan covenant system.
English Arminianism and liberal Puritanism differed 
substantially5 the term "Arminian" did not actually re­
flect the theological position of the liberal divines, 
but was used by the Puritans as a term of derision. More 
than a separate theological group, they were a splintering 
of Puritanism, and indicated that any claim to theological 
solidarity was at an end. The controversies involving 
Jonathan Dickinson and John Porter had demonstrated the 
weaknesses of traditional Puritanism in refuting these
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eighteenth century heretical views. The retention of 
Puritan order and the revival experience required a com­
plete revision and redefinition of their religious posi­
tions. This task faced Jonathan Edwards and the New 
Divinity School in the 1750's and 1760's,
CHAPTER III
A CAREFUL AND STRICT ENQUIRY INTO THE MODERN PREVAILING 
NOTIONS OF FREEDOM .OF THE WILL» JONATHAN EDWARDS 
AND THE ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD
He that would know the workings of the New 
England Mind in the middle of the eighteenth 
century, and the throbbing of its heart, 
must give his days and nights to the study 
of Jonathan Edwards.1
Few historians have taken issue with this assess­
ment by George Bancroft that revealed Jonathan Edwards' 
central position in American intellectual life. However, 
in explicating that leadership, historians have not agreed 
whether he was the first modern American, or the last in 
a long line of medieval philosophers.2 Generally, one 
can presume that the critics of Edwards' modernity looked
iGeorge Bancroft, The History of the United States, 
quoted in Edward M. Griffin. Jonathan Edwards (Minneapolis» 
University of Minnesota Press, 1971), p. 5, and Vincent 
Tomas, "The Modernity of Jonathan Edwards," New England 
Quarterly. XXV (1952), p. 60,
2For an assessment of Edwards' modernity see Perry 
Miller, Jonathan Edwards, pp. 77-78, and passim. Vincent 
Tomas, in his critical review of Miller's biography. The 
Modernity of Jonathan Edwards, pp. 60-84, and Peter Gay,
A Loss of Masteryi Puritan Historians in Colonial Amer­
ica (Berkeley and Los Angelest University of California 




only at the nature of the religious questions he dealt 
with, and the doctrine that he defended. The questions 
and the doctrine were medieval in form and substance, yet 
his methodology unquestionably indicated his modernity. 
Twentieth century man does not share Edwards' concern 
for original sin or the bondage of man's will, but the 
intellectual milieu of the eighteenth century determined 
the importance of these questions, so that his preoccupa­
tion with them was not singular.
While Edwards' conclusions conformed to sixteenth
t
century Calvinist dogma, the manner in which he arrived 
at them departed wholly from the scholastic tradition. 
Edward H. Davidson stated that Edwards "conducted his 
intellectual and spiritual pilgrimage in point for point 
relevance with the most advanced thought of his age— and 
undercut it at nearly every occasion."3 He turned to the 
source of the Latitudinarian attack— Lockean epistemology 
and Newtonian science— and demonstrated that traditional 
Calvinist doctrine, and not the Arminian errors, confor­
med exactly to eighteenth century reason. In this manner, 
Edwards became in mid-century both an exponent of reason­
able religion and a primary defender of experiential re-
3Edward H. Davidson,. "From Locke to Edwards," 
Journal of the History of Ideas. XXIV (1963), No. 3, p. 
372.
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ligion. He denied that reason and emotion were distinct 
faculties of the mind, functioning separately according 
to Aristotelian terms, but were "powers of the unified 
self."**' Since.these faculties were not separate, there 
could be no hlerocratic ordering of "understanding," 
"affection," and "will"-— each contributed in a like man­
ner to human knowledge. Thus, one could emphasize the 
role of religious affections (emotions), as identical to 
that of m a n ’s will, and not denigrate religion, but honor 
it.-5
Edwards' Introduction to John Locke's Essay Con­
cerning Human Understanding came in his second year at 
Yale College at the age of thirteen. Towards the end of 
his life, Edwards, in recollecting that early reading, 
statedi
/I/ was as much engaged, and had more sat­
isfaction and pleasure in studying it, than 
the most greedy miser in gathering up hand­
fuls of silver and gold from some new dis­
covered treasure.6
^Griffin, Jonathan Edwards. p. 2k.
^Ibid., p. 2k. J. M. Bumsted and J. E. Van de 
Wetering, '"What Must I Do to be Saved?' The Great Awak­
ening in Colonial America" (MS, unpublished, 1971), state 
that the singularity of Edwards' acceptance of the new 
intellectual mood has been exaggerated. The Awakening it­
self emphasized the harmony of mind and emotion, and by 
its end, most leaders had read commentaries upon Locke, if 
not the works themselves. The wholeness of mind, spirit, 
and emotion was widely accepted, p. 132,
67
He gained more than pleasure from this early reading of 
Locke, for while still in his teens, he formulated the 
intellectual and religious principles that were to govern 
the remainder of his life. He wrote the "Notes on the 
Mind," a collection of uncompleted thoughts, which demon­
strate his complete digestion of Locke's psychological 
principles, and foreshadowed much of his later treatise 
on the Freedom of the Will. One cannot over-emphasize 
Edwards' early intellectual development and the effect 
that this early maturity had upon his later life. He re­
tained throughout his career as a minister and theologian 
those intellectual principles that he had developed in 
his teen.?
In the same manner that the "Notes on the Mind" 
foreshadowed his later philosophic development, his youth­
ful preparation for religious conversion previewed his 
later concern for experiential religion. Both as a child 
in his father's congregation and in his senior year in 
college, he underwent "seasons of awakening" which ex-
6samuel Hopkins, "The Life and Character of Rever­
end Mr. Jonathan Edwards," Jonathan Edwards: A Profile.
David Levin, editor (New York« Hill and Wang, 1969), PP. 
5 - 6 .
^Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. "Edwards was
not the sort who undergoes a long development or whose 
work can be divided into 'periods.' His whole insight 
was given him at once, preternaturally early, and he did 
not changei he only deepened."
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posed to him an "inward delight" in religious duties and 
concern for the salvation of his soul. This concern 
stimulated him to pray "five times a day in secret," to 
spend much time in religious talk with other boys, and to 
meet with them in prayer.® While his early religiosity 
was fervent, he found that -these affections fostered a 
self-righteous pleasure and false sense of grace. After 
each awakening, he soon "returned like a dog to his vomit" 
to his old ways of sin. The experience did not lead to 
inner quiet and hope, but to violent inward struggles and 
doubt as to his eventual salvation. "I made seeking my 
salvation the main business of my life...I felt a spirit 
to part with all things in the world...but yet it never 
seemed to be proper to express my concern that I had."9 
The experience of trying to earn grace and failing, left 
Edwards with the strong belief that salvation rested en­
tirely in the hands of God, and that man's will had no 
effect in securing true grace.
Soon after graduation from Yale College in Septem­
ber, 1720, Jonathan Edwards experienced the deep religious 
conversion that he had sought earlier. Before conversion, 
he had come to a full understanding of the meaning of the
®Hopkins, The Life and Character, pp. 24-25. 
9Ibid., p. 25.
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sovereignty of God. In his youth, he had looked with 
horror at God's absolute determination of election and 
damnation. But to the mature Edwards, this doctrine ap­
peared exceedingly pleasant and honorable. He stated 
that the change occurred while reading I Timothy It 17—  
"Now unto the king eternal, immortal, invisible, the only
wise God, be honor and glory for ever and ever, Amen."
This passage opened within him a new sense of the divine 
glory of God and the excellence of His being. "From about 
that time, I. began to have a new kind of apprehension and
idea of Christ, and the work of redemption, and the glo­
rious way of salvation by Him.1,10
A short time after discovering this new sense of 
divine things, he experienced saving conversion while 
walking alone in his father's pasture. He felt the glori­
ous majesty of God and the meekness of His grace come to-
1 1gether in a "sweet c o n j u n c t i o n . H i s  religious attitude 
after this conversion changed drastically from that fol­
lowing his youthful awakenings.
Those former delights, never reached the 
heart; and did not arise from any sight of 
the divine excellency of the things of God; 
or any taste of the soul-satisfying, and 
life-giving good there is in them.12




Edwards' conversion convinced him that man's will was 
entirely passive in the affair of salvation. Man's heart 
must be touched, or his will disposed toward God before 
he could receive salvation or exhibit true justifying 
grace.. Part of the preparation that man must undertake, 
was a complete understanding of the sovereignty of God 
and the binding of one's self to the will of God,
A year and a half after Edwards began to sense 
this new spirit of divinity, he accepted the pastorate 
at a small church in New York City, where he remained 
slightly longer than one year. He returned to the Connect­
icut Valley, and in June of 1724, became a tutor at Yale 
College. In the interval between his graduation in 1720 
and his tutorship, the Yale apostasy, or the defection of 
Hector Timothy Cutler, Samuel Johnson, and others had 
taken place, ^  This defection had left the college in 
disorder, so that Edwards' tutorship, coming so soon after 
the event, helped to stabilize the quality of instruction. 
He left the college in 1727» and, at the invitation of 
his grandfather Solomon Stoddard, became assistant pastor 
at Northampton. Edwards received ordination at the North­
ampton Church on February 15, 1727» and two years later, 
after the death of his grandfather, took sole charge.^
•^Supra. p. 32 , and Johnson, Autobiography. p. 7.
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The Connecticut Valley had experienced periodic 
ripples of revival, usually emanating from the pulpit of 
the Northampton Church. Grandfather Stoddard had stimu­
lated several seasons of renewal, marked by an increase 
in the number experiencing conversion and widespread con­
cern for salvation. In 173^ Edwards' own experimental 
acquaintance with the spirit of God aided in the outpour­
ing of renewal within his congregation, 1-5 The Northamp­
ton revival began the Awakening in New England that lasted 
for over a decade in varying degrees of intensity.!6
Samuel Hopkins stated that Edwards was "what is 
called by some a rigid Calvinist." because he defended 
those doctrines which many in the eighteenth century 
thought should be removed.*? One of the central themes 
that he supported and others opposed was the sovereignty
l^Willsiton Walker, "Jonathan Edwards," Jonathan 
Edwards> A Profile, David Levin, editor (New Yorki Hill 
and Wang, 1969)» P. 93.
l^Hopkins, The Life and Character, pp. 51-52.
l^Edwards traced the spirit of revival in three 
separate monographsi A Faithful Narrative of the Surpris­
ing Works of God in the Conversion of many Hundred Souls 
(Boston t S. Knee land and T. Green, 173&). The"''Distin­
guishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God"(Boston> S. 
Knee land and T. Green*." 17^1). and Some Thoughts Concern­
ing the Present Revival of Religion in New England (Boston» 
S. Kneeland and T. Green, 1742.)
17Hopkins, The Life and Character, p. 52.
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of God. After the Great Awakening, he did not Join 
Dickinson and others in the controversy with the Anglican 
Arminians primarily because of the difficulties he faced 
with his own congregation. Edwards opposed the practice 
begun by his grandfather in opening the sacrament of the 
Lord's Supper to the u n c o n v e rt e d. S ev e ra l  influencial 
families, led by Israel Williams and Joseph Hawley, known 
for their economic position in Northampton rather than 
their piety, declared that Edwards was "un-Stoddardean.
The conflict between Edwards and the Williamses culminated 
on June 18, 1750, when a council of nine churches met to 
advise the Northampton Church whether or not to dissolve 
the relationship between pastor and congregation. The 
council, packed with anti-Edwardseans, voted five to four 
recommending dismissal. The congregation concurred, vot­
ing more than two hundred to twenty-three in favor of his 
removal.20 On June 22, 1750, "fit only for study, aged
1^Stoddard saw that the Half-Way members, brought 
into the church through the Synod of 1662, were not under­
going conversion. Stoddard opened the Lord's Supper to 
the unconverted as a means to obtain conversion. This 
move discarded the New England covenant theories, and 
blurred the distinction between the Visible and Invisible 
Churches. Miller, The New England Mind, From Colony to 
Province, pp. 232-236". :
l^Miller, Jonathan Edwards, pp. 218-219.
20Hopkins, The Life and Character, p. 61, and 
Walker, Jonathan Edwards, pp. 105-107.
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forty-six and physically exhausted, Edwards was thrown 
onto the world, a major artist and America's foremost 
philosopher.
In December of that year, the rural church at 
Stockbridge invited Edwards to become their minister and 
missionary to the Housatonnuck Indians.22 Removed from 
the pressures of a large congregation, he wrote his major 
theological works, The Freedom of the ¥111. and The Great 
Christian Doctrine of Original Sin. Defended. The first 
treatise, published in 1754, reflected his concern over 
the Latitudinarian challenge to the sovereignty of God. 
Edwards' research into Arminianism began much earlier.
In a letter to Joseph Bellamy dated January 15, 1746/7, 
he stated that he had begun reading Daniel Whitby's dis­
courses, and "with It I have got so deep into this con­
troversy, that I am no willing to dismiss it, till I know 
the utmost of these matters."23 Edwards asked Bellamy If 
he knew of any Axminian better versed in the idea of free 
will, because, "I don’t know but I shall publish something 
after a while on that Subject."2^
2lMiller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 225.
22Stanley T. Williams, "Six Letters of Jonathan 
Edwards to Joseph Bellamy," New England Quarterly, I (1928), 
p . 240.
23Ibid.. p. 230. 2^Ibld.. p. 231.
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The Freedom of the Will reflected Edwards' reli­
ance upon both major attitudes that he had cultivated as 
a young man. He combined Lockean epistemology and tra­
ditional Puritan doctrine to establish a new reasonable 
Puritanism, one that repudiated Aristotelian scholastic­
ism in favor of the science and psycholosy that dominated 
the eighteenth century. The Freedom of the Will, the 
cornerstone of the New Divinity theology, introduced the 
reasonableness of the Enlightenment to Puritanism, but 
did not change the restrictiveness of the benefits of 
Christianity. Edwards defended the traditional Puritan 
sovereignty of God, election, and saving grace, and denied 
the validity of the notion that free will was necessary 
for man's moral agency.
The real controversy in America was hidden within 
questions of moral agency and man's working for salvation. 
Edwards understood that freedom of the will was the central 
issue in the Arminian-Puritan d e b a t e . T h e  sovereignty
25conrad Wright, The Beginnings of Unitarianism, 
insists that Edwards confused the issues; American Armin- 
ians held that the most important conflict was over ori-' 
ginal sin and not free will. However, Wright looked at 
these liberals, not. as they were in the 1750's, but what 
they became for the nineteenth century, nascent Unitarians. 
Therefore, failed to explicate properly their threat to 
Puritanism in the mid-eighteenth century, even though 
they were not Arminians in the strict sense of the word.
of God required man to bind his will to God's, and to be­
come completely passive in salva,tion. Bondage of the will 
was the central theme attacked by the Arminians, but a 
first principle in traditional Puritanism. Also, Edwards 
clearly recognized who his adversaries actually were. He 
ignored those Anglicans and liberals in America, and . 
struck at the source, the the English divines who revived 
the doctrines, of Jacobus Arminius. Edwards concentrated 
on the writings of three popularizers, who together en­
compassed the entire scope of eighteenth century Arminian- 
ism, Thomas Chubb, a Deist, illustrated the extremes of 
the heresy, Daniel Whitby; an Arian-Armlnian, was a min­
ister of the Church of England, and Isaac Watts, repre­
sented Edwards* own tradition of theology,26 By demon­
strating the unreasonableness of the central theme (free 
will) and each divine's application of it, Edwards struck 
a decisive blow at the root of the heresy and established 
the bondage of man's will to God on a reasonable and a 
scriptural basis,
Edwards* approach to free will closely followed 
the treatment presented by John Locke in An Essay Concern-
26Jonathan Edwards, A Careful and Strict Enquiry 
into the Modern Prevailing Notion of Freedom of the Will, 
Paul Ramsey, editor (New Haveni Yale University’ Press, 
1957)i P. 66. (Editor's Introduction,)
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ing Human Understanding. Locke had examined the reason­
ableness of free will and stated that the question itself 
was improper and invalid.
It is as insignificant to ask whether man’s 
will be free, as. to ask whether his sleep 
will be swifti Liberty being as little ap­
plicable to the will as swiftness is to sleep. 
Liberty which is but a power, belongs only to 
agents, and cannot be an attribute or modi­
fication of the will which is also but a power, '
This definition restricted liberty to an agent5 liberty 
cannot have liberty, and the power to choose cannot have 
the power to choose? therefore, these conditions did not 
establish a valid question. To ask if man has free will 
was to ask if the "will wills,M or if one ability has 
another ability, "a question at first sight too grossly 
absurd to make a dispute or need an answer.”^® Edwards 
agreed with this assessment, and with Locke's description 
of volition as an ability of the mind, rather than the 
scholastic notion that will and understanding were sep­
arate faculties. However, as a-dedicated Calvinist, he 
could not merely answer that the question was invalid.
He had to demonstrate more explicitly the nature of the 
will and to prove that it could not be self-determining.
27john Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Under­
standing, vol. 1, p. 199.
2^Ibld.„ vol. 1, p. 200.
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Like Locke, Jonathan Edwards defined "will" as 
that "by which the mind chooses anything.,.and an act of 
the will is the same as an act of choosing or choice."^9 
Edwards deviated slightly from Locke when he stated that 
one choses according to one's desires, and therefore, vo­
lition and desire always a g r e e . 30 Man's voluntary actions 
arose from his pleasure or desire; he performed that which 
he found most agreeable. If man chose his actions from 
disagreeable motives, then he would deny his pleasure. 
Therefore, Edwards said, "the will always is as the great­
est apparent good is."^1 In other words, "will" and "the 
greatest apparent good" (desire) were co-equal terms, and 
an agent chose according to his pleasure those motives 
that he comprehended as most inviting. The equation of 
will and desire further demonstrated that will was not a 
separate faculty of the mind, but a power or ability. 
Willing or choosing required an agent in the same manner 
that desiring required an agent to desire.
Building upon the statement that choice or volition
2^Edwards, Freedom of the Will, p. 137.
-^Locke stated that choice resulted from uneasiness 
in man's present state or condition and did not relate dir­
ectly to desire. Man's action, determined by uneasiness, 
and his desire could run counter to each other. Therefore, 
he held man's choice (will) and desire as separate and dis­
tinct. Locke, Essay, vol. 1, p. 199.
31-Edwards, Freedom of the Will, p. 142.
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required the action of an agent, Edwards demonstrated the 
unreasonableness of the Arminian self-determination of 
the will. He said, "to talk of the determination of the 
will, supposes an effect, which must have a cause. If 
the will be determined, there is a determiner."^2 With 
regard to a self-determined will, the will became the de­
terminer and the determined, or both cause and effect.
This demonstration by Edwards echoed the earlier state­
ments by John Locke that the question of freedom of the 
will was unreasonable and invalid.
If one accepted the Arminian claim of the will's 
self-determining power, then one must grant that the will 
had sovereignty over itself, and acted independent of any 
antecedent acts. These conditions were necessary, so that 
the will itself would have the power of volition, and not 
something, or some other agent, outside of the will. 
Further, Edwards deemed that the free action of the will 
required an equilibrium of the mind before determination, 
and also contingency of the will. The mind must be devoid 
of any antecedent causes or predilections that could ef­
fect the will's determination. Edwards defined contin­
gency "not in the common acceptance of the word...but as 
opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and certain con-
32Ibid.. p. 1^1.
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nection with some previous ground or reason for its ex­
istence.'*^ These conditions isolated the will from any
i i
motives other than the will itself. Otherwise, Arminian
self-determination actually had another cause, and the
will was only the determined and not the determiner.
After outlining these necessary conditions for the
self-determination of the will, Edwards demonstrated that
such conditions could not exist. First, self-determination
of the will could logically only mean that the soul, or
the individual, exercised the power of willing.
When it is said, the will decides or deter­
mines, the meaning must be, that the person 
in the exercise of a power of willing and 
choosing, or the soul, acting voluntarily, 
determines.34
Edwards, drawing support from Locke, stated that only 
agents had the power of choice, and not the powers them­
selves. However, according to the Arminian notion, the 
will determined its own free actsj therefore, a preceding 
act of choice had determined every free act of the will.
If the will determines the will, then choice 
orders and determines choicei and acts of 
choice are subject to the decision, and fol­
low the conduct of other acts of choice,35
In other words, a free act of the will depended upon all
previous acts of the will, which must be free. In a
33ibid.. pp. 164-165. 3^ibid.. p. 172. 
35lbld.. pp. 171-172.
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series of three acts of volition, the freedom of the third 
act depended upon the freedom of the acts that had immedi­
ately preceded it. If the second, or the first act in 
that series was not self-determined or free, then in a 
like manner, that third act could not be free. Further, 
according to the above definition,' for the first act in 
this series to be free, a preceding free act of the will 
must have taken place— a contradiction in the given as­
sumption that there were only three acts of volition in 
the series. The only remaining explanation, said Edwards, 
was that the first act in the series was not free or self- 
determined, and therefore, all succeding acts were also 
not free, but determined by that first act.36
Edwards' approach was reductio ad absurdum, or to 
logically extend his opponents' key assumptions until 
they contradicted themselves. The statement that the will 
determined volition became absurd when directed specifi­
cally toward the first necessary resolution the will made» 
whether or not it would be free. His argument, going be­
yond whether the will had the power to choose, settled 
upon whether or not it had the power to choose that it 
would be free. Edwards maintained that unless a free act 
of the will made this decision, unrestrained and unaided,
36lbld.. p. 172.
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the will could not "be free, but was determined and bound. 
Further, reason insisted that this determination was im­
possible, as any free act required a preceding free act. 
The only other explanation, then, was that this first act 
of the will was uncaused, for if a cause existed outside 
of the will itself, it would be determined and not free. 
Yet one could not Imagine an effect without a cause, so 
that the first determination must have had some other 
foundation than the will itself.37
Edwards purposefully did not base his destruction 
of free will upon traditional Puritan theology and scrip­
tural proof. Jonathan Dickinson had failed to refute the 
Arminians because he depended upon the authority of the 
scriptures, but his opponents had not accepted the primacy 
of the scriptural word over reason. Edwards, by attacking 
the doctrine of free will on reasonable grounds, severed 
the connection between Puritanism and scholastic episte- 
mology.
The denial of man's free will, in turn, established 
the necessity of God's absolute sovereignty, for man re­
quired some first principle or first cause outside of him­
self to control and direct his volitions. Thus, having 
sustained God's sovereignty, Edwards re-established the
37lbld., p. 181, and passim.
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validity of the arguments Dickinson had presented defend­
ing emotional religion and man's passivity in salvation. 
Edwards re-affirmed the principles of the Reformation and 
the Great Awakening, but he placed these principles firmly 
within the common sense framework of the eighteenth cen­
tury. In The Freedom of the W i l l , he successfully brought 
together those two early attitudes that governed his lifei 
experiential religion of the heart and Lockean psychology.
At this point in the treatise, Edwards had not ad­
vanced much beyond John Locke. He had described the in­
consistency between free will and reason with greater 
clarity and in greater detail, but for the purposes of the 
controversy that he had enjoined, Edwards had to approach 
the specific arguments of his opponents. Edwards realized 
that they were "Arminian" in the same manner that he was 
"Calvinist." He could not assume that all those labelled 
as Arminian held only those beliefs taught by Daniel 
Whitby, any more than as a Calvinist, he accepted every­
thing taught by Calvin,39 He selected Whitby as an op­
ponent because he was a central figure in the English 
heresy, widely read and quoted by the American Armlnians. 
Thomas Chubb, less well known in either America or England,
38supra, pp. 39-^0, and p. ^3. 
39Edwards, Freedom of the Will, p. 131.
83
was a Deist and represented what Jonathan Edwards be­
lieved was the natural extention of Arminian thought.
His third opponent, Isaac Watts, represented the serious 
breach that Edwards felt Arminianism was making within 
his own. theological tradition.^ With a defense this 
broad, Edwards, by demonstrating the errors of only these 
three divines, effectively blocked all Arminian arguments.
The first opponent Edwards challenged was Thomas 
Chubb, a candle and glove maker who devoted his leisure 
to the study of philosophy and theology. Within the cir­
cle of English Arminlans and Deists, Chubb managed to ob­
tain some repute as both a theologian and philosopher, 
although he lacked formal education. Sir Leslie Stephen 
described him as "a good Salisbury tallow-chandler, who
ingenuously confesses, whilst criticising the scriptures,
h,1that he knows no language but his own." A self-proclaimed 
disciple of William Whiston and Samuel Clarke, Chubb began 
his theological writing with a defense of Arianlsm in The 
Supremacy of the Father Asserted (1715). During his career, 
he passed from Arianism to Soclnianism, and finally to 
Deism. He was the least educated of the English Deists, 
but showed considerable natural ability. According to
^°Ibld., pp. 65-66. (Editor's Introduction.)
Ai Stephen, The History of English Thought, vol.
1. P. 73.
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Stephen, Chubb's writings came after the culmination of 
the Delstic movement, accounting for his negligible in­
fluence , although he had encompassed nearly the entire 
spectrum of Deistic beliefs.^
A Collection of Tracts on Various Subjects (1730) 
contained the arguments for free will that Edwards chal­
lenged. Chub had stated that the mind can choose to 
comply with the motives that influenced the will, or to 
refuse them. "Man has the power, and is as much at lib­
erty to reject the motive that does prevail as he has 
power, and is at liberty to reject those motive that do 
not,"^3 in other words, Chubb granted that man's will 
and man's desire were not the same, nor did choice proceed 
from previous dispositions of the mind. Man was at per­
fect liberty to accept or reject any motive that influen­
ced the will. By this separation of will and motive,
Chubb argued that an effect could be uncaused, or without 
any necessary connection between cause and effect. The 
will "apparently acts wholly without motive, without any 
previous reason to dispose the mind to it." However, this
^2Ibld,, vol. 1, pp. 138-140, and Edwards, Freedom 
of the Will, p. 67. (Editor's Introduction.)
^Thomas Chubb, A Collection of Tracts on Various 
Subjects (London* 1730), quoted in Edwards, Freedom of the 
Will, pp. 226-227.
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statement contradicted a condition that Chubb had out­
lined in the same tract* "no action can take place with­
out some motive to excite it."^
In addition to this contradiction, Edwards stated 
that Chubb's concept of liberty was liberty of the will 
from reason. Reason and will were described as separate 
faculties of the mind, in order to allow the will free­
dom and to remove the necessary connection between will 
and the last dictate of the understanding. Thus, Chubb's 
definition of liberty and will conformed more closely 
with scholastic epistemology than with Locke’s mixed modes. 
The absurdity of Chubb's argument was "certainly as much 
to say there is previous ground and reason in the motive 
for the act of preference, and yet no previous ground for 
it. "^5
Daniel Whitby offered Edwards a much more difficult 
challenge. Whitby was better educated than Chubb, he had 
received his D.D. from Trinity College in 1672, and had 
acquired wide recognition in England and in America as a 
polemical divine. Beach, Johnson, and other American 
Anglicans adapted their Arminian arguments directly from 
Whitby's tracts. Jonathan Edwards himself became enmeshed 
in the question of free will through Whitby’s discourses,
^ Ibld. . p. 230. ^5Ibld.. p. 231.
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and in 17^6 asked Joseph Bellamy to ask Dr. Johnson if 
anyone else was better versed in the Arminian notion of 
free will.^ Whitby had adopted his heterodoxical views 
prior to 1700, and with Dr. Samuel Clark's publication 
of The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity in 1712, became 
an Arian as well as an Arminian. At his death in 1726, 
he held an extreme Arminianism, but did not approach the 
Deism of Thomas Chubb.
Whitby wrote several tracts attacking the Calvin­
ist principles of the English theologian John Edwards^? 
which were published in 1710 as the Discourse on the Five 
P o i n t s In Freedom of the Will, Edwards directed his 
his assault upon this work, especially Discourse IV, "The 
Liberty of the Will of Man in a State of Trial and Pro-
^Williams, Six Letters of Jonathan Edwards, pp. 
230-231.
John Edwards was an English polemlst who died in 
1716. His dissenting views and rigid Calvinism, forced 
his resignation from St. Johns College in Cambridge in 
1670, because he conflicted with the 1662 Act of Unifor­
mity. He retired from the pulpit in 1686, and until his 
death, published against the Arminian heresy that was 
permeating the Church of England. Sidney Lee, editor, 
Dictionary of National Biography, vol. VI (London 1 
Smith,"Elder, and Co., 1908), pp. 539-5^1.
^Edwards simplified the title of Whitby's tract, 
The Dummer Collection at Yale College listed it as Dis­
courses on the Qulnquartlcular Controversy. Edwards, 
Freedom of the Will, pp."'62-63. (Editor"'s Introduction. )
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bation."^9 in this discourse, Whitby ventured beyond 
the traditional Arminian position and departed from the 
more specifically theological defense of the five prin­
ciples.^®
Whitby had asserted that if God had absolute and 
perfect foreknowledge of the free actions of a moral 
agent, that foreknowledge could not affect the individual's 
free decisions. A basic tenet of traditional Calvinism 
stated that God did have perfect foreknowledge, and that 
foreknowledge restricted man's will. The American Puri­
tan tradition modified that principle, not to denigrate 
God's omniscience, but to allow man more freedom in that 
scheme. Whitby's statement went beyond Puritan volun­
tarism and insisted that God's foreknowledge had no ef­
fect on the determination of human events, and that man's 
will was not subject to the divine will. He stated that 
foreknowledge had as little effect in the determination 
of events as afterknowledge. "God's prescience is not 
the cause of things future, their being future is the 
cause of God's prescience that they will be."-^
•̂9Ibid. . p. 82.
50supra, pp. 30-31 . Arminians traditionally were 
concerned less with free will (specifically a doctrine of 
Pelagianism), than in Insisting upon conditional grace 
over irresistable grace. Whitby then modified Arminianism 
from that condemned at the Synod of Dort in l6l8.
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Whitby did not deny that God had foreknowledge of 
man's volitions. God was omniscient, but omniscience was 
not determination. Edwards stated that Whitby's view 
contradicted reason, for common sense dictated that God's 
prescience of the volitions of moral agents was incon­
sistent with the contingency of events. Arminians argued, 
in essence, that man was under no restraint or "coaction," 
yet because they allowed God's foreknowledge, these sup­
posedly voluntary moral actions were necessary and deter­
mined, -52 God could not foreknow events unless they were 
to happen, and since they were foreknown, they must hap­
pen, and therefore, were determined. Whitby had argued 
that the free actions of the individual were necessary 
for man to act morally, but like the Puritans, held that 
to obtain salvation, man must comply with the teachings 
of God. To Edwards, this Inconsistency Indicated that 
the Arminians were as guilty as the Puritans in implying 
a doctrine of fatality.53
Edwards questioned Whitby's reliance upon the 
contingency of events rather than prior determination.
51 Daniel Whitby, Discourse on the Five Points, 
quoted in Edwards, Freedom of the Will, pp. 262-253.
•52Edwards, Freedom of the Will, p. 271.
53ibid.. p. 269, and pp. 270-271.
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By contingency, the free actions of individuals, and not 
God, determined the future state of the world. The course 
of events depended upon "millions and millions of voli­
tions," so that a single event could drastically change 
the future for all succeeding g e n e r a t i o n s.5^ The whole 
divine order and purpose rested upon contingency and not 
God's sovereignty. Therefore, man's independent actions 
could thwart all biblical predictions, and God was "liable 
to be frustrated of His e n d . "55 Edwards admitted that the 
Puritan doctrine of necessity had restricted human liberty, 
but the Arminians, through contingency, had restricted 
the liberty of God. They had, in effect, denied moral 
agency to the most perfect moral agent— an absurd conclu­
sion.
The essential qualities of a moral agent are 
in God, in the greatest possible perfections} 
such as understanding to perceive the differ­
ence between moral good and evil...and a 
power of acting according to his choice or 
pleasure, and being capable of doing those 
things which are in the highest sense of praise­
worthy. 58
In the process of the will's determination, nec­
essity and contingency again came in conflict. Whitby had 
argued that free acts must be contingent. He did not 
state with Chubb that acts of the will were uncaused, so




that the will's determination must depend upon antecedent
choices.57 Therefore, the will was not contingent, but
previous choice had determined the action of the will, and
made it necessary.
An yet they say, necessity is utterly in­
consistent with liberty. So that, by their 
scheme, the acts of the will can't be free 
unless they are necessary, and yet cannot 
be free if they are necessary.58
Whitby claimed the impossible! contingency belonged to the 
notion of liberty, yet was inconsistent with it. Edwards 
argued that Whitby's liberty, like Chubb's, was liberty 
to act unintelligently and unreasonably, without the gui­
dance of understanding.59 The Arminian argument could be 
sound only if reason and will were separate, or "as long 
as the will awaits outside the council chamber of specu­
lation. "60
Isaac Watts, the most moderate of these divines, 
was one of the most popular writers of the day. His Cate­
chisms. Or Instructions in the Principles of the Christian 
Religion (1730) and A Short View of the Whole Scripture 
History (1732) were standard works in England at mid-
5?Supra. pp. 77-78.
58Edwards, Freedom of the Will, pp. 270-271.
59lbld.. p. 273.
^°Mlller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 25*K
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century, but his greatest reputation resulted from his 
hymns. Although he was affected by the Arian heresy, he 
never widely departed from the mainstream of Puritan 
thought in either his theology or his hymnody.^l In 1732 
he wrote An Essay on Freedom of Will in God and in Crea­
tures . expressing a mildly Arminian view. He stated that 
"spirits, which are beings of active nature," have the 
power within themselves to make determinations.^2 Edwards 
countered that the soul could not determine itself as 
Watts suggested, because the mind cannot be the determin­
ing cause of its own actions, Edwards pointed out that 
the soul, or spirit within the mind, was merely a linguis­
tic substitution for will, and allowed the creature no 
greater freedom. "Therefore the activity of the nature 
of the soul affords no relief from the difficulties which 
the notion of a self-determining power in the will is at­
tended with."^3
Edwards treated these three divines in the same 
fashion? he demonstrated the inconsistencies and absur­
dities within each's argument for free will in the manner
^Sidney Lee, editor, Dictionary of National Bio­
graphy , vol. XX, pp. 978-981.
^Edwards, Freedom of the Will, p. 186.
63lbld., p. 189.
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first outlined by John Locke. The process of volition 
required an agent and a cause outside of the will itself, 
so that the will could not be self-caused. Chubb, Whitby, 
and Watts each described different mechanisms for voli­
tion, but each contradicted the conditions necessary for 
free determination. By answering the specific arguments 
of each, Edwards undermined the foundation of Arminlanism 
and upheld the Puritan doctrine of necessity and the sov­
ereignty of God on wholly modern grounds.
After removing the major stumbling block, free 
will, Edwards turned to questions of moral agency that 
Whitby had raised and that had occupied American polemists. 
Whitby stated that if human actions were necessary, then 
virtue and vice were empty names, and man was not account­
able for sin. Edwards answered Whitby from the scriptures. 
First, he said, "if there be any truth in Christianity or 
in the holy scriptures, the man Christ Jesus had his will 
infallibly, unalterably, and unfrustrably determined to 
good and to that a l o n e . E d w a r d s  doubted that any would 
claim that Jesus was not virtuous or praiseworthy, although 
His will was determined..The Arminian statement that praise 
and blame, virtue and vice could not exist when man's 
actions were determined, contradicted the sense of the
6^Ibld.. pp. 289-290.
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scriptures, These conditions could not apply to Christ's 
actions, and likewise, would not apply to man's. If the 
perfect moral agent lost no virtue because of determina­
tion, then human actions, although determined, would also 
deserve praise and blame. Second, the Arminian notion 
questioned the need for Christ's atonement for man's sin, 
Whitby held that determination removed the accountability 
for sin from man, and therefore, the imputation of blame 
as well. Without the pollution of sin, God had no need 
to sacrifice His son. This scheme perverted the entire 
gospel and made Christ's atonement completely unnecessary.̂
The most difficult argument that the Arminians 
posed, claimed that the Puritan doctrine of necessity 
made the first cause and orderer of all things /God7 the 
author of sin.^ Edwards defined "author of sin" in two 
waysi the doer of an evil act, and the permitter of an 
evil deed. "*Tis manifest, that God sometimes permits sin 
to be committed, and at the same times orders things so, 
that if He permits the fact, it will come to pass."^? God 
had a completely passive role in the occurrence of sinj
65ibld., p. 301. 66Ibld., p. 397.
67ibld., p. 403. See also A. B. Crabtree, Jonathan 
Edwards View of M a m  A Study in Eighteenth Century Calvin­
ism (Wallington Surrey, Englandi The Religious Education 
Press, Ltd., 19^8), pp. 8-9, and p. 50. Crabtree presents 
seven means that reformed theologians used to expiate God's 
responsibility for sin. Edwards, in choosing "permission"
through His Infinite foreknowledge, He knew that man would 
sin, and permitted it to take place, The permission of 
sin and the performance of that sin differed greatly, so 
that to accuse God of the latter was blasphemous, while 
the former was not reproachful to His character. Edwards 
stated that God permitted sin because that permission 
created greater good within the divine scheme, than if He 
had forbade it. He offered the example of Joseph’s en­
slavement by his brother^' evil act. They intended evil 
and harm to Joseph, but God's ordering and determining 
created greater good than if they had not sinned. "As for 
you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto 
good.
The doctrine of necessity supposed all events were 
connected to some antecedent ground and reason, and there­
fore, man had the means to prove the existence of God.
In contrast, the Arminian doctrine of contingence, or that 
events had no dependence upon preceding causes, took away 
all such proof.^9 Arminians dispensed with all such
was not novel, since he had such predecessors as Hollinger 
and Voetius. However, Edwards used "permission" differently 
than these earlier theologians, as he had severed the con­
nection with scholastic rationalism.
Genesis 50*20, and Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 
p. 406. For Joseph Bellamy's application of permission 
beyond Edwards, infra, pp. 153.
^Edwards, Freedom of the Will, p. ^05.
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notions of world order or a grand design on the part of 
God. They tended toward a mechanistic cosmos, created by 
God, and instilled with reason. However, that reasonable 
order was human, contingent upon millions and millions 
of volitions by finite men. Such a plan could have no 
other result than to destroy whatever order God had in­
tended. Edwards argued that the maintenance of the grand 
design necessitated that this reasonable order be depen­
dent upon God, and not upon man and man's will.?®
Edwards admitted that the Puritan doctrine of the 
sovereignty of God placed limits upon man's reason, but 
these’were the natural limitations of a finite creature. 
The Arminians, in advancing man's reason, placed no limits 
upon the finite creature, but by so doing", limited God.
One could not reasonably suppose that the creator could 
allow his creations greater liberty than Himself, without 
fear of frustrating the divine order, or His predetermined 
plan. Both the gospel and the sacrifice of God's son were 
purposeless, if His will were limited by the free actions 
of men. Edwards united biblical proof and reason to halt 
the Arminian subversion of the grand design of God and to 




Edwards had begun to reconcile the two chief atti­
tudes that dominated his personal intellectual and reli­
gious life. He demonstrated that Lockean epistemology 
supported the central doctrine of Puritan experiential 
religion— the sovereignty of God, and undermined the cen­
tral theme of the Arminian detractors. As knowledge of 
the sovereignty of God was the first step in saving con­
version, so was it the first step in establishing the new 
reasonable religion. Edwards' Freedom of the Will pro­
vided that foundation, but other fundamental tenets of 
Puritanism required that same profound redefinition.
CHAPTER IV
THE GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN, DEFENDEDI 
THE NEW ENGLAND PURITAN RESPONSE TO JOHN TAYLOR’S 
SCRIPTURE-DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN
With Jonathan Edwards' defense of the Puritan doc­
trine of the sovereignty of God in 175^» that controversy 
in New England slipped into the background. The Arminians, 
lacking any effective counter arguments for The Freedom of 
the Will, levelled only claims that Edwards was too meta­
physical and had clouded the issues with his reductio ad 
absurdum. Further, Edwards, by ignoring the specific ar­
guments posed by either the Anglicans or the liberal Puri­
tans , had removed the controversy from the American exper­
ience. He had argued against position that the liberals 
had also avoided— they had not argued freedom of the will, 
but only the right of private judgment. But the major 
reason that the liberals Ignored Edwards' treatise was that 
the nature of the controversy had shifted. The liberals 
and the moderate Puritans now clashed over the pollution 
of Adam's sin.
From the time of St. Augustine, the question of
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free will included the scriptural argument on the doctrine 
of original sin.1 In the eighteenth century, John Taylor 
broached this question in his Scripture-Doctrine of Ori­
ginal Sin, published in 17^0.^ Taylor's treatise renewed 
protest against the ancient Christian doctrine that held 
that the imputation of Adam's first sin tainted and pol­
luted all of his posterity. Traditional Christianity 
taught that man's original corruption was necessary in the 
redemptive scheme. Romans 5«19 stated, "For as by one 
man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obed­
ience of one shall many be made righteous.'' Through Adam, 
the natural head of mankind, all were made sinners and de-
^The doctrine of original sin, with its roots in 
the Old Testament, traced man’s natural depravity to Adam's 
fall from grace. By that fall, all men were placed in dis­
favor with God. Paul, in Romans 5«18-19— "Therefore as by 
the offense of one .judgment came upon all men to condemna­
tion...For as by one man's disobedience many were made sin­
ners..."— established the covenant relationship between sin's 
entrance into the world, and man's deliverance from that 
sin. However, until the early fifth century, during the de­
bate between St. Augustine and Pelagius, no one had under­
taken a systematic study of original sin. St. Augustine 
described man's fall as complete, so that all of Adam's 
posterity received his "spoilt seed” and lacked the ability 
to will good. James Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and 
Ethics. vol. 9» PP. 559-561.
2John Taylor of Norwlck, England, (169^-1761) wrote 
the Scripture-Doctrlne of Original Sin in 1735. "but some 
dispute exists over the actual publication date. Perry : 
Miller, Jonathan Edwards, cites the date as 1738, while both 
the Dictionary of National Biography and Jeremy Goring, 
"Calvinism in Decay," Hibbert Journal, vol. 60, p. 206, 
give the date as 17̂ -0.
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serving damnation, just as through the sacrifice of Christ, 
mankind's spiritual head, God offered salvation to His 
predestined elect.
Puritan covenant or federal theology softened God's 
determinism, but did not lessen the effects of the impu­
tation of Adam's sin. If man were not depraved and ori­
ginally corrupt, Christ's atonement and sacrifice were 
superfluous. The atonement included a change of state, 
regeneration or circumcision of the heart? man must neces­
sarily have been in an evil state for God to change his 
heart to good.^ The sixteenth century Reformation had af­
firmed the inability of sinful man to gain his own salva­
tion. The spirit of renewal during the Great Awakening 
similarily emphasized man's depravity and the divine beauty 
.of God. Puritan experiential religion depended upon a close 
connection between the doctrines of original sin and the 
sovereignty of God? man's passivity and God's absolute de­
termination in the affair of salvation reflected man's ori­
ginal corruption.
In the disruption of orthodoxy caused by the Lati- 
tudinarians and Arminians in eighteenth century England, 
the Christian doctrine also came under scrutiny. John
3Joseph Haroutanian, Piety Versus Morallsm, the 
Passing of New England Theology (Hamden, Connecticut?
Archon Books, 1965), pp. 20-21.
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Taylor's Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin renewed the 
attack upon this fundamental doctrine of the Reformed 
Churches In the same manner In which Christ's divinity and 
the sovereignty of God had earlier been questioned. Taylor 
questioned original sin on two grounds« reason and scrip­
ture, He examined the Greek and Hebrew texts and found 
mistranslations that had been used incorrectly to estab­
lish the doctine. In this manner, he posited an opposing 
view to St. Augustine's doctrine, that withstood traditional 
Puritan counter arguments. An Irish minister, reacting to 
the treatise, stated "it is a bad book, and a dangerous 
book, and an heretical booki and, what is worse than all, 
the book is unanswerable. Taylor expressed similar con­
fidence, calling his tract the final blow to Calvinism. 
Sereno Dwight, in his 1829 biography of Jonathan Edwards, 
stated that Edwards' answer to Taylor's treatise dealt such 
an unexpected blow to the confident Arminian, that it 
brought about his early death.5
John Taylor, reputedly the best Hebraic scholar in 
England, had attended the liberal academies at Finden and
^Goring, Calvinism in Decay, p. 206, and Jonathan 
Edwards, The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin. De­
fended. Clyde A. Holbrook, editor (New HavenV Yale Uni- 
versity Press, 1970). p. 3. (Editor's Introduction.)
■^Edwards, Original Sin, p. 3. (Editor's Introduc­
tion. )
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Whitehaven. Despite their emphasis upon free thinking, he 
did not drift away from orthodoxy until after he had left 
school and entered the ministry. While in college, he had 
read the works of Philip van Limborch, the Dutch Remon­
strant^, but these heretical ideas did not immediately in­
fluence his theology. His defection to Arminianism became 
apparent only after his acceptance of the assistant pastor­
ship at Norwich, England, in 1733. Taylor wrote his trea­
tise on original sin two years later, and followed in 17^5 
with The Key to the Apostolic Writings. and in 1751 with 
The Scripture-Doctrine of the Atonement. Taken together, 
these three books hastened the decline of rigid Calvinism 
in England, in Scotland, and in America.^
The Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin, the most 
important of these three books in America, received wide 
attention from both Arminian and Calvinist clerics. Taylor's 
extensive Hebraic scholarship, combined with Lockean epis- 
temology, created an attack upon the orthodox view unlike 
any that had preceded it. He exploded the federal relation­
ship of Adam to his posterity, as inconsistent with reason. 
Taylor stated that unless man had some voice in the choos­
ing of his personal representative, then he lacked respon-
^Supra. p. lOn,
?Goring, Calvinism in Decay, p. 206.
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sibility for that representative’s actions. In the case 
of Adam, he became mankind's federal head only through 
divine decree, and without m a n ’s concurrence, so that his 
posterity could not share in A dam’s guilt. Further, Taylor 
stated that the Hebrew texts scripturally demonstrated 
that man did not suffer the guilt of Adam’s sin, but only 
its consequences.
Taylor divided The Scripture-Doctrine of Original 
Sin int.o three parts. The first two were critical exami­
nations of the Greek and Hebrew biblical texts, and the 
third dealt with moral theology. The last part gained the 
most attention among his contemporaries, as he attacked 
Calvinist assumptions regarding original sin.
Essentially, Taylor argued that the doctrine of 
original sin was the invention of St. Augustine and that 
the Apostolic Church had not held such a view. There were, 
he claimed, at most five references in the Bible that ex­
plicitly described the consequences of man's first trans­
gression. Two of these were in the Old Testament and three 
were in the New.® He denied that any of these references
®The two Old Testament citations were Genesis 2il7, 
"But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou 
shalt not eat of itj for in the day that thou eatest thereof 
thou shalt surely die," and Genesis 3*7 to the end of the 
chapter. This passage described the punishment God levied 
for Adam's transgression. God threatened Adam with death 
in the first reference, but according to the second, that
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established the federal nature of Adam, so that all of his 
posterity could not have shared in the guilt of his sin, 
but only in its consequences, Adam brought death into the 
world, but only physical death, or the loss of immortality. 
This, he stated, was not a punishment, but a blessing, for 
how else could man enter into the Kingdom of God, save by 
dying,9 Taylor based his argument upon original guilt 
rather than original sin. Man could not be blamed for 
sharing in the sin of Adam, any more than the family of a 
criminal shared in the guilt of the father*s crimes. The 
father in this case, as with Adam, was the natural or fed­
eral head of the family. The guilt in either instance was 
not imputed to the posterity, but only the consequences of 
that guilt. The criminal's family would suffer because 
of his crime, but they would not share in the responsibility 
of blame.
death was only the loss of immortality. In the New Testa­
ment there were Romans 5*12-21, especially verse twelvei 
"Wherefore, as by one sin entered into the world and death 
by sin; and so death passed to all men, for that all men 
have sinned," I Corinthians 15*21-22; "For since by man 
came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. 
For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be 
made alive," and I Timothy 2;l4i "And Adam was not de­
ceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgres­
sion. "
^John Taylor, "The Scripture-Doctrine of Original 
Sin," Hlbbert Journal, vol. 6l, pp. 91-92. This journal 
article contained only excerpts from the third section of 
John Taylor's full treatise.
10^
Original guilt and the nature of representation 
reflected the changing thought in the eighteenth century. 
Guilt Implied the action of an agent, with the agent ac­
countable for his performance. Man in "sinning with Adam" 
did not willfully join Adam in the performance of sin, and 
therefore, suffered only the consequences of that sin, the 
fall from grace, but not the pollution of guilt. In a 
like manner, representation could not be absolutely decreed 
or imposed upon mankind. They must have shared in the 
choosing in order to have shared in the responsibility of 
their representatives guilt. If man neither willfully sin­
ned, nor selected his representatives, then reasonably, he 
could not suffer the actual guilt for another's actions.
Further, Taylor admitted that sin and corruption 
were in the world, but the cause of that sin must be in 
man himself, and original sin gave a false cause.
Doth not the doctrine of original sin teach 
you to transfer your wickedness and sin to 
a wrong cause i whereas you ought to blame 
or condemn yourself alone for any wicked 
lusts which prevail in your heart...you lay 
the whole u p o n  A d a m . 10
Taylor felt that the doctrine of original sin imputed the 
cause of man's sin to a pollution or corruption of the 
nature of man. Extended logically, this doctrine imputed 
the cause of sin to God, rather than to man. Assuming a
l°Ibid.. p. 91.
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pollution of man's nature, meant that man was necessarily 
vicious and sinful, And if sin were natural and unavoid­
able , there could be no guilt or condemnation for that 
which one could not avoid. Taylor felt, then, that the 
doctrine of original sin subverted the Christian practices 
of sobriety, righteousness, and charity; original sin cor­
rupted the basic Christian ethical system and was blasphe­
mous to God. Christians needed to emphasize the encour­
agement offered by Christ's redemption, rather than a state
of wretchedness that rendered man's reasonable powers 
11quite useless. A
New England clerics made no immediate response to 
Taylor's treatise, although it must have had wide circu­
lation in the early 17^0's.^ However, until after the 
middle of the 1750's, the doctrine of original sin was 
only a secondary issue. The Anglican Arminians, Dr, Samuel 
Johnson and John Beach, had attacked that doctrine, but 
they had directed the brunt of their assault against the 
sovereignty of God.*3 Until the publication of the Freedom
11Ibld.. p. 91.
12h, Sheldon Smith, Changing Conceptions of Original 
Sin; A Study in American Theology Since 1750 (New Yorki 
Charles"Scribner*s S o n s 1955)» PP. 1 ^ - 1 5 . Smith cites 
Samuel Hopkins reading the tract at the age of twenty-three 
(he was born in 1721), and assumed that it was widely cir­
culated late in the 1740's, Jonathan Edwards had received 
a copy from John Erskine of Scotland in 17^8.
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of the Will in 175^» the liberal wing of the Puritan 
Church placed little emphasis on original sin. Edwards, 
by undermining the arguments for man's free will and moral 
agency, shifted the controversy to the doctrine of original 
sin. Liberals, in attacking the Freedom of the Will, as­
serted that Edwards' use of Locke was abuse, and that by
establishing "a theoretical necessity of sin, it destroyed
1 it-the sinfulness of sin."x With this apparent chink in 
Puritan orthodoxy created by the earlier controversy,
Samuel Webster published A Winter's Evening Conversation 
upon the Doctrine of Original Sin in 1757» attacking that 
Puritan doctrine.
At the time of publication, Webster was not one of 
the more prominent clergymen in New England, He had earned 
his B.A. and M.A. at Harvard College, the latter in 17^0, 
and settled as minister of the Rocky Church of the West 
Parish of Salisbury. Prior to the Winter's Evening Conver- 
sation, he was unknown as a polemical divine, and even as 
the controversy progressed, his principle rival, Peter 
Clark, knew him only as the author of that heretical pamph­
let. The controversy removed Webster's obscurity as his 
works became widely read throughout New England. By 177^
^ Supra. pp. 35-36.
^Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 268.
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he had gained sufficient repute to be asked to deliver the 
Dudleighean Lecture at Harvard, an honor stemming from his 
attack upon the doctrine of original sin,1-5
The "conversation'' was a dialogue between two Puri­
tan laymen and a liberal clergyman. The laymen had raised 
the question whether the doctrine of original sin was a 
fundamental statement in Christian orthodoxy. The cleric's 
answer, in denying original sin, offered a watered-down 
version of John Taylor's tract, without the scriptural 
arguments. The clergyman skillfully exploded the federal 
relationship of Adam to his posterity, using the catch 
phrases of Taylor. He argued that even if Adam was the 
chosen representative of mankind, and committed sin, the 
guilt could not be imputed to his posterity. . The effector 
of the sin alone was balmeable for the guilt; mankind suf­
fered only the folly and ill consequences of sin. He con­
cluded that if man received no taint from the sin of a 
chosen representative, then certainly the sin of one who 
was not his chosen representative could not be imputed,1^
^Shipton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates, vol. 10, p.
253.
l6Supra, p., 101, and pp. 104-105. Webster argued 
Taylor's point regarding original guilt rather than ori­
ginal sin, and guilt required man's moral agency. Both 
the position on guilt and the demands concerning repre­
sentation negated the idea of the imputation of original 
sin to mankind.
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Webster's cleric followed closely Taylor's other major 
argumentsi original sin was the invention of St. Augus-. 
tine1?, death was a blessing to man and not a punishment, 
and there was little scriptural support for this doctrine.1®
Webster differed from Taylor in applying the effects 
of the imputation of Adam's sin upon newborn children.
Taylor originated the point, but Webster changed the empha­
sis. Instead of being merely an application of the doc­
trine of original sin, infant damnation became the funda­
mental issue between moderate Puritans and the liberals.
The argument, while based in reason, was charged with emo­
tion. Webster asked what was the nature of a God that 
would condemn a stillborn or newborn child for Adam’s sin, 
a sin which reflected no fault or wrongdoing on the part 
of the child? "How can you reconcile, the goodness, holi­
ness, or justice of God, to make them heirs of Hell, and 
send them into the world only to breathe and die, and then 
take them to Hell?"19 The question of infant damnation was 
the most compelling argument posed by Webster? an argument 
that many Puritans were wont to answer. Webster pushed the
1^Samuel Webster, The Winter's Evening Conversation 
upon the Doctrine of Original Sin (Boston» Green and Rus­
sell, 1757), p. 4, and p. 23.
^ Ibld. . p. 13, and passim.
19Ibld., p. 6.
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argument to the extreme, and. stated that if the infants 
were not sinners before the imputation of Adam's sin, then 
the imputation alone made these infants sinners and deserv­
ing of eternal damnation. If this were the case, the 
author of that imputation was the cause of their sin and 
alone was blameable. The creator of all that was good and 
holy could not also be the author of all that was evil.
Thus, Webster argued, the doctrine of original sin did not 
reflect well upon the character of God, and the holders of
O Asuch doctrine were guilty of blasphemy.
Peter Clark, the minister at Danvers, took issue 
with Webster's claims the following year. The title of his 
tract, The Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin, Stated, and 
Defended In a Summer-Morning Conversation. Between a Minis­
ter and a Neighbor, indicated that he was examining original 
sin in the harsh light of reason, Instead of the idle specu­
lation of a "Winter's Evening Conversation." Clark had 
earned a reputation as a champion of reason in an earlier 
controversy with the Baptists (1735)* and was considerably 
better known than Webster.2* Clark was a conservative 
minister of the same ilk as Joseph Sewall and Thomas Prince,22
2QIbld.. p. 27.
2^Shipton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates, vol. 5» p.
61.7. : :
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He had welcomed the Great Awakening and supported evangel- 
icalsism, but like most of the Boston clergy, opposed enthu­
siasm. Clark's tract maintained the mechanical framework 
begun by Websteri the reluctant layman, reflecting upon 
the ideas that Webster had presented, entertained doubts 
about the liberal view. However, instead of returning with 
his questions to the "Winter's Evening" minister, the lay­
man went to his own, a moderate Puritan. The question of 
infant damnation disturbed neither the layman nor the 
cleric; they stated that the major conflict between Puri­
tans and Arminians was whether original sin was a funda­
mental doctrine. . Clark dismissed infant damnation in the 
preface of this trace as among the secret things which be­
longed only to God, Again in the body, he referred to in­
fant damnation as a "thing which few or none maintain," 
but otherwise ignored it as a major issue in the contro­
versy .^3
Peter Clark's Summer-Morning Conversation presaged 
many of the arguments that Jonathan Edwards would use to
? ?Joseph Sewall and Thomas Prince, two of the older 
moderate leaders in Boston, shared the pulpit of the Old 
South Church from 1718 until Prince's death in 1758.
23peter-Clark, The Scrlpture-Doctrlne of Original 
Sin. Stated and Defended in a Summer-Morning Conversation, 
between a Minister and a" Neighbor (Bostoni S. Kneeland. 
i'758 )t P. i» and p. 6.
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explode John Taylor's tract. He combined reason and scrip­
ture in the manner of Edwards, but his argument had one 
major deficiency, he rigidly retained federal theology.
In so dbing, he denied man the right to choose his own re­
presentatives. An act of God established Adam as the fed­
eral head of mankind} God covenanted with the whole of 
mankind, when Adam was the whole of mankind, for, as Clark 
argued, Adam's posterity "are but Adam multiplied."2^ Adam 
was the natural representative of mankind, as parents are 
the natural representatives of their children. The federal 
relationship, then, was merely the continuation of a law 
of nature.2-5 Clark was unwilling to surrender this argu­
ment, as he saw covenant theology, complete with original 
sin, as the major discord between Webster and himself. If 
Adam were not the head of physical mankind, as Christ was 
the head of spiritual mankind, then the entire Puritan 
redemptive scheme failed. Sin entered the world by Adam, 
and redemption by Christ. Man was totally depraved and 
corrupt by nature, which established original sin as a 
fundamental doctrine. Clark correctly centered the contro­
versy on the relationship of original sin to the redemption 
by Christ, but placed his defense in an untenable position 
through his insistence upon federal theology.
2^Ibld.. p. 21. 25Ibld.. p. 17.
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Clark denied that St. Augustine had invented the 
doctrine of original sin. St, Augustine had given the be­
lief a name, but the doctrine itself had Old Testament 
roots, and was generally received and confessed in Apostolic 
times. As the name was lacking before the fifth century, 
one could not expect to find references to "original sin" 
in the scripture, but it "was copiously and in a great 
variety of terms asserted and explained therein,"2? Clark 
cited several additional texts, not cited by Webster, like 
Genesis 6 *5• which while not referring directly to Adam's 
sin, did "teach and prove the original and universal depra­
vation of man's nature from its effects."2®
Probably the most important point that Clark made 
dealt with the claim that the doctrine of original sin 
made God the author of man's sin. He defined sin as a pri­
vation of moral good, and therefore, had no efficient cause 
that one could impute to God, Man, in the case of sin, was 
not a moral agent or efficient cause of sin, but only the 
deficient cause. Man sinned because he failed to perform 
good. Clark's answer was incomplete, but pointed toward
26Ibld., pp. 99-100. 2?Ibld., p. 125.
2®Ibld.. p. 7^. Genesis 615 stated, "And God saw 
that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that 
every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil 
continually."
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the argument that Edwards expressed upon the nature of sin. 
But more importantly, Clark uncovered a basic difference 
between the Puritan and Arminian view of sin. To the 
former, sin was a lack of good, the Inability to perform 
righteous actsj in other words, it was a part of the basic 
nature of man. Arminlans viewed sin from the standpoint 
of guilt, and guilt required the performance of unholy acts, 
instead of an original corruption or a polluted nature.
The individual's personal activity had to deserve damna­
tion. Therefore, the questions that Webster posed were 
not valid in the Puritan sense, and Clark, mistakenly, did 
not dismiss them, rather than agreeing that few held such 
feelings or that infant damnation belonged to the secret 
things of God.
In the pamphlet dispute that followed, one point, 
infant damnation, became the major contention between 
moderate and liberal Puritans. Charles Chauncy and Edmund 
March .joined Webster in defenses of the Winter's Evening 
Conversation, and all three liberal clerics insisted that 
Clark had Ignored the major dispute, that Calvinism advo­
cated infant damnation. Chauncy and March ignored the body 
of the tract, and directed their writings to the preface. 
Edmund March advised the attestors to Clark's defense to 
temper his statements. He asked them why, in Clark's 
tract, infants were a special case, that they were not
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subject to the federal liableness for Adam's sin, "while 
othersj viz.» all that live to years, etc. remain under 
the same?"3° Chauncy exploited the same inconsistency in 
Clark's scheme. Puritans viewed the whole of Adam's pos­
terity as liable to eternal death for Adam's sin, but 
Clark's doctrine allowed some of Adam's posterity, namely 
infants, exception from damnation. Chauncy accused Clark 
of substituting "the private opinions of such men as Mr. 
Locke and Taylor, in the room of universally known tenets 
of Calvinism,"31 Clark had made the damnation of infants 
a special case, and in that instance agreed with the lib­
eral position. Chauncy assumed that Clark's silence con­
noted total agreement with Webster and a significant modi­
fication* "I rather think the better of him for not say­
ing, with the Calvinists, that the first sin is so imputed 
to them /infants/, as that they are liable to the damna-
^The attestors to Clark's tract were Joseph Sewall, 
Thomas Prince, Samuel Phillips, Thomas Foxcroft, and Eben- 
ezer Pemberton. Ibid., p. ii.
30Edmund March, Fair PlayI Or a Needful Word to 
Temper the Tract Entitled A Summer-Morning Conversation 
(Portsmouth* Daniel Fowle, 1758), p. l̂ f.
31/Charles Chauncy/, The Opinion of One that has 
Perused the Summer-Mornlngs Conversation Concerning Ori­
ginal Sin by the Rev, Mr. Peter Clark (Boston* Green and 
Russell, 1756)* p. 1^. Clark, expecting a favorable re­
sponse from Charles Chauncy, asked the liberal cleric to 
review his work. The result was this unfavorable letter, 
printed anonymously. H. Sheldon Smith, Changing Concep­
tions of Original Sin, p. 47.
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tion of hell."32
In less than a year, the liberal view abandoned 
the specific attack begun by John Taylor, and held that 
the only point of controversy was the emotional issue of 
infant damnation, the point least defensible from either 
the scriptures or common sense. The idea that an all 
powerful God would condemn innocent, newborn babes repugned 
the Puritan defender and aided the Arminians. This issue 
was only a minor point in the entire concept of original 
sin, a point that had little validity for either side when 
viewed in the broad perspective. The condemnation of in­
fants was in fact no different than the condemnation of 
adults. If Adam's sin tainted all mankind equally, and the 
taint of that sin deserved damnation, then no separate 
cases existed for infants and adults. These liberals backed 
Clark into expressing neither a Calvinist nor a liberal 
view of original sin, over this one specious question, an 
emotion filled one that he wanted to leave moot.
Joseph Bellamy, a disciple of Jonathan Edwards, bet­
ter typified the kind of Puritan response these charges re­
quired. Bellamy challenged the validity of Webster's 
placing God as the judge higher than God as the sovereign.
32chauncy, The Opinion of One that has Perused, pp.
1 6 -1 7 .
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But how do you prove, that death comes upon 
It /the infant7 in this legal manner, from 
God as the lawgiver and judge? Who while 
acting in that capacity, ever renders to every­
one according to their desserts?33
His answer to infant damnation was equally unequivocal; if 
one agreed to the imputation of Adam’s sin, as under the 
federal conception, then God had no choice but to damn . 
them. They were not innocent babes, but shared in Adam's 
sin, as all the rest of mankind had. "God may justly cast 
them off forever; in case that sin deserved so great a 
punishment, which you grant it d i d . H a d  Clark answered 
Webster in this manner, he would have avoided his incon­
sistencies, and the nature of the controversy would have 
taken a different complexion. The liberals would have had 
to pursue the central issues that separated the moderate 
and liberal Puritan thought on this doctrine. The contro­
versy would have retained the framework first established 
by John Taylor; was original sin a fundamental statement 
of Puritan orthodoxy, scripturally what proof existed for 
original sin, and what punishment did man deserve, if any, 
for Adam's sin? Clark lacked the bluntness of Bellamy, 
and had allowed the controversy to become stalled upon a
33Joseph Bellamy, A Letter to the Rev. Author of 
the Winter's Evening Conversation (Boston; S. Kneeland, 
175&Y, P. 5. : “
3^-ibld.. p. 7.
minor point.35
The controversy included another round of pamphlets 
by Samuel Webster and Peter Clark. Together, The Winter's 
Evening Conversation. Vindicated and A Defense of the Prin­
ciples of the Summer-Mornings Conversation, illustrated the 
degradation of the debate. Clark's apparent surrender over 
the point of infant damnation overshadowed the several 
good, reasonable arguments that he had Introduced. Clark 
had stated that the futurity of infants belonged to God 
alone, but admitted that if God did condemn infants, surely 
He would not punish them as severely as those whose actions 
deserved damnation. God exempted them from "the stings and 
horrors of a guilty conscience, which arise from reflection 
upon men's actual sins."-^ Clark avoided the onus of de­
claring that infants deserved damnation, and essentially 
gave up this minor point. Webster turned this acquiescence 
into abandonment of the entire doctrine of original sin.
He insisted that there was less controversy between his 
position and Clark's than between Clark and the Calvinist,-^
35joseph Bellamy had more importance in this contro­
versy than the present discussion indicates. However, be­
yond this letter, his contribution belongs more properly to 
Chapter V. Infra, pp. 152-159.
3^Peter Clark, A Defense of the Principles of the 
Summer-Mornings Conversation Concerning Original Sin (Bos­
ton i Edes and Gill, 1760), p. 19, and p. 23.
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The more important assertions, clouded by this 
false argument, dealt with the necessity of man's sinning 
while under a polluted or tainted nature.3® Webster stated 
that natural necessity removed the blame of sin from man, 
and placed the blame on the cause of the Imputation. Clark 
countered that the federal relationship did not make sin­
ning necessary? God was not actively involved in the impu­
tation. God did not will the fall of Adam, but permitted 
the violation of the covenant made between God and Adam, 
so that man brought sin into the world through his own free 
will. With the fall, man lost free will and sin completely 
and irrevocably tainted his nature. Therefore, one could 
not reasonably charge God as the author of sin, but merely 
the permitter of sin.39
Clark, by borrowing heavily from Jonathan Edwards* 
treatises on The Freedom of the Will and Original Sin, 
actually countered one of the major claims lodged by the 
liberals against the Puritan scheme. However, in the con­
text of this controversy, such insight did not aid the
8 37samuel Webster, The Winter's Evening Conversation,
Vindicated (Bostoni Edes and Gill, 1759), p. 21.
^Essentially this is the same doctrine of neces­
sity that the Arminians claimed that the sovereignty of God 
required. Man's actions were determined, and therefore, 
man lacked responsibility for sin. Supra. p. 88.
39peter Clark, A Defense of the Principles, p. 104,
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Danvers minister. The doctrine of original sin was no 
longer the concern of the liberal clergy. The controversy 
between Peter Clark and Samuel Webster clouded rather than 
clarified the issues between liberal and moderate Puritan 
doctrine. Clark's reluctance to answer the charges of 
Webster straight away, led to an avoidance of the major 
issues, so that this pamphlet debate was only a sideshow 
in the controversy between Puritans and Arminians. The 
disputants did uncover many of the major issues initially, 
and Clark's answers definitely demonstrated the trend to­
wards a redefined Puritan doctrine, but they failed to 
maintain the controversy on the level it began.
Several authors, in defending Puritanism from the
Arminian attack upon original sin, avoided the regretable 
twist that Clark’s and Webster's controversy had taken. 
Joseph Bellamy was one, but more Important in this dis­
cussion were Samuel Niles and Jonathan Edwards. Both of 
these authors Ignored the pamphlet warfare that was taking, 
place in.New England and struck at the root of the heresy, 
at John Taylor's Scrlpture-Doctrlne of Original Sin itself. 
Samuel Niles wrote The True Scrlpture-Doctrlne of Original 
Sin, Stated and Defended in 1757, and in the following year,
Edwards' The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin, De­
fended was published posthumously. Because these works 
avoided the peculiar twist that the other phase of the
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controversy had taken, they dealt more exactly with the 
major issues of disharmony between Puritan and Arminian 
principles. Both dismissed infant damnation and agreed 
that God had every right to damn infants as He damned adults, 
because of pollution from Adam's sin.
In the preface to Original Sin, Jonathan Edwards 
stated that he had written his defense prior to knowledge 
of Mr. Niles' work, and continued publication even with the 
chance of d u plication.Edwards had not read Niles' de­
fense, so that he did not realize that concern over dupli­
cation was unwarrented. There was a great disparity be­
tween the answers that Edwards and Niles presented to Tay­
lor's tract, Niles' work was scriptural and scholastic, 
and had ignored the changes in eighteenth century eplstem- 
ology. He echoed John Calvin, the Synod of Dort, and St. 
Augustine in reaffirming those defenses of origina.1 sin 
formulated centuries before. Niles denied that Taylor had 
opened a new argument, but merely restated the false debate 
begun by Pelagius in the fifth century. The difference be­
tween Niles' and Edwards' arguments demonstrated the tran-
^®Edwards stated that Niles had confined his answer 
to the first two parts of Taylor's Scrlpture-Doctrlne. 
while his own was a more general defense of the entire doc­
trine. Both he felt, "may receive light from each other, 
and may confirm one another? and so the common design be 
better subserved." Edwards, Original Sin, p. 103,
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sition from a more traditional Calvinism to the new rea­
sonable Puritanism in the period following the Great Awak­
ening. Both held similar doctrinal views, but the manner 
in which they defended these views differed drastically. 
Edwards could no longer reassert the fundamentalist ideas 
of Calvin, but now had to reinterpret those principles ac­
cording to the temper of the Enlightened Age.
The background of the two divines differed as 
much as did their treatises on original sin. Samuel Niles, 
born in 1673» was seventy-three at the time he wrote the 
True Scripture-Doctrine. He was the first student to enter 
Harvard College from Rhode Islands matriculating at.twenty- 
one , he vastly exceeded the average age of entering first- 
year students. Following graduation in 1699* he spent over 
ten years as a missionary in Rhode Island, before he became 
minister at the South Parish in Braintree. Soon after his 
ordination on May 23, 1711, the Braintree parishioners felt 
Niled' conservativism over the inclusion of singing in the 
Sunday services. Unlike most New England clerics, Niles 
feared the inroads of popery by such a practice, and saw 
the "hand of the Devil in the new way of singing, as they 
call it,"^1 He accepted this innovation only after the de-
-■•Acceptance of Kymnody was widespread in the eigh­
teenth century. Niles, however, retained Calvin's impost 
against singing proclaimed during the sixteenth century 
Reformation. Niles' position wa:s generally more stringent
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fection of twenty: members of his congregation to the Church 
of England. During the Great Awakening, his conservativism 
reappeared; he was one of the most bitter opponents of 
George Whitefield and the "enthusiastic exhorters. Fol­
lowing the revival, his major concern was defending ortho­
doxy from the liberal wing of the Puritan Church. In 1757 
he again defended another Reformation principle, and his 
conservativism was as apparent in the True Scripture-Doc­
trine . as in his refusal to accept hymnody.
John Taylor, in exploding federal or covenant theo­
logy* stated that there was a logical inconsistency in the 
covenant of works, the covenant of grace, the Mosaic Law, 
and the imputation of sin. The covenant of works, accord­
ing to Taylor, made between God and Abraham, governed the 
salvation of the Jews until the death of Christ and the 
ascendency of the covenant of grace. The covenant of works 
established a legal salvation, God judged man according to 
his merits, but this legal salvation preceded the law which 
God gave to Moses. Taylor stated that this contradicted 
reason to assume that man was under legal salvation from 
Adam to Moses without the law. He cited Romans 5«13» "For
than that common In New England at that time. Shipton, 
Sibley's Harvard Graduates, vol. 4-, p. 4-88.
^2Ibld.. p.>89.
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until the:law sin was in the worldi but sin is not im­
puted when there is no law.”̂ 3 Under the conditions estab­
lished by the Old Testament and by Paul, until God gave 
man the Mosaic Law there was no imputation of sin. Thus, 
Adam's sin could not be imputed because there was no law 
in the world. To Taylor, this text from Romans specific­
ally denied that the doctrine of original sin was a funda­
mental religious statement.
Niles' traditional answer to Taylor stated that 
Adam was the federal and natural head of mankind, and as 
the first man represented all his posterity in the coven­
ant with God. His failure to comply with the provisions 
of that covenant resulted in his fall from grace, and the 
pollution of all his natural posterity with his sin. How­
ever, Niles stated that God, in His infinite foreknowledge, 
knew that Adam would fall from grace, and therefore, en­
joined Christ in the covenant of grace prior to the cre­
ation of the world,^ Since the covenant God made with 
man came after the creation of the world, Niles had the 
covenant of grace preceding that of works. This scheme 
clearly contradicted reason? if the covenant of works came
^Edwards, Original Sin, p. 315.
^Samuel Niles, The True Scripture-Doctrine of Ori­
ginal Sin, Stated and Defended (Boston! S. Kneeland, 1757), 
pp. 24-25.
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after the covenant of grace, then the former had. no valid­
ity, and was a false covenant. God's predetermination of 
Adam's fall from grace removed the first sin from man's 
free will, and thus could not he imputed. Calvinist doc­
trine had allowed Adam free will prior to the fall, but 
Niles' conclusions contradicted any notions of free will 
at all.
Taylor had broached infant damnation in his dis­
cussion of man's original nature. He denied that man was 
originally either righteous or corrupt and polluted with 
Adam's sin. Conformity to the law required the action of 
a moral agent, and an Infant could not be a moral agentj 
an Infant came into the world without any preconceived 
notions of good and evil because these were learned con­
cepts. The Calvinist assumption that Adam was perfectly 
righteous before the fall, or that his posterity were ori­
ginally corrupt because of imputation, contradicted reason. 
Man was born without any innate knowledge or ability, and 
therefore, was originally neither good or evil.
Niles brushed aside Taylor's reasonable argument, 
responding only with biblical proof. He answered that if
^Taylor indicated here his reliance upon Lockean 
epistemology. Man could not assume an original pollution, 
because there was in man no innate determination of good 
and evil, because they were learned qualities.
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man were destitute of original righteousness, then man 
would have had no right to immediate communion with God.
But God had spoken directly to Adam, demonstrating that in 
fact he was originally righteous. Further, Niles argued 
that simple observation of infants' demonstrated the pol­
lution of Adam's sin and their lack of virtue.
The absence of this /conformity to the moral 
law/ so evidently appearing in all children, 
as soon as they are mature enough to be cap­
able of religious and virtuous action, demon­
strates them to be born, in a state of sin.^7
Niles' conclusions demonstrated a complete lack of under­
standing of Lockean epistemology and a reliance upon tra­
ditional arguments. His treatise was of the type which, 
Taylor boasted, made his work irrefutable,
Samuel Niles worked himself into a maze of contra­
diction within the Calvinist scheme. One could not refute 
Taylor without reinterpreting the foundation of the prin­
ciples he defended and rejecting scholastic reasoning. Man 
had new faith in human ability and responsibility, so that 
the old arguments no longer were acceptable. Reason was 
the tool that man used to find God in the eighteenth cen­
tury, and scripture had to conform to reason., rather than 
reason to scripture. Niles failed to answer Taylor because
Ibid.. p. 6 3.
?̂Ibid., pp. 179-180
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his philosophy and religion were medieval, and the Puritan 
order emerging in the 1750's required an enlightened de­
fense .
Obviously, Niles had not read nor understood Jona­
than Edwards' Freedom of the Will, for in that treatise, 
Edwards answered many of those problems that lead Niles 
into inconsistencies and illogical conclusions, In the 
Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin, Defended, Edwards 
continued the framework established in his first work .
hoagainst the Arminian heresy. He defined original sin, 
not merely as Adam’s sin, as Taylor took it to mean, but 
as "the innate sinful depravity of the heart” vulgarly 
understood to include the imputation of Adam's s i n ,
Taylor's concern with original sin was a result of not 
understanding imputation of sin, and looking for guilt or 
or blame in an act too remote to suppose human activity, 
Edwards compared the federal relationship of Adam and his 
posterity to the roots and branches of a tree. If the
^®Many of the arguments presented by John Taylor 
parallelled those of Daniel Whitby and Thomas Chubb, so 
that many of those conditions Taylor deemed necessary for 
human nature, Edwards had already demonstrated to be false 
in the Freedom of the Will, Because of the nature of ori­
ginal sin, Edwards presented a much more scriptural proof, 
and thereby avoided the charge of being too metaphysical. 
Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 267,
^Edwards, Original Sin, p. 107.
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roots, the beginnings of the tree, are polluted and rotten, 
one could not expect the branches to produce good fruit,
God in the covenant made with Adam ’’looked on his posterity 
as being one with him.”5° Thus, the pollution of man's 
soul a t „birth was not frim the imputation of Adam's guilt, 
but the imputation of the first sin. The race of Adam 
partook
of the sin of the first apostasy, so as that 
this, in reality and propriety, shall become 
their sin; by virtue of a real union between 
the root and branches of the world of mankind 
.,.and therefore the sin of apostasy is not 
theirs, merely because God imputes it to them; 
but is truly and properly theirs, and on that 
ground, God imputes it to them.51
Edwards established the covenant or federal frame- 
work on both reasonable and scriptural grounds. Niles and 
Clark had relied heavily upon the proof of the federal 
nature of Adam and Christ from Romans 5*19.^ This text 
was the major pillar of federal theology, but remained in­
adequate in light of human liberty and the rights of man. 
Taylor had argued against the covenant theory, because of 
the necessity of the pollution of moral agents, Edwards 
stated that Taylor misunderstood imputation and also the
5°Ibid.. p. 389.
53-ibia.. pp. 407-408.
52"For as by one man's disobedience many were made 
sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righ­
teous. "
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nature of the pollution that resulted from Adam's fall.
Taylor had charged that the doctrine of necessity had made 
God the author of sin, corrupting man's nature by a divine 
declaration. In Freedom of the Will. Edwards had rejected 
the charge that sin’s entrance into the world required 
God's activity, but only His permission,-^ Taylor had 
attacked a rigid determination that Edwards declared did 
not exist; man was not bound to sin by a divine decree.
In this treatise on Original Sin, he expanded the nature 
of man's pollution. According to Edwards, God created man 
with two sets of principlesi a natural or carnal set which 
made him a part of God's creation, and a spiritual or super­
natural set which was decidely superior.5^ When man fell 
from grace and communion with God, he lost the spiritual 
set of principles and possessed only the carnal or natural 
one s. -5 -5 This accounted for the corruption of mankind; 
without the superior principles to guide him to holy and 
virtuous activity, man could not refrain from becoming sin-
-^Supra, pp. 93-9^.
5^Edwards was careful to point out that "natural 
and supernatural" did not have the traditional scholastic 
connotation. Natural principles were not those which man 
had originally, but only those which man has "only as a man," 
His use of natural and supernatural differentiated between 
the carnal and spiritual sets of principles. Edwards, Ori­
ginal Sin, pp. 381-382, and Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p.281.
^Edwards, Original Sin, p. 382.
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ful. Further, as mankind multiplied, only these natural 
principles passed to Adam’s posterity, as one could not 
pass on something that he did not possess.
Edwards' explanation avoided the usual difficulties 
attendant with covenant or federal theology. The pollution 
imputed to mankind was not guilt for sin, nor an active 
exercise by God. God could not be the author of sin, as 
He never implanted any bad principles in man's nature, but 
merely withdrew those that were perfect and holy.56. The 
separation of natural and supernatural principles explained 
man's original righteousness before the fall, and the pol­
lution of sin afterwards. God's sovereignty remained in­
tact, and the Arminian charge of His authorship of sin was 
demonstrated to be false. Both Edwards and Clark described 
sin as a privation of moral good and built upon God as the 
permissive cause and not the effector of sin.
As Taylor had directed two-thirds of his tract to 
a scriptural denial of original sin, Edwards top connected 
his reasonable argument with the scriptures. Of the 
five biblical citations that Taylor had claimed referred 
to Adam's sin, or the consequences of that sin, the most 
important was the long passage from Homans. ^  From this,
56lbid.. p. 383.
57"Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the 
world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men,
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Taylor had extracted his scriptural argument against fed­
eral theology, the imputation of sin, and described death 
merely as physical death and not the wages of sin. As 
Indicated by Niles, Calvinists had difficulty with the 
thirteenth verse, "sin is not imputed when there is no law.” 
Thus, according to Taylor, the death that "reigned from 
Adam to Moses," was not spiritual death, but only physical 
death which carried no blame for sin. Niles had abrogated 
the covenant of works in an attempt to answer Taylor, but 
Edwards sought a higher patriarch than Abraham for that 
covenant. Edwards stated that this passage clearly indi­
cated Paul's intention of proving that the covenant of
for that all have sinnedi (For until the law sin was in 
the worldj but sin is not imputed when there is no law. 
Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over 
them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's 
transgression, who is the figure of him that was to come.
But not as the offence, so also is_ the free gift. For if
through the offence of one many be dead, much more the
grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, 
Jesus Christ,, hath abounded unto many. And not as it was 
by one that sinned, so is the gifti for the judgment was 
by one to condemnation, but the free gift is of many offen­
ces unto justification. For if by one man's offence death 
reigned by one; must more they which receive abundance of 
grace and of the gift of righteousness shall reign in life 
by one, Jesus Christ.) Therefore as by the offence of one
judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the
righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto 
justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience 
many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall 
many be made righteous. Moreover the law entered, that the 
offence might abound. But where sin abounded, grace did 
much more abound; That as sin hath reigned unto death, even 
so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life 
by Jesus Christ our Lord." Romans 5• 12-2-1.
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works predated Abraham. Man's moral state depended upon 
Adam and not upon Abraham, and the law that man violated 
and made him a sinner was not the Mosaic Law, but the cov­
enant articles between God and Adam, Paul showed that 
"sin, guilt, and desert /sic/ of ruin, became universal in 
the world, long before the law given by Moses to the Jewish 
nation had any being,"58
Edwards found no obstacle in the thirteenth verse
as had other defenders of the covenant theology and ori-
/
ginal sin. He demonstrated that sin belonged to man, not 
because Adam's seed was spoiled, but that Adam was the 
legal representative of mankind, a highly compatible idea 
with the Age of Enlightenment.^ Jonathan Edwards reinter­
preted the covenant relationship between Adam and his pos­
terity, and opposed any notion of sinning because of a 
divine imposition. The relationship was a natural one, 
conforming to a higher law than man's, and entirely reason­
able .
Edwards' Original Sin avoided all. of the pitfalls 
inherent in Samuel Niles' scholasticism, and demonstrated 
that Puritan doctrine, regulated by reason, created a via­
ble religion in the eighteenth century. He retained the
58lbid., p. 338.
^^Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 277.
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Puritan doctrinal positions 6n the sovereignty of God, the 
denial of free will, and the pollution of original sin.
His methodology had changed from the first treatise on free 
will to the second on original sin, but then so had the 
controversy. The two treatises joined the dominant themes 
in Edwards' life. He emphasized the unity of the scrip­
tures and experience in contrasting human depravity with 
the divine beauty of God. He had exploded the belief that 
man sinned by necessity and demonstrated that man merely 
had a tendency to sin, a tendency which gave as clear an 
indication of man's depravity as if he had sinned by nec­
essity. The Arminian notion that man had a basically good 
charcater because he sinned less than he performed good 
works was as absurd as to declare "the state of. that ship 
is good, to cross the Atlantick Ocean in, under a notion 
that it will proceed and sail above water more hours than 
it will be sinking."^0
Jonathan Edwards died on March 22, 1758, from an 
innoculation against smallpox. He lived long enough to 
redefine Puritan principles upon a reasonable basis, but 
did not determine the direction in which they would be de­
veloped by his principle students, Joseph Bellamy and Samuel 
Hopkins. Edwards had not intended to posit an optimistic
^°Edwards, Original Sin, p. 129.
world view, Man remained polluted by Adam's sin and sal­
vation was "not opened to a general call. However, Edwards’ 
view of God had significantly changed traditional Puritan­
ism. God's sovereignty was not diminished, but the rule 
of reason tempered the disparity between God the judge and 
God the sovereign. God did not control mankind and the 
world by arbitrary judgment or whimsy, but created and 
governed by reason. For the developing optimistic view, 
Edwards' greatest advance was to remove man from the nec­
essity of sinning. He had tempered the doctrine of pre­
destination, without destroying God's sovereignty or grant­
ing man free will, Jonathan successfully created a world 
order, consonant with Puritan principles, that neither 
diminished the power of God, nor resulted in the mechanical 
sterility of the Deists. The doctrinal resolutions of 
Edwards provided the foundation from which Joseph Bellamy, 
and other New Divinity followers of Edwards, would create 
optimistic Puritanism.
CHAPTER V
THE WISDOM OF GOD IN THE PERMISSION OP SIN« JOSEPH 
BELLAMY'S OPTIMISTIC INTERPRETATION OF NEW 
ENGLAND PURITANISM
With the death of Jonathan Edwards in 1758, the 
leadership of the New Divinity School of theology passed 
to his close friend and student, Joseph Bellamy. Their 
friendship of mind and spirit began after Bellamy gradu­
ated from Yale College, and journeyed to Northampton to 
read theology under Edwards in 1736.1 Shortly after his 
graduation at sixteen, Bellamy experienced saving conver­
sion and dedicated his life to the ministry. Edwards re-
1Bellamy graduated from Yale College with special 
honors in language and literature, and until his conver­
sion, did not display any special concern for theology. 
Following conversion, he read with the Reverend Mr. Samuel 
Hall, pastor at Chesire, Connecticut, before travelling to 
Northampton. Bellamy's stay with Edwards coincided with 
Jonathan Edwards' preparation of the Faithful Narrative of 
the Surprising Works of God, a history of the revival in 
Northampton,' 173^-1735.' Bellamy absorbed much of the 
spirit of revival from Edwards and that revival. For more 
biographical detail, see Glenn Paul Anderson, "Joseph Bel­
lamy (1719-1790)i The Man and His Work," (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Boston University, 1971), and Tyron Edwards, 
"Memoir," The Works of Joseph Bellamy, vol. 1 (Bostoni The 
Doctrinal Tract and Book Society , 1853), and William B. 
Sprague, Annals of the American Pulpit, vol. 1 (New Yorki 
Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969), PP. ^04-^14.
13^
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mained, until his death, the strongest influence upon 
his theological thought. After reading at Northampton 
for about one year, Bellamy was licensed to preach by 
the New Haven East Association of Ministers on May 31t 
1737. The following year, in November, he accepted a 
temporary call from Bethlem, Connecticut? that call be­
came permanent on February 28, 17^0, and ordination fol­
lowed that spring.^ Bellamy occupied the pulpit of the 
Bethlem Church for the next fifty years.
In the year of his ordination, the revival swept 
through the New England village of Bethlem and lasted 
until the summer of 17^-1.^ The evangelical fervor, spur­
red by the presence of George Whitefield, the Grand Itin­
erant, in the Connecticut Valley, overtook the young 
preacher. Bellamy followed Whitefleld's example, and for 
nearly two years, stumped Connecticut, Massachusetts, New 
York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.^ Often he would
2Anderson, Joseph Bellamy, p. 132, and p. 181, and 
Edwards., Memoir, p. viii.
3Anderson, Joseph Bellamy, p. 193.
^Itineracy was a new phenomena in New England that . 
the revival spawned, and was in turn spurred by it. Before 
the Great Awakening, ministers ventured beyond their pul­
pit only upon invitation from another congregation. Itin­
erant preachers ignored, the contractual relationship be­
tween a minister and his congregation, and preached in 
fields, in the commons, as well as in churches. Ibid.,
PP. 329-331.
136
preach several times on the same day from different pul­
pits. Bellamy was a powerful preacher— his pulpit style 
and ability exceeded that of Jonathan Edwards' and, ac­
cording to some contemporaries, surpassed even those of 
George Whitefleld's.̂
Bellamy and his fellow itinerants, Benjamin Pom­
eroy, Eleazar Wheelock, Jonathan Parsons, John Graham, 
and Jedidiah Mills, occupied a moderate position in the 
revival experience. They separated themselves from the 
enthusiastic lay exhorters, like James Davenport and 
Andrew Croswell, who had stimulated the negative reaction 
to the revival and to experiential religion. Bellamy saw 
these radical new lights spreading a "fanatical and cen­
sorious spirit, which seemed to put in Jeopardy the best 
interests of the church,"^ Their evangelizing fostered 
pride, ignorance, and spiritual quackery that moved Bel­
lamy to end his itineracy.? In 1?42, he returned to his 
flock Bethlem, and initiated a program for preparing 
young men for the ministry. Bellamy led his students 
away from the "errors" of enthusiasm, into careful, system­
atic theology by reading, conversing, and writing upon the
5lbld., p, 195.
^Bellamy, quoted in Sprague, Annals of American Pul- 
£it, p. 405.
?Edwards, Memoir, p. xl.
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important doctrinal questions. By this method, he empha­
sized experimental and practical religion, and retained 
the proper spirit of the Great Awakening. He probably 
directed more student's theological studies than any 
other divine in New England at this time, and consequently 
exerted his personal influence over the theology of the 
succeeding generation.®
Joseph Bellamy, in his writings that followed the 
Great Awakening, focused upon the radical new lights, or 
"refined Antinomians,"9 that appeared during the revival. 
These radicals preached a salvation by faith and depen­
dence upon God's grace that Bellamy equated with the Anti- 
nomian heresy prevalent in Boston in the l630's. Like 
their predecessors, the "refined Antinomians" held a false 
conception of the sacrifice that Jesus had madet Christ 
satisfied the entire obligation of the elect, so that 
nothing more was required of them than their assurance of 
personal salvation. Such preaching, he argued, emphasized 
a self-righteous grace that endangered true piety and ex­
periential religion. Puritan doctrine denied that man
8Ibld.. p. lvii.
^Bellamy coined the phrase "refined Antinomians" in 
his attack upon the "false piety" expressed by Andrew Cros- 
well. See Bellamy's tract entitled A Blow at the Root of 
the Refined Antlnomlanlsm of the Present Age (Boston's sT 
Kneeland, 1763).
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could ever hold such assurancej rather man lived in igno­
rance of his actual future state. These new Antinomians 
misrepresented the true nature of religion and the gospel 
scheme of salvation.
Hence it is on the one hand that Arminian, 
Neonomian, and Pelagian errors have taken 
their rise and the Antinomian on the other.
Wrong notions of God lie at the bottom; and 
then wrong notions of the law; and then 
wrong notions of religion in generali and 
all originally proceed and grow up out of 
the wrong temper of men's minds.
Bellamy did not ignore the threat Latitudinarianism posed
for orthodoxy, but reacted more strongly to the radical
new lights, and the danger they presented to revivalism
1 1and emotional religion. He reflected this concern in 
nearly all of the doctrinal and controversial works he 
published in the two decades following the Great Awaken­
ing. Fear of this radical threat modified his essentially 
Edwardsean Calvinism into a more optimistic theology,
Bellamy was not an original theologian, but pri­
marily an interpreter of Edwardsean thought. He began his
Joseph Bellamy, True Religion Delineated; or Ex­
perimental Religion, as Distinguished from Formality on 
the one hand, and Enthusiasm on the other, set in a scrip­
tural and a Rational light (Bostont S. Kneeland, 1750), 
p. 68.
^Bellamy's objections against the new light radi­
cals were not unique. Jonathan Edwards addressed the same 
problem in identifying true religion in Religious Affec- 
tions and True Grace, Distinguished from the Experience 
S F ^ v i l s . ------------ --------- -------------------
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study of theology under Edwards' Influence, and the 
master-pupil relationship continued after Edwards' death. 
Their correspondence began in January, 17^1» and illus­
trated their warm friendship and Bellamy's respect and 
reliance upon his former teacher. They shared ideas, 
letters, and books; each sought the other's suggestions 
and approval for their major doctrinal works.*2 In 1750, 
when Bellamy finished True Religion Delineated, he sent 
the manuscript to Edwards for comment. The latter re­
sponded with hearty approval, and wrote a preface declar­
ing the importance of this book, as false piety had ob­
structed revivals in religion since the Reformation.^
True Religion Delineated, the cornerstone of 
Bellamy's interpretation of the new theology, was a gen­
eral defense of Puritan covenant theology, Bellamy asked 
rhetorically, what was true religion, and answered that 
it was both an understanding and a conformity to the law 
and to the g o s p e l . H e  divided the treatise into two 
discourses to discuss essentially four issues; the being 
of God, the law of God, the ruin of man, and the salvation
12Anderson, Joseph Bellamy, p. 27^, and Stanley T. 
Williams, Six Letters From Jonathan Edwards to Joseph 
Bellamy, p. 231.
■ ^ J o n a t h a n  Edwards, "Preface," True Religion Delin­
eated , p. ii.
^Bellamy, True Religion Delineated, p. 2.
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of man.1-* The first discourse demonstrated the reason­
ableness of God and God's law, and the second demonstrated 
that covenant theology conformed exactly to the gospel 
and to’reason, Bellamy intended this treatise to be theo­
logically constructive, rather than controversial.1^ He 
did, however, challenge Arminian and Antinomian errors in 
understanding God's law and their failure to conform to 
the gospel,
Bellamy's search of the scriptures uncovered in
Matthew 22i37-39* the only law that God gave to man*
Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy 
heart, and with all thy soul, and with all 
thy mind...and the second is like unto it, 
thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.
He stated that Adam's violation of this commandment caused
mankind's fall, and Christ's completion established the
new covenant of grace, God's law could not have changed
between the fall of mankind and Christ's atonement* the
law was as infinite and unchangeable as God Himself. To
change the law required a change in the nature of God, an
idea that Bellamy held too impossible to suppose,1?
Bellamy deviated slightly from Puritan orthodoxy in his
l^Anderson, Joseph Bellamy, p. 692.
l^Frank Hugh Foster, Genetic History of New England 
Theology (New York* Russell and Russell, 1963)1 p. 108.
1?Bellamy., True Religion Delineated, pp. 63-64.
1^1
interpretation of the being of God. God was as absolute 
and as infinite for Bellamy as for traditional Puritan­
ism, but He could neither be arbitrary nor unreasonable. 
God's law commanded men to love Him with all their hearts, 
souls, and minds, but did not demand any absolute stan­
dard of conformity for all men. His law accepted the 
natural variance in men's abilities, and therefore, placed 
perfect obedience to that law within the abilities of all 
men.l® Bellamy here demonstrated the fundamental shift 
from the scholastic view Of man to that held in the eigh­
teenth century. He witnessed the dignity of the individ­
ual, with distinct abilities and differences, and adapted 
God's law to this conception.
Throughout the treatise, Bellamy referred to God 
as the moral governor of the world, rather than God the 
sovereign or God the judge. The term "moral governor" 
moderated between these extremes} God determined and con­
stituted the law absolutely, because the nature of the 
law and the being of God demanded it. Only an infinite, 
all-powerful being could establish an Infinite law beyond 
the limitations of the finite creature.
l®"And it is plainly the case, that all mankind, 
as to their natural capabilities, are capable of a per­
fect conformity to the law, from this, that when sinners 
are converted they have no new natural faculties, though 
they have a new temper." Ibid.. p. 99.
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God. knows infinitely the best what to do with 
what he has, that there is no motive from with­
out to excite him to act, it is infinitely fit 
he should be left to himself, to act according 
to his own discretion,19
On the other hand, Arminians insisted that God act only 
as a judge— to judge individuals according to their merits, 
rather than hold their future state dependent upon an ab­
solute decree. Dr. Samuel Johnson referred to God as the 
"moral governor" as well, but connoted only God's judge­
ship.^® Jonathan Edwards' sovereignty of God matched 
the traditional Calvinist view, and held that God acted 
according to his absolute decree.^1 Bellamy's position 
stood midway between these two viewsi God established the 
law absolutely, but judged man's performance to the law 
according to his individual abilities.
Bellamy reflected the traditional Puritan position 
that God acted sovereignly because of His infinite abil­
ity and foresight. Yet, "moral governor" tempered this 
traditional view, so that God could not act either arbi­
trary or unreasonably; therefore, sin, or the violation 
God's infinite law, was an infinite evil and deserved 
eternal damnation. Man sinned by refusing to love God 
with all his heart, mind, and soul; this refusal was en-
19Ibld.. p. 37.
2QSupra. p. 35. 2*Supra, pp. 94-95*
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tirely voluntary and did not stem from any polluted nature 
or inability of man to conform to the law.22 Damnation, 
then, was not an arbitrary punishment, but one levied by 
a reasonable God. God's infinite being required that He 
act absolutely, but likewise His infinite reason demanded 
that He not contradict reason.
In the second discourse, Bellamy applied the rea­
sonableness of God and God's law to those doctrinal ques­
tions connected with covenant theology. He maintained 
the federal relationship of Adam and Christ as the physi­
cal and spiritual heads of mankind, and consequently the 
doctrines of original sin and salvation by faith alone. 
However, he did not retain the traditional, Augustinian 
imputation of sin, passing from the body of Adam to his 
posterity through his polluted seed. Man, according to 
Bellamy, sinned voluntarily, following the free, sponta­
neous inclinations of his heart. Man did derive a pol­
luted nature from Adam, mankind's legal representative, 
but that legal guilt did not restrict man’s ability to 
conform to God's law.
Now it is true, we did not personally rise in 
rebellion against God in that first transgres­
sion, but he who did do it was our representa­
tive. We are members of the community he acted 
for, and God considers us as suchj and there-
22Bellamy, True Religion Delineated, p. 106.
Iii4
fore looks upon us as being legally guilty.
Arminians and liberal Puritans denied the federal 
nature of Adam as man's representative, because those that 
he represented did not determine his selection. They ar­
gued that mankind could not be legally responsible for 
the actions of an agent determined by an absolute decree, 
without free c h o i c e . B e l l a m y  countered this view, 
stating that God had as much freedom and right to legally 
appoint Adam the physical head of mankind as He did to 
appoint Christ, or the second Adam as the spiritual head.
If God could not appoint the first, then, reasonably, He 
could not appoint the s e c o n d . A g a i n ,  Bellamy emphasized 
both the absolute and reasonable nature of Godj He acted 
with divine authority, but His actions conformed to rea­
son. Bellamy argued the necessity of the federal relation­
ship, so that Christ completed the same law that Adam had 
violated. Federal theology, then, maintained the cor­
rect perspective of the nature of sin, the performance by 
Christ, and the promised salvation through grace. Both 
Arminians and Antinomians lost this necessary perspective,
23Ibld.. p. 256.
2^Supra, pp. 89» 93» and p,101, for Daniel Whitby's 
and John Taylor's discussion of the necessity of man's vo­
lition in moral agency.
^ B e l l a m y ,  True Religion Delineated, p. 264.
145
and therefore, did not understand either the true nature 
of God, or of religion.
The first covenant between God and Adam still ex­
isted after the fall and needed to be fulfilled. God's 
law was infinite and unchangeable! man's obligation to 
love God was the same after Adam's fall, as after Christ's 
performance as man's surety, Bellamy stated that both 
Arminians and Antinomians misunderstood the necessity of 
God's great sacrifice! the former saw the abatement of 
the law and Christ's satisfaction for their imperfections, 
and the latter, Christ's dying for them in particular, 
resulting in their absolute election.2^ Neither heret­
ical group understood the actual need for Christ's atone­
ment. His performance proved that God's law was justj 
His satisfaction of the justice of the law magnified the 
evil nature of sin, and made the law honorable. Christ 
did not abate the law, but established it, and disclosed 
the means for sinners to turn from sin towards God.2?
In True Religion Delineated, Bellamy was particu­
larly concerned over the Antinomian tendencies of the 
new light radicals' view of the atonement. They consid­




When Christ upon the Cross said, it is fin­
ished he then paid the whole debt of the elect, 
and saw the book crost /closed/, whereby all 
their sins were actually blotted out and for­given. 28
This Antlnomian view was without basis in the gospel, said
Bellamy. The sacrifice of Christ did not merely open the
salvation to the elect, but opened a wide door for the
exercise and display of divine mercy.
Christ's merit lays the foundation for a gen­
eral resurrection, and all that believe and 
repent shall be raised up to Glory and com- 
pleat blessedness, and all that die in sin 
shall be raised up to shame and compleat mis­
ery, 30
At this point in the treatise, Bellamy departed signifi­
cantly from Edwards and from traditional Puritanism, by 
postulating a general call for the redemption of mankind. 
Edwards, while not maintaining strictly the Calvinist 
doctrine of predestination31, did confine redemption to 
God's elect, Bellamy, in responding to the new light 
radicals, stated that the law posited by God and completed 
by His son, did not reasonably exclude any man's perfor­
mance should he voluntarily choose to follow Christ's ex­
ample. Christ's performance demonstrated the means to 
salvation— total commitment of heart, mind and soul to 
God— without restriction to any portion of mankind.
28Ibid., p. 336. 29ibld.. p. 344.
3°ibid.. p. 364. 31supra. p. 128,
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Bellamy's general call placed salvation within the 
abilities of all men and advanced the role volition played 
in either salvation or damnation. But his general redemp­
tion differed substantially from the universal redemption 
demanded by John Beach, Samuel Johnson, and other Armin- 
ians. Bellamy stated that salvation was totally by grace—  
Puritan saving grace, not common, universal, or general 
grace given to all mankind,32 His salvation scheme still 
required election, as man needed the proper temper of mind 
(saving grace) to perform the only works required by God's 
.lawi faith in Jesus Christ and love for God above love 
for self.
Bellamy's treatise defended traditional Puritan 
doctrine, but his demands for the reasonableness of God 
and of the gospel tempered the pessimism and restrictlve*- 
ness of man's future state. God was not an arbitrary or 
vengeful tyrant, but the promulgator, through His infinite 
wisdom, of the best possible world order. Bellamy offered 
a rather optimistic scheme within the confines of Puritan 
doctrine, but he retained one major obstruction to the 
encouragement of all m e m  the great punishment mankind 
deserved for Adam's original sin. He had denied the 
actual pollution of this sin, but substituted a legal
32supra, pp, 39-40,
1^8
guilt that was no less damning for Adam*s posterity.
Man's tainted nature consisted of a temper or state of 
mind that turned man from God toward sin. Man was not 
so much bathed in sin, as he was wont to sin by his own 
natural inclinations.33 Preceding from corrupt motives, 
man after the fall could not perform holy and righteous 
acts. Bellamy's legal guilt and Puritan actual guilt 
had the same effectj without the saving experience of 
God's grace, mankind could not complete God's law and 
gain salvation,3^
Because of Bellamy's evangelical position, he re­
tained the doctrine of original sin. Genuine repentance 
required the sinner's knowledge of the infinite evil that 
sin presented to God, and that he justly deserved damna­
tion and God's wrath. Man could not understand the whole 
of God's plan or the great sacrifice that Christ had 
made unless he opened his heart and mind to the evil of 
sin. The saving experience was not as the Antinomians 
claimed, the realization that God had saved them speci­
fically, but the understanding of their enormous personal 
guilt for their depravity. The nonrepentant sinner, 
when confronted with the reality of his future state,
33Bellamy, True Religion Delineated, p. 152,
3^lbld.. p. 256.
1^9
would curse and blame God wrongly for his condition. 
Whereas the truly repentant sinner would humble himself 
before God and praise His beauty and purity.35
God had allowed the entrance of sin into the world 
for some greater purpose than simply the damnation of 
part of mankind., Bellamy expanded upon this theme on 
Hay 30, 17531 when he preached The Great Evil of Sin, As 
Committed Against God, before the Consociation of Litch­
field County, He repeated the hateful nature of sin to 
God; sinners broke God's law, but more importantly, they 
went against the very nature of God.
All sin is forbidden by His authority; and 
therefore every act of sin is considered 
as an act of rebellion against the Lord, , 
and sinners have the character of rebels.3°
As in True Religion Delineated, he described sin as a 
means to true evangelical repentance. Sin, the voluntary 
action of man against God, was Inimical to Him, yet it 
served God's greater purposes and aided in the determin­
ation of His elect. Without sin, man could not clearly 
understand the nature and beauty of God and the deprav­
ity of man. Realization of the nature of sin "immediately 
affects the heart with sorrow, and humbles and abases the
35ibid.. p. ^5» and passim,
36Joseph Bellamy, "The Great Evil of Sin, As Com­
mitted Against God," The Works of Joseph Bellamy, Tyron 
Edwards, editor, vol.T {Boston1 The Doctrinal Tract 
and Book Society, 1853), p. -̂69.
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soul before the L o r d . "37 Only through sin did G o d  reveal 
to man any understanding of the divine plan.
In both the sermon and the larger treatise, Bellamy 
sidestepped an important issue raised by the liberal Puri­
tans. If God hated sin, because it violated His law, 
authority, and government, then why did He not merely 
forbid sin? The liberals posed this query to the ortho­
dox position which, like Bellamy's, had not explained the 
presence of sin in a world dominated by an all-powerful 
God, unless He had willed men to sin. Bellamy admitted 
that God had the authority to forbid sin and thus insure 
the salvation of all men, but he stated that the presence 
of sin must better serve the divine plan. He explained 
that God's scheme, as revealed in the scriptures, pointed 
to "some greater good than human happiness."38 "He judged 
it best to permit the Angels to sin and man to fall, and 
so let misery enter into His dominion," because the con­
sequences of sin contributed to purposes unknowable to 
the finite creature.39 Bellamy described only vaguely 
how sin benefitted the divine plan, asserting that the 
answer was beyond man's understanding. This response was
37ibid., pp. 463-^64,
38Bellamy, True Religion Delineated, p. and
passim.
39ibid. . PP. ^3-^.
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inadequate in an age celebrating human reason, and, in 
light of Bellamy's demands that God act reasonably, the 
mystery of God's permission of sin seemed incongruous.
Notwithstanding this mystery, Bellamy's True Reli­
gion Delineated received wide acceptance throughout the 
colonies, in England, and in Scotland, Jonathan Edwards, 
after giving the manuscript his explicit approval, sent 
a copy to John Erskine^0 in Scotland, where it was sub­
sequently reprinted. In 1752, Samuel Davies, the•new 
light leader in Virginia, wrote Bellamy that in his colony 
the treatise was widely read and circulated. William B. 
Sprague, writing a century later, wrote:
With the single exception of Edwards' book 
on the Beligious Affections, perhaps no book 
in the language, on the same general subject, 
has been more widely known, or more highly 
and generally prized.^1
And in this century, Edwin S. Gaustad, when referring to
its circulation, called it "the Pilgrim's Progress of New
£ipEngland." * An important reason for the agreement of
^°John.Erskine (1721-1801), Scottish minister at 
Culross and later Edinburgh, was a correspondent of many 
of the New Divinity leaders. Bellamy and Erskine corre­
sponded for over thirty-five years, frequently exchanging 
books of common interest.
^Sprague, Annals of the American Pulpit, p. 405.
^2Edwin S. Gaustad, "The Theological Effects of the 
Great Awakening," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
vol. 40 (1953-195*0, P. 697. 1
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these assessments lay In the nature of the treatise. Like 
his teacher's system of theology, Bellamy presented basi­
cally a strict Calvinist interpretation. He had, however, 
tempered the absolute determinism of God's sovereignty 
and man's redemption, and elevated human dignity in the 
gospel scheme. He described God as the moral governor of 
the world and demanded that He act reasonably and argued 
that salvation was not restricted, but open to the abil­
ities of all men. He brought an essentially pessimistic 
doctrine into line with the eighteenth century.
In 1758, Bellamy defended the role of original sin 
in Puritan redemptive scheme, during the controversy be­
tween Samuel Webster and Peter Clark that had begun the 
previous year. His reply to Webster asserted God's sov­
ereignty and man's legal guilt for Adam’s s i n . Realiz­
ing that the liberals were, avoiding the major issues of 
the controversy, he published Four Sermons on the Wisdom 
of God in the Permission of Sin in the same year as his 
letter to Webster. In these sermons, Bellamy explained 
more completely why an omnipotent, absolute sovereign, 
who hated sin, permitted man to violate His law. First,
he answered the Arminian claims that the Puritan God
LLfore-ordained sin , and second, demonstrated that God's
^ Supra, pp. 115-116,
153
permission of sin occasioned the greatest happiness and 
virtue in the world. In this manner, Bellamy converted 
one of the most hopeless doctrines in traditional Puri­
tanism into one that promised greater felicity for the 
whole of mankind, than if God had absolutely forbidden 
sin.
In disputing the Arminian claims against the Puri­
tan God, Bellamy borrowed heavily from Edwards' treatise
bn the Freedom of the Will. Bellamy, like Edwards, in­
sisted that God's permission conformed perfectly to reason, 
divine reason that was infinitely superior to human reason. 
Man could see the wisdom of God's actions only through 
hindsight.. The Bible aptly chronicled the inability of 
man to decipher God's plan prior to its completion. In 
Genesis 50*20, Joseph answered his brothers, "But as for 
you, ye thought evil against me 1 but God meant it unto 
good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much 
people a l i v e . G o d  permitted Joseph's brothers to sell 
him into slavery, an act of evil intention, for without 
the commission of that sin, Joseph would not have risen 
to the governorship of Egypt. God permitted a sinful act,
^Foster, Genetic History of New England, p. 19.
^Edwards used the same biblical passage in Freedom
of the' Will in a similar manner to describe the permission
of sin. Supra, pp. 93-9^«
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and through that act Increasedi
the belief of the being and perfection of 
God and of His government of the world} and 
to give him an affecting, ravishing sense of 
the holiness, wisdom, goodness, power, and 
faithfulness of the God of A b r a h a m . 46
The passage from Genesis demonstrated that the permission 
of sin did not lessen the great evil of sin. The act of 
Joseph's brothers was still hateful to God, but worked 
greater good than if God had denied its commission.
Because God turned the sin into benefit for mankind, the 
executors of sin deserved no less God's complete wrath 
and damnation. Further, human reason could not under­
stand the beneficial effects of that permission until 
the act was completed; God's ultimate purpose remained 
hidden from the finite creature until He chose to reveal
r
it.
In True Religion Delineated, Bellamy stated that 
God had some higher objective for the world than human 
happiness, and that the permission of sin aided, rather 
than hindered the completion of that g o a l . T h e  story 
of Joseph in Genesis was only one example of the frustra­
tion of human happiness for some higher purpose, not imme-
Joseph Bellamy, Four Sermons on the Wisdom of God 
in the Permission of Sin (Bostont S. Kneeland, 1758), pp.
T f W .
^Bellamy, .True Religion Delineated, p. 42.
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diately knowable to man. The first five books of Moses 
demonstrated similar frustrations! the evil committed 
against the Israelites by Pharaoh, the destruction of 
Pharaoh's army in the Red Sea, and the hardships of the 
forty year trek to Palestine. In each case mankind could 
perceive only misery and not God's higher'intention, be­
cause human reasoning was limited to those parts of the 
divine plan already revealed. Thus, man could visualize 
the wisdom of the whole of God's plan only through the 
nature of those revealed parts. If they conformed to 
reason and demonstrated God's divine wisdom, as in the 
examples Bellamy cited, then one could conclude that the 
whole must conform in the same manner.^®
God, by allowing sin, clearly displayed His power 
and glory before man, and furthered man's knowledge of 
the divine system. Bellamy agreed that God could have 
exposed His scheme through revelation, but knowledge ob­
tained in that manner would not have had the desired ef­
fect, "Nothing could teach them like experience."^ Sin, 
and its corresponding misery, disclosed explicitly the 
purity and beauty of God and the baseness of mankind, and 
revealed God's right to command and man's obligation to
^Bellamy, The Wisdom of God, p. 106, 
^9lbid.. P. 138.
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obey. As man’s knowledge of God increased, he experi­
enced an elevation of humility, holiness, and h a p p i n e s s . 50 
Thus, the experience of sin, while revealing man’s de­
pravity and desert of damnation, actually benefitted 
mankind and raised the general level of happiness in the 
world. Bellamy acknowledged that to sinful man, the per­
mission of sin appeared dark and gloomy rather than 
glorious and beautiful. However, man's view of God was 
imperfect, and wicked men viewed only the evil and wick­
edness in God’s acts, not their beauty and wisdom. They 
saw only "the wanton destruction of Pharaoh rather than 
the greater good in saving Israel and exposing God’s 
divine power. "-51 God's elect, on the other hand* gained 
a clearer vision of God's perfection through the presence 
of sin, than possible in a sinless world.
The apostasy of the angels and man has given 
the moral governor of the universe an oppor­
tunity to set all his moral perfections in 
the clearest and most striking point of light; 
and, as it were, to open all His heart to the 
view of finite intellegence.52
Bellamy stated that one could best explain the 
beneficial effects of God's permission of sin by compar­
ing the relative value of good in a world containing sin,
/
5°ibld., p. 153.
^1Ibld., pp. 111-112. 
52Ibld.« p. 159.
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and one without sin. He concluded that the permission 
of sin, including the damnation of a portion of mankind, 
had two distinct advantages. First, only through sin, 
could man realize the power and the glory of God by 
actual experience. By suffering under God's power and 
witnessing His divine justice in the treatment of sin, 
man clearly obtained an understanding of God's design 
and perfection. Revelation or logic could not have pro­
duced the same results as God's touching man's very 
soul.33 The permission of sin, then, was the best pos­
sible means for God to uncover or expose His intentions 
to the world, and to bring honor and glory to Himself. 
Secondly,, the damnation of part of mankind created greater 
happiness among those that were saved. The regenerate, 
realizing the great difference between man's moral state 
and God's, fell upon their knees and honored God for His 
perfections. Damnation expanded God's glory and concomi­
tantly, human happiness and holiness.
Bellamy included a rather specious statistical 
argument demonstrating the greater good resulting from 
God's permission of sin. He supposed that if the entrance 
of sin damned one-third of mankind, and if by that act 
the relative level of holiness and happiness in the two-
53ibid., p. 135» and p. 153.
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thirds saved increased a hundred-fold, and the misery of 
the damned decreased by a like amount, then one could 
readily visualize the advantage that sin created. In a 
world unstimulated by sin, the relative value of happiness 
remained at a constant value of three (one degree of hap­
piness per individual), while in a world stimulated by 
sin, the value of those saved increased by two hundred, 
and the misery of the one-third damned increased by one 
hundred, plus the loss of the one degree of happiness 
that the damned originally had. Thus, in this abstraction, 
the presence of sin gave mankind a clear ninety-nine de­
grees improvement, even though one-third of the world 
received damnation. Stated slightly differently, a world' 
containing sin held thirty-three times as much happiness 
and holiness than in one not stimulated by sin.^
Bellamy overstepped his conclusions with this 
quantitative approach,; the figures were arbitrary and he 
had attempted to quantify something that he even admitted 
was beyond man's complete understanding. However, such a 
demonstration Indicated the faith of the age in mathemat­
ical truths. While the demonstration smacked of counting 
angels, it revealed confidence in science and mathematics 
to explain those things beyond human experience. For
5^ibld. . p. 18̂ -n.
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Bellamy's purposes, the effort did. demonstrate God's 
"proposing the best ends, and choosing the best means
for their accomplishment."^
No distinction was made, in these sermons or 
Bellamy's earlier treatise, between man's first sin and 
all subsequent sins. In all cases, sin was voluntary 
and resulted from God's permission, or "merely not hinder­
ing the activity of sin."-^ Adam's first sin was not pre­
determined, any more than later sinful acts, but all 
followed the free inclinations of the individual. Bellamy's 
Four Sermons on the Wisdom of God in the Permission of Sin, 
complemented his earlier optimistic proposals on man's 
salvation. Bellamy's conclusions conformed to the rea­
sonable philosopies of the Enlightenment, and his Wisdom 
of God had a distinctly Leibnitzian flavor. ^  God pro­
posed the best possible ends for the world, and chose the 
best means for their accomplishment. For Bellamy, the 
permission of sin best demonstrated those means, and dis­
played God's infinite justice and mercy, and stimulated 
honor and worship to Him in the best of all possible man-
55ibid.. p. 154.
56Ibid., p. 74.
=>7-"Foster, Genetic History of New England, p. 120. 
Foster believes that Bellamy had read Leibnitz before 
1759, although there is no record that he had.
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ners.
Bellamy had departed significantly from his ' 
teacher in the sermons on the permission of sin. Edwards 
had insisted that God’s last end in the creation of the 
world was the glory of God and not the happiness of man,^ 
Bellamy concluded that these ends were not mutually ex-i
elusive, for the glorification of God stimulated human 
happiness. In any case, Bellamy's more optimistic scheme 
provoked response from the more traditional Puritan posi­
tion. Samuel Moody published anonymously An Attempt to 
Point out the Fatal and Pernicious Consequences of the 
Rev. Mr. Joseph Bellamy's Doctrines in 1759.*^ Moody 
charged that Bellamy was "being overly curious and posi­
tive in doctrines and dispensations obtuse and mysteri­
ous."^0 He, like most earlier Puritans, was content to 
allow God alone understanding of some parts of His divine 
plan. Moody was more willing to accept Armlnian free will
5%aroutanian, Piety Versus Morallsm, p. 34,
^^Samuel Moody (1726-1795)» the first master of the 
Dummer Academy, received his B.A. from Harvard in 1746 and 
M.A. three years later. Moody entered the ministry, but 
by 1759, had found that vocation unsuitable. On February 
27, 1763, he became the master of the Dummer "Free Grammar 
School." Shipton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates, vol. 12, pp. 
48-50.
^°Samuel Moody, An Attempt to Point out the Fatal 
and Pernicious Consequences of the Reverend Mr. Joseph . 
Bellamy's Doctrines- (Boston, 1759), p. 6 .
l6l
than Bellamy's permission!
I conceive, with safety and certainty that 
all we can affirm with regard to sin, is, 
that it is in the world;— that God is holy;—  
hates sin— cannot be the author of it; and 
therefore the creature must. And is this 
not enough?6l
Bellamy's scheme, to Moody, overbalanced sin in relation 
to good; one might assume that the earth, complete with 
sin,was more holy and happier than heaven without it.
Also, one could likewise assume, from Bellamy's sermons, 
that sinners advanced the glory of God and general good 
in the world to a greater degree than did the most eminent 
saints, "Is the greater the moral evil, the greater the 
moral good?"^2 Thus Bellamy had placed God in a more un­
favorable light, than he had Satan, Moody argued that if 
God allowed sin because it advanced His glory and univer­
sal good, then He must necessarily will and choose sin 
to enter into the world. And, further, Satan, the author 
ov evil, became the primary instrument for advancing God's 
honor and perfection.^
Moody had misrepresented Bellamy's sermons, had 
twisted Bellamy’s points to serve his own ends, and had 





Bellamy had not argued that the earth was holler than 
heaven, hut that the presence of sin increased the glory 
of God In a manner not possible without it. Secondly, 
sinners had not advanced the glory of God, but the saints, 
in viewing God's perfection, praised God and worship Him. 
The action of the saints was occasioned by the presence 
of sin. Further, Moody had misunderstood permission, and 
insisted that God's permission required His activity.
He argued that Bellamy's scheme made God the author of. 
sin, and by attempting to explain things beyond human 
reason, blasphemed God. Better that man accepted sin as 
a result of the free will of man, than to create an odious 
God as Bellamy had d o n e . ^
4
Bellamy answered Moody’s Attempt the following 
year, concentrating on the nature of God's permission.
Moody had claimed that Bellamy created a false view of the 
nature of sini sin was a benefit and not the great evil 
committed against God. Moody argued that sin was not a 
part of God's scheme, but only a device of the devil, 
Bellamy answered that if God had not permitted the entrance 
of sin into the world, then the devil caused man to sin 
over the objections of God. Moody's reluctance to allow 
the permission of sin dishonored God to a greater degree
6^Shipton, S1bley*s Harvard Graduates. vol. 12, p.
49.
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than did permission, Bellamy declared that the question 
between them was not who sinned, God or man, but why did 
the ’’holy and infinitely wise creator and governor of 
the world permit the creature to sin, when he could have 
easily .hindered it / ? y 66 j-f one admitted that sin was 
in the world, then one must explain its entrance over 
the divine will. Permission was the only reasonable means 
that sin could gain entrance, Bellamy turned to Genesis 
50*20, and stated that if God in this one Instance per­
mitted sin for wise and holy ends, then "it is at least 
possible, that He may have done so in all instances."^?
Bellamy's Four Sermons on the Wisdom of God also 
evoked the publication of a tract by Samuel Hopkins, an­
other student and associate of Jonathan Edwards.^8 Hopkins 
agreed with Bellamy that the permission of sin was the
occasion of great good. He claimed that every sin that
had taken place in the world had been overruled by God 
in order to answer some good end. "Sin is not in its own
nature such a thing, as that it cannot be improved by in-
66Ibld.. p. 68. 6?Ibld.. p. 51.
68°Samuel Hopkins, a major leader in the New Divin­
ity School, was at least as important as Bellamy in the 
modification of Edwardsean thought. Hopkins has not re­
ceived the same attention and detail here as Bellamy, pri­
marily because the majority of. Hopkins’ controversial and 
doctrinal work lay outside the time period of this inves­
tigation.
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finite wisdom to bring about some good."^9 Man could not 
just assume that God acted in this manner, but must de­
clare that in every instance, He acted precisely in this 
manner, "This is the way Christ bruises the serpent's 
head, viz. by bringing good out of evil,"?®
Hopkins' Sin, Through Divine Interposition consis­
ted of three sermons. In the first, he drew from the 
background established by Bellamy and Edwardsi God per­
mitted the occurance of sin in the world in order to 
create greater good. Hopkins' emphasis changed slightly 
from Bellamy's 5 God was more authoritarian, and actively 
drew good out of evil acts. Bellamy inferred that the 
benefit from sin required no active participation by God, 
and thus, did not deprive the sinner's freedom and liberty. 
Hopkins' God was not as passive and interferred with the 
results of sin after its commission. In the last two 
sermons, he tempered the advantage gained from the per­
mission of sin. He warned against encouraging sin for the
^Samuel Hopkins, Sin, Through Divine Interposition, 
An Advantage to the Universe, and yet this is no Excuse for 
Sin, or Encouragement to it". Illustrated and Proved (Bos- 
ton; 1758), p. 8 ,
?°This referred to Genesis 3?15. Man's original 
sin, inspired by Satan (the serpent) was turned to good by 
God; man fell, but by that fall, opened the way for Christ's 
redemption. Ibid., p. 14,
71Bellamy, Wisdom of God, p. 74.
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greater good, that would follow. The nature of sin was 
exceedingly criminal and dishonorable to God, so that 
even though it brought about good ends, the evil of sin 
had not diminished.
..Those instances of sin which have been the 
occasion of the greatest good, were at the 
same time very offensive and provoking to 
God, and brought his awful judgment on 
those who were guilty of it.73
Hopkins agreed that God's divine plan was optimistic, but
insisted that man did not share in the benefits of God's
optimism. The greater good reflected to God and not to
man. Bellamy's interpretation of the divine scheme was
more mechanical and guided by a reasonable God, while
Hopkins' maintained a more traditional conception of God's
sovereignty.
Bellamy re-interpreted Edwardsean thought to pre­
serve the balance between religion of the heart, and reli­
gion of the mind. When he left itineracy in 1742, he 
perceived the greatest threat to experiential religion 
arising from the radical new lights and their "refined 
Antinomian" doctrines. For the next two decades, he con­
sistently reacted to that threat. True Religion Delin­
eated . undoubtably the most important of his writings,
72nopkins, Sin Through Divine Interposition, pp.
■30-31. 73ibid., p. 26.
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sought to describe the balance between formalism (Armin- 
ianism) and enthusiasm (Antinomianism). More than any 
other new light leader, Bellamy sensed his median posi­
tion, and as a result, modified Edwardsean theology into 
a more optimistic promise for mankind.
By 1760, Bellamy had limited God*s' sovereignty, 
so that He could not act unreasonably, posited a general 
call for redemption, placed salvation within the reach 
of all men, and described the effects of original sin as 
a benefit and means to true piety. This optimistic 
scheme was an outgrowth, and not a rejection of traditional 
Puritan principles. He had maintained the fundamental 
doctrines of the Reformation, but had adapted them so that 




The Great Awakening in New England attempted to 
end the depersonalization of religion that had occurred 
in the previous half-century» As a reform movement* the 
Awakening sought the piety and spirituality of the Puri­
tan founders outside the institutional framework of the 
church. The reform was individual, operating on the 
heart of the sinner, revealing his natural depravity, and 
turning him toward the beauty and purity of God. This 
renewal, accepted initially as an outpouring of the spirit 
of God, received relatively little criticism for nearly 
two years, 1739 to 17^1 * before reform conflicted with 
the institution of the church over questions of itineracy 
and enthusiasm. Opposing views developed, created schism 
within the Puritan Church, and introduced a new phase of 
reform, the embodiment of the spirit of renewal into the 
doctrine and practice of the church. In the institutional 
phase of reform, three clearly discernible doctrinal 
groupings appeared. The moderate, or centrist position 
occupied by Dickinson, Edwards, and Bellamy, endeavored to
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preserve both the spirit of the revival and traditional 
Puritan doctrine. They conflicted with both, the liberal 
wing of the church and with the radical new lights, in 
seeking the tenuous balance between religion of the 
heart and religion of the mind.
The motivation of Jonathan Dickinson was precisely 
the same as that of Edwards and Bellamy. All three Puri­
tan divines had a deep personal involvement, in the revi­
val experience, and felt that their antagonists threat­
ened not only that single revival, but the entire Protes­
tant Reformation. Dickinson especially attacked the 
Anglican Arminians as apostates to popery. Their denial 
of the sovereignty of God, of the doctrines of justifica­
tion by faith alone, and the pollution of original sin, 
rejected the essential dogma of the Protestant Reformation, 
Dickinson defended these doctrinal positions in the lan­
guage of that Reformation, without regard to the differ­
ence in epistemology between Arminianism and traditional 
Puritanism. The logical systems were not at stake, but 
instead, the very principles of the Reformation. Further, 
Dickinson did not address his arguments to New England 
Congregationalists or Presbyterians, but to Anglicans—  
Anglicans who admitted their Arminianism. That he ignored 
the reasonableness of their arguments was understandable, 
for he felt the unified support of New England Puritanism
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sustaining him.
Between Dickinson's death in 17^7 and1Jonathan 
Edwards' publication of Freedom of the Will in 175^ and 
Original Sin in 31758* one could no longer presume unified 
support for traditional Puritan dogma. Many opposers of 
the revival now moved into open heterodoxy, supporting 
mild forms of Arminianism, Arianism, or Universalism.
They borrowed from the polemical assertions of the Eng­
lish divines, Daniel Whitby and John Taylor, against Cal­
vinism, and overbalancing religion of the mind. The tra­
ditional Puritan response to these heresies no longer 
sufficed; Lockean reasoning and Newtonian science had 
replaced older scholastic conceptions, so that religious 
questions, formerly withheld from human understanding, 
could not now reasonably remain hidden, Puritanism after 
1750 could not merely re-affirm the five articles of the 
Synod of Dort, but had to conform to the mood demanded by 
the eighteenth century.
Jonathan Edwards answered these needs of New Eng­
land Puritanism, Sydney E. Ahlstrom called him a "Dortian ' 
philosophe," because he fused the seminal ideas of the En­
lightenment with the major principles of the Reformed 
Church.1 He defended the sovereignty of God and man's
1Sydney E. Ahlstrom, "Theology in America 1 A Histor
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pollution from original sin and demonstrated that the 
Arminian scheme contradicted reasonable Lockean thought. 
Edwards did not attempt to posit an optimistic religious 
view in these treatises, but to re-establish traditional 
Puritan doctrine upon a modern basis. He directed his 
polemical attacks upon those English Arminians who favored 
an intellectualized religion, divorced from emotion.
With Edwards, ho contradiction arose between emotional 
and reasonable religion, for without touching the heart, 
religion lost its essential pietical spirit, and led to 
a sterile faith. Within Edwards' scheme, a unity existed 
between Enlightened thought and his redefined Calvinism,' 
a unity that strengthened the revival experience.
The New Divinity theologians, especially Joseph 
Bellamy, were not able to maintain the balance that 
their teacher had established. Edwards was involved 
primarily with the liberal or Arminian attack upon the 
centrist position. Even his treatise on Religious Af­
fections resulted from his controversy during the Great 
Awakening with Charles Chauncy, the liberal. Bellamy 
in True Religion Delineated, a treatise on the same sub­
ject which drew heavily from Edwards' work, reacted more
leal Survey," The Shaping of American Religion, edited by 
James Ward Smith and A. Leland Jameson (Princetoni Prin­
ceton University Press, 1961), pp. 2^5-2^6.
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strongly to the danger presented to orthodoxy by the 
radical new lights than by the Arminians, His unique re­
vival experience explained this fear. More than either 
Edwards or Dickinson, Bellamy reacted negatively to the 
excesses of the revival and left Itineracy because of the 
diffusion of false religion. These radicals overbalanced 
religion of the heart; salvation required only that man 
knew, from the emotional experience of conversion, that 
he was of the elect. Sanctification played no part in 
their "refined Antinomianism."
The impulse causing Bellamy to modify Edwardsean 
theology came from this threat that he perceived from 
the radical new lights. In 1750 in True Religion Delin­
eated. Bellamy described a general redemption, available 
to all men, in order to emphasize the importance of san­
ctification in the salvation scheme rather than justifi­
cation. The radicals had argued that Christ's atonement 
paid the elect's whole debt for Adam's and man's sins, 
and required no further duties. Bellamy argued that 
justification gave man only a new temper, so that he 
could turn from sin to God. Sanctification, the actual 
use of that new temper in the process of purification, 
was completed only in heaven. He tempered this call for 
a general atonement, stopping short of Arminianism, by 
Insisting that the change in man's disposition required
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the particular workings of saving grace, not common or
universal grace. However, even by qualifying the compass
of Christ's atonement, he offered a significant changei
This affirmation of a general atonement 
meant that the elect now were seen as those 
who chose God, and not those chosen by God 
in the sense that some were to be saved 
while others were to be damned.?
In this same treatise, Bellamy stated that God had 
some greater purpose in sin, than merely the damnation of 
some of mankind. Eight years later in The Wisdom of God 
in the Permission of Sin, he again modified Edwards to 
explicate that greater good. Sin was advantageous for 
the whole divine scheme, and benefited man more than if 
God had forbidden the entrance of sin into the world.
Sin was the best possible means for demonstrating God's 
glory and uncovering His grand design. Bellamy's mediation 
o-f Edwards' Calvinism moved away from those Dortian prin­
ciples that Edwards had preserved. Specifically, he. had 
modified man's total depravity and the limited nature of 
atonement outlined by the Synod of Dort in 1618.^
Bellamy's optimistic interpretation of man's first
?Anderson, Joseph Bellamy, p. 887.
-^Ahlstrom, Theology in America, p. 2k6. The five 
points included, besides total depravity and limited atone­
ment, unconditional election, irresistible grace, and the 
perseverance of the saints.
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sin differed substantially from that of Samuel Hopkins', 
especially with regard to the sovereignty of God. Again, 
Bellamy reacted more strongly to the opposition from the 
radical new lights, and softened God's sovereignty in 
order to increase man's role in damnation as he had in 
salvation. He expanded Jonathan Edwards' statements on 
God's permission of sin; man's free acts brought sin into 
the world, unhindered by God's agency. Hopkins, on the 
other hand, was more the "consistent Calvinist,"^ and 
pushed the absolute nature of God almost to the point of 
making God the. author of man's sins. Consequently, Hopkins 
did not describe the same benefit of sin to mankind that 
Bellamy did; God alone benefitted from the presence of 
evil in His divine plan.
Bellamy, in defending the spirit of revivalism, 
observed critics at both extremes of his moderate position. 
His ends were the same as Edwards' and Dickinson's, but 
his recognition of the danger from "refined Antinomianism" 
led him to reject much of the negative or pessimistic, 
dogma within the Puritan creed. He did not confine his 
concern only to this radical position. In the years that 
followed the publication of The Wisdom of God (1760 to 
1763), he became involved with Moses Mather, pastor of
^Ibld.. p. 256.
1?^
the church in Middlesex, over the nature of the covenant. 
Bellamy, like Edwards, sought to remove those obstructions 
to true piety and experimental religion, the Half-Way 
Covenant and Stoddardlsm. Both denigrated the sacraments 
of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, by opening their cele­
bration to the unconverted. In this controversy, Bellamy's 
opponent was one of the old light opposers to revivalism.
At the same time, he was also engaged in controversy 
with Andrew Croswell, a new light radical, over the nature 
and glory of Jesus Christ. Although these controversies 
led in different directions, Bellamy's goal was constanti 
to defend revivalsism and the true understanding of the 
gospel and the promises of God. Because he was truly in 
the middle, his Edwardseanism received greater modifica­
tion than that of other New Divinity theologians.
The impact of Bellamy's scheme of theology is more 
difficult to assess than to describe. His system of 
training students in theology, and the institution of the 
first "Sunday School" at Bethlem, must have given wide 
reception to his dogmatic religious views. He personally 
had trained at least sixty ministers, and when Hopkins, 
Nathaniel Emmons and Jonathan Edwards, Jr.5 are also con-
^Jonathan Edwards, Jr. was trained by Joseph Bel­
lamy at Bethlem, whereas Nathaniel Emmons had not trained 
under Edwards or his students; he was nonetheless a thor-
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sidered, the number of clerics trained by these four New 
Divinity leaders exceeded one hundred-fifty,.® Edmund S, 
Morgan stated "the New Divinity had a consistency and 
vigor that young intellectuals found challenging," and 
as a result by 1792 they had claimed one-half the pulpits 
in Connecticut, and an increasing number throughout New 
England.? The expansion of the. New'Divinity in Connect­
icut undoubtably reflected the personal influence of. 
Joseph Bellamy, "the Pope of Litchfield County,"®
Although the number of clerics converted by Bellamy 
and others was large, Morgan argued that their success was 
not matched among the populace at large. "Their sermons 
became complex, abstruse, metaphysical /and7 devoted to 
details of theology that the layman found incomprehensi­
ble."^ Their theology required a subtle mind and a deep 
religious motivation, so that they addressed their "fear-
ough-going Edwardsean. Hopkins and Bellamy were the more 
important New Divinity leaders, immediately after Edwards' 
death, but shared that leadership towards the end of the 
century.
£
Ahlstrom, Theology in America, p. 255.
?Edmund S. Morgan, "The American Revolution Consid­
ered as an Intellectual Movement," Paths of American 
Thought, edited by A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Morton 
White (Bostoni Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), p. 19.
8Ibid.. p. 18. 9Ibld., p. 20.
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less, intransigent, ridiculous brand of Calvinism” to
other bright young clerics, rather than to their congre- 
10gations. The alienation of the New Divinity minister 
from his congregation did not modify his doctrine; he 
was unwilling to appease the unconverted, in order to 
increase the size of his congregation.11
Morgan declared that this alienation explained the 
shift from the dominance of New England society by the 
clergy in 17^0, to control by statesmen in 1790. His 
assessment has more validity than that offered by Alan 
Heimert, who argued that no such shift occurred. The 
later described an unusual development on the American 
Revolutionary mind in the late 1750's, emanating from 
Bellamy's sermons on The Wisdom of God in the Permission 
of Sin and The Millenium. Heimert indicated that Bellamy's 
call for the enlistment of all men as volunteers in the 
church militant against the Antichrist aroused the revolu­
tionary fervor of the 1770's.12
10Edmund S. Morgan, The Gentile Puritan, A Life of 
Ezra Stiles. 1727-1795 (New Haveni Yale University Press, 
1966), p. 314.
I1Ibid.. p. 31^.
•^Alan Heimert, Religion and the American Mind 
(Cambridgej Harvard University Press, 1966). Heimert dis­
cussed the relationship between the church militant and 
the revolution, pp. 339-350.
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What had begun was the long process, to be 
completed neither in the Revolution nor even 
in 1800, of making men's wills the ultimate 
guarantor of the collective happiness and 
the general weIfare.13
Heimert overplayed the influence of religion on secular 
political science. The Enlightenment, an essentially 
secular intellectual movement, did not arise out of a 
change in New England theology, but rather stimulated the 
religious change that occurred in the 1750's and 1760's, 
The Wisdom of God had a more restricted appeal 
than True Religion Delineated, as the former was "complex, 
abstruse, and metaphysical." No solid indication exists 
that its influence extended beyond the 1760"s and, the 
controversy that had stimulated it. However, that was 
not the case with True Religion Delineated. In that 
treatise, Bellamy defended revivalism in extremely simple 
terms (merely man's love to God), and in a manner that 
was widely read and studied. Timothy Dwight, the New 
Divinity president of Yale College who succeeded Ezra 
Stiles in 1795* stated that during the Second Great Awak­
ening of 1802, Bellamy's treatise accelerated the spirit
1 If.of revival that swept through Yale. His most important
13ibid.. p. 350.
l^Tyron Edwards, Memoir of Joseph Bellamy, p. lxi.
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and longest lasting effect was defending revivalism and 
mediating Edwardsean theology to conform to the optimis­
tic demands of the eighteenth century.
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